MEMORANDUM

The Montreux Conference and the Soviet Union.

In amplification and extension of the Moscow Embassy's despatch No. 1764 of August 3, 1936, concerning the Montreux Conference and the Soviet participation therein, the following comment, based upon an examination of the official publication of the minutes of the Montreux Conference, is submitted for such interest as it may present. The publication under reference is entitled "Actes de la Conférence de Montreux concernant le régime des détroits, 22 juin - 20 juillet 1936", and is published by Editions A. Pedone, 13 rue Soufflot, Paris V^e; it was forwarded to the Department by the Embassy at Istanbul under cover of its despatch No. 209 of February 5, 1937. In this memorandum only those aspects of the Conference, not covered in the despatch from Moscow, are discussed - particularly those relating to the interpolations and arguments of the Soviet delegates during debates in both the plenary sessions of the Conference itself and the in camera meetings of the technical committee.

At the opening session of the Conference (June 22, 1936), Litvinov stated that he was prepared to participate in the negotiations for the purpose of placing the régime of the Straits into harmony with the interests of the security of Turkey and of assuring peace and tranquility to that region. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had a special interest in the problem by reason of its geographical situation and the lack of communication between the seas which bathe its littoral. He traced the

gradual

gradual break-up of the spirit of pacifism which was so characteristic of the immediate post-war period, and pointed to the warlike and aggressive spirit which typifies the present epoch. He intimated that the right of individual defense was not to be observed only in the abstract; one must of necessity adopt a different attitude with regard to this right when there are fears that it will be used deliberately to endanger the interests of other countries and for the purpose of aggression. The attitude to take when the revision of a treaty helps to maintain and reenforce peace is quite different from that which obtains when this revision provokes political perturbations, troubles international peace and tranquility or ends in the violation by force of the interests of other states. Litvinov concluded with the hope that the Conference would embark upon its work with the interests principally of Turkey and the Black Sea powers at heart.

At the session of June 23, the next day, Litvinov paid homage to the Turkish thesis that the Straits should in principle not be closed to ships of war of all powers. However, he emphasized that the Black Sea should, nevertheless, be considered a closed sea, but should not be compared to the great international canals and straits which connect open and free bodies of water. Apparently not unmindful of regional security he stated, "The more we limit the tonnage and the number of ships entering the Black Sea the greater will be security in this region of Europe and Asia; and if we create security in one part of the world, we will thereby render a great contribution to the general security." However, for the Black Sea powers

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he asked complete freedom of passage in and out of the Black Sea. The case of the Soviet Union was different, he insisted, in that it was absolutely imperative that unhampered liaison be maintained between the shipyards of the Baltic and Black Seas, and that naval units be transferred at will between them. The remilitarization of the Straits, he insisted, was an incontestable right of Turkey, as was the right of self defense. The League of Nations was not dead, he concluded; it will emerge from its present difficulties stronger than ever. Consequently, the interests of the League must never be forgotten, particularly when it becomes necessary for the League to send ships of war to assist the victim of an aggressor.

At the session of June 24, Litvinov proposed that Article 6 of the Turkish draft proposal (relating to the movement of warships in time of peace) be made applicable only to non-Black Sea powers, and that the prohibition against aircraft carriers be added to that of submarines. This in fact would have reserved complete freedom of action for Black Sea powers and presupposed a series of restrictions against non-Black Sea powers. Lord Stanhope, the British delegate, then interpolated that there were two fundamental principles of note in the Lausanne Treaty, namely freedom of passage through the Straits for the naval forces of all powers, and limitation on the size of fleets of non-Black Sea powers to the tonnage of the fleet of the strongest Black Sea power. There were therefore liberty of entrance into the Black Sea for all powers and security for the Black Sea powers in particular, - a general

reciprocity

reciprocity of principle on both sides. Security was the more certain in that it was elastic. It was now proposed, continued Lord Stanhope, that these principles be discarded. There was to be a pronounced difference of treatment in ingress and egress from the Black Sea for the two categories of powers.

Sato, the Japanese delegate, then interpolated to the effect that Japan was ready to make concessions provided that there were equality of treatment for Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. In rebuttal Litvinov insisted on special rights for the Soviet Union and for the abolition of aircraft carriers.

Later on, when the subject of security in both the Straits and the Black Sea came up, Litvinov took issue with other delegates, principally the British. The contention of the latter was that there were two questions to be decided: security between the Black and Mediterranean Seas, that is in the Straits, on the one hand, and security in the Black Sea on the other. Litvinov insisted that the two were closely bound together and were component parts of a single problem.

In connection with the notification preliminary to passage through the Straits, Litvinov was prepared to accede to the wishes of the Turkish delegate, provided that this be applicable only to non-Black Sea powers. The show-down between Litvinov and Lord Stanhope then became apparent: Litvinov for discrimination against non-Black Sea powers, Lord Stanhope for absolute equality of treatment. Litvinov maintained resolutely that there was no situation which could arise where a non-Black Sea power would find it

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necessary to send large battleships into the Black Sea, whereas for Black Sea powers it could easily happen that large ships be dispatched from the Black to the Mediterranean Seas. The argument finally settled on Article 6 and particularly on paragraphs (b) and (h) thereof. Under the former, non-Black Sea powers would be limited to 14,000 tons in passing through the Straits, and under the latter the same would apply to Black Sea powers. Litvinov's contention was that the security of the latter was as important a consideration as the security of Turkey, the one as dependent as the other upon the remilitarization of the Straits. To hold Black Sea powers to a fixed maximum in traversing the Straits would be to discriminate against them, and place them at a disadvantage in case of war; Black Sea powers should have full liberty of disposing of their armed forces as they choose.

In the discussion of paragraph (f) of Article 6, relating to the interdiction against the use of airplanes carried aboard warships, Litvinov asked that his original motion prohibiting the passage of aircraft carriers, be kept on the calendar.

In the discussion of Article 7, Litvinov proposed two amendments: first, that vessels of belligerents be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea, in order not to extend to the Black Sea a war which might be raging outside it; second, that if a Black and non-Black Sea power be at war, ships of the latter be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea except on the order of the League of Nations.

In the discussion of Article 13, Litvinov proposed that the whole convention enter into force after ratification by

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five members, that is one-half of the participants in the Conference.

After the interval of ten days between the Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the Conference, the British delegate, Lord Stanley, presented a new and revised project which was immediately adopted as a basis for discussion. If Litvinov was opposed to this British manoeuvre, he certainly did not show it, but accepted rather gracefully. He did insist that the original Turkish project be considered simultaneously with the new British project.

In the discussions concerning Article 6, Litvinov pretended to find a distinction in the conception of neutrality, that is, that a country could be neutral vis-à-vis Turkey but belligerent to another, hence the necessity for specifying "neutral vis-à-vis Turkey". President Bruce then stated that this could only arise if there should be two simultaneous wars, to which Litvinov responded that that was precisely his idea. The Rumanian delegate then stated that a more exact wording would be necessary to determine the state of war, for a war might be going on far from the Black Sea area, but yet involve it. To this Litvinov proposed that instead of the term "neutral" there be introduced the phraseology "Turkey not being a belligerent". This was accepted by the Turkish delegate. The Rumanian delegate was then assured by the Turkish delegate that, no matter how many wars might be raging, if Turkey were neutral, passage through the Straits would be possible under the terms of the Convention. Article 6 was then adopted with the reserve that Article 23, when edited in final form, make provision for action

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In the discussion of Article 9, the Rumanian delegate referred to the question of submarines and pointed out the necessity for Rumania to have a free hand in ordering and conditioning submarines outside the Black Sea. Litvinov again brought up the question of the special rights of Black Sea over non-Black Sea powers, and insisted on this difference in favor of the former. Litvinov stated that he desired that the Soviet Union be able to procure or have constructed submarines outside the Black Sea without necessarily purchasing them. In view of the opposition of the British delegate, however, the question of submarines was postponed to a subsequent date. Mr. Rendel, who presented the British argument, stated that his delegation had come to Montreux with instructions to negotiate for a settlement tending to protect the interests of Turkey, but based upon the general principles of Lausanne. In view of this, the British could not see why submarines, which were no more dangerous than a number of other categories of war vessels, should have to be restricted, to say nothing of aircraft carriers.

In the discussion of Article 10, Litvinov reverted to his stubborn insistence on special rights for the Black Sea powers. He contended that preliminary notice of 15 days was not too much, since it would take that much time to ascertain just how much tonnage there was actually in the Black Sea. He then proposed that 15 days be adopted for non-Black Sea and 3 days for Black Sea powers. Lord Stanley took exception and asked that similar treatment be meted out to both categories of powers. The

Turkish

Turkish delegate also took exception to the Soviet proposal, saying that three days was not enough to effect any appraisal of tonnage in the Black Sea, nor to give notice to the various powers signatory to this Conference. Litvinov, in answer to the proposal of the Japanese delegate that Turkey should notify all powers of the composition of all naval forces which pass through the Straits, made violent and sarcastic reply, asking that under such reasoning all powers in all seas should report ship movements for the general interest of mankind. In rebuttal the Japanese delegate* stated that such information as would at all times be in the possession of the Turkish authorities would enable powers to know in advance the situation in the Black Sea, and if it were possible to send ships through the Straits. The Japanese insisted, however, that the same period of time for the preliminary notification be applicable to both Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. Litvinov argued that 15 days were necessary to ascertain the composition of fleets in the Black Sea, but three days were enough to make provision for the protection of the Straits, that is for egress from the Black Sea. The British delegate then asked that the same period of time be applicable to all, since it was purely an administrative act on the part of Turkey. After discussions among the other delegates, Litvinov made full reservations to Article 10, insisting apparently on a show-down at some point or other as to whether the Soviet Union as a Black Sea power were to be

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*Mr. Sato, the present Foreign Minister of Japan.

given a favored position, or placed on a par with outside powers.

In the discussions of Article 11 the Soviet Union was insistent that every size ship of a Black Sea power should be able to pass the Straits, and that such ships be allowed escort of their own vessels.

In the discussions of Article 14 Litvinov presented the thesis that, even in visits of courtesy, Turkey should have no greater consideration than Black Sea powers. In other words, in visits of courtesy, where presumably ships in excess of 15,000 tons might be used to convey the head of a state, Black Sea powers should have privileges not less than Turkey. The British delegate, in explanation of this article, stated that the intention was that such ships would not enter the Black Sea, but would merely pay their visit and depart by the same route by which they came. Litvinov then proposed an amendment, accepted by the other delegates, to the effect that visits of courtesy to Turkey, in the Straits, be limited to a certain time, - clearly a derogation of sovereignty by Turkey.

In the discussions of Article 15 Litvinov proposed the figure of 30 percent instead of 10 percent above the standard allowable 30,000 tons above which Black Sea powers would increase their fleets before a proportionate increase be permitted to "outside" fleets which might come into the Black Sea. He further proposed that no nation be permitted more than one-half this tonnage. He conceded that other reasons than courtesy be permitted for ships entering the Black Sea, on condition that this be no excuse for increasing tonnage. He further proposed that ships of non-Black

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Sea powers be limited to "light surface vessels", and that the duration of all visits be limited to fifteen instead of thirty days. A median variant of three weeks was then proposed by Lord Stanley and accepted by Litvinov and the other delegates.

In connection with the definition of "humanitarian" as applied to visits of ships, the British delegate explained that there were many interpretations; famine, revolution, natural disasters such as earthquakes, pursuit of pirate vessels, etc. Litvinov took sarcastic exception to this thesis, and stated that he would agree provided that the period of time for such "humanitarian" visits be reduced and that a time limit be fixed. As to the possibility of a calamity he foresaw such an eventuality "once in a century". The British delegate took exception to Litvinov's statement, and said that every eventuality must be foreseen. As to the tonnage above 30,000 tons allowable for non-Black Sea powers in case of calamity or disaster, it was proposed by the British delegate that provision be made for the dispatch of at least one cruiser of an interested power.

As to the decision to be taken in case of war, to brand a belligerent, Litvinov proposed that such decision be taken by the League, since for Turkey alone to label an aggressor was too great a responsibility. The Turkish delegate said that his country would rather not have to take such a decision in an emergency, but would do so were that the wish of all signatory powers.

In the discussion of Article 18, Litvinov asked that provision be made that, in case of a menace of war, ships

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be allowed to join their bases immediately before the definitive closing of the Straits. Turkey was not willing to do this, insisting that her position in case of war might be jeopardized thereby. Litvinov countered with the observation that this would constitute a new rule of international law, and that on the basis of such a precedent a country might find a pretext for seizing foreign shipping in its own ports in case of a threat of war.

In the discussion of Article 23, perhaps the most important of the whole Convention, Litvinov submitted a new and separate article. The basic idea incorporated in the new article was that freedom of passage be permitted to those powers who were acting in conformity with obligations arising out of the Pact, or pursuant to accords supplementary to the Pact, which have as their object the rendering of assistance to the victim of an aggressor. Mutual assistance pacts, of course, were the real subject at issue, and considerable opposition was evident from the British side, with particular respect to the "obligations" which Turkey might have as a member of the League to assist in carrying out appropriate measures against an aggressor.

Article 25 concerned ratification. Litvinov proposed that the ratification of five or six participants be sufficient. He also proposed that the duration of the Convention be shortened, and that fifteen years be considered the maximum variant.

In the second reading of Article 10, Litvinov stated that he did not want to insist on special consideration for Black Sea powers. He stated that all he was interested in was a reduction in the period of time necessary for Black

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Sea powers to give appropriate warning, and was willing to accept eight days, which was then adopted by the Conference.

In the second reading of Article 14, Litvinov proposed that submarines be barred from visits of courtesy of foreign fleets to Turkish ports in the Straits, and that such visits be limited to twenty-one days. He stated later that he was willing that this idea be incorporated into a protocol to be added to the Convention wherein it would be stated that the Turkish Government had no intention of inviting submarines to pay visits of courtesy.

In the second reading of Article 15 Litvinov proposed that the definition of "Light Surface V$_e$ssels" be that embodied in the London Naval Treaty of 1936. As to the administrative authority to be notified concerning tonnage in the Black Sea, Litvinov proposed that this be the Secretary General instead of the Council of the League of Nations.

When Article 16 was submitted to its second reading in the British project, Litvinov, in a self-confessed spirit of "conciliation", withdrew his proposed amendment in favor of the French proposal, - but on condition that other concessions be made to him.

When the second reading of Article 18 was finished, the Soviet amendment was adopted. This provided that, in case of a menace of war, ships cut off from their bases be permitted to pass through the Straits to rejoin their fleets, provided they not be of the so-called "menacing power".

At the second reading of Article 21 Litvinov took violent exception to that part of the new proposal which provided that Turkey be required to inform all signatory powers of any movement of ships of war in the Straits. He asked sarcastically if the same information were not germane with respect to the Suez, Kiel and other Canals, as well as international avenues of navigation. He asked that this section be suppressed, except insofar as it applied to the League of Nations, and then only in respect of annual statistics. Later he withdrew his objections, on condition that reports concerning ship movements be made to signatory powers only, at the time of passage.

In connection with Article 25, Litvinov desired that the period of validity for the Convention be shorter that 20 years, but withdrew his objections later.

Article 26, as was to be supposed, caused a great deal of argument. Litvinov favored the Turkish proposal, which provided that if one of the high contracting powers desired to amend the Convention, and if this were impossible in unanimity through diplomatic channels, then a majority of three-fourths, including Turkey, would be sufficient for a revision. After lengthy discussion by the other delegates, this proposition was taken up by the British delegation, - in the face of opposition from Litvinov, who desired that decisions be contingent upon approval of all Black Sea powers. The British argued that this would give Black Sea powers a special right of veto. Turkey, argued the British, should be entitled to a right of veto, but not one of the Black Sea powers. A compromise was ultimately reached whereby, in connection with

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Article 11, a three-fourths majority including Turkey was accepted. As for Article 15, a majority of three-fourths, including a majority of three-fourths of the Black Sea powers was accepted.

As to the reservations formulated by the Japanese delegates, Litvinov proposed that the Japanese sign last, so that there be no possibility of supposing that any other power had accepted provisions of the Convention under reserve. After some rather terse comment Litvinov agreed to sign in alphabetical order provided that this did not signify that the Soviet Union accepted in advance the effects or the consequences resulting from the Japanese reserve.

In the public plenary session of July 18, Litvinov, in the same manner as the other delegates, paid homage to Mr. Bruce, the President of the Conference, with more than the usual flattering remarks.

At the final session of the Conference on July 20, Litvinov made a concluding and testimonial speech in which he commended Turkey for the circumstances under which the Conference had been called. He praised the regenerated new Turkish Republic and its leader Ataturk, and boasted somewhat at length about the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. He made reference to the long established friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. He stated that the Conference had recognized, although not categorically enough, the special interests in the Black Sea of the countries bordering on it. Liberty of the Seas must not be accorded to all powers in the Black Sea, except for ships of commerce. The principal

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preoccupation of the Soviet Union during the whole of the proceedings had been admittedly to restrict the movement of ships of war of non-Black Sea powers in that sea. Litvinov also stressed the importance of the new relation between pacts of mutual assistance, the League, and the Montreux Convention. The Soviet Union had received practically all that it had wanted at the Conference, stated Litvinov. In conclusion he praised the action of Turkey in convening and carrying through by peaceful means an international conference, at a time when most of the world had lost faith in peaceful collective action. The Convention was the first ray of light in a uniformly sombre scene.

In connection with the sessions of the Technical Committee and other sub-committees of the Conference, a few remarks might be pertinent. The Soviet Union made no interpellations with respect to taxes and fees to be levied by Turkey in the Straits. The Rumanian delegate was most concerned about this. The Soviet delegates, however, were disturbed over the Danube Treaty of 1856, which permitted each of the three signatory powers to station two light surface vessels at the mouth of the Danube. Soviet delegates in the sub-committees fought tooth and nail to secure recognition of their thesis that ships of Black Sea powers be permitted to move at will to "join their bases."

In the technical committee the Soviet delegates tried hard to have aircraft carriers included with submarines in the category of vessels for which passage through the Straits would be forbidden. The Soviet delegates also attempted to limit the calibres of guns on ships authorized

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to pass through the Straits. In the debates concerning the movement of ships in time of war, the Soviet delegation also endeavored to bar visits of courtesy in the Black Sea: to any non-Black Sea power at war, and; to any non-Black Sea power at a time that a Black Sea power is at war. As to submarines, the Turkish delegate made known that in the Soviet-Turkish Naval Treaty it was provided that Turkey be notified of the construction of units intended for the Soviet-Black Sea fleet. The Soviet delegate then proposed that the movement of submarines of Black Sea powers not be made known by Turkey to any other power, that is, at the time of passage of these submarines. A compromise was finally arrived at wherein it was provided that information concerning the movements of all vessels, including submarines, be published at the end of each year in a general statistical report to be prepared by Turkey.

The Soviet delegates in the sub-committees were also opposed to the proposal that, in time of emergency (earthquake, etc.), in case the total tonnage of non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea be already at the maximum of 30,000 tons, a country having no ship in the above total be authorized to send into the Black Sea one ship of war of not more than 10,000 tons to take care of the interests of that particular country. The Soviet delegates were of the opinion that in such cases those powers not represented could use the facilities offered by powers which already had ships in the Black Sea. The question of notification, in the above cases, caused considerable argument. The Turkish delegates were unwilling to allow ships, in such emergency operations, to be liberated from

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In subsequent debates the British lowered their demands for allowable excess tonnage to 8,000 tons, in cases of emergency, above the total of 30,000 tons, for powers not represented. The Soviet delegates also attempted to define "humanitarian purposes" as earthquakes or other "acts of nature". This was opposed by the Japanese and British. After considerable debate, in which the Soviet delegates insisted that the additional tonnage of 8,000 tons be permitted only after receipt of consent of all Black Sea powers, it was finally decided that Turkey should notify all Black Sea powers and receive their unanimous approval before permitting the passage of ships to carry out a "humanitarian" task. The time limit for the foregoing was agreed upon as 48 hours, in spite of Soviet objections. In case the "ceiling" of maximum tonnage had not been attained it was agreed that Turkey alone was to be the arbiter, within the same period of time.

Both the Soviet and Rumanian delegations offered amendments to Article 18. The Soviet proposal was that ships, which had already cleared the Straits prior to the time that Turkey had taken a decision under this Article, be allowed to rejoin their bases, except ships of those powers which were considered as "menacing" Turkey. This was acceptable to Turkey, providing that the decision be in its hands. In this manner it would not be necessary for Turkey to designate the potential "agressor". Turkey also insisted on certain measures of security such as obligatory pilotage and towage in case of threat of war. The Soviet delegates insisted that Turkey actually designate the potential "agressor", forbid passage of ships of

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the latter, but have no facultative power whatsoever with respect to other so-called "neutral" powers.

In discussions of Article 25 the Soviet delegation supported the Turkish proposal that the Convention enter into force immediately, upon signature, instead of upon subsequent ratification. A period of five years, as the appropriate duration of the Convention, was proposed by the Soviet Union, against the original period of 20 years proffered by Turkey.

In the final discussions concerning the transport of fuel on supply ships, the Soviet Union succeeded in suppressing the word "supplies" and substituting therefore the definitive word "fuel", since the latter is the sole article of supply exported from the Black Sea on naval auxiliaries. A suggestion of the Soviet delegation was adopted, which provided for a determination of tonnage by the method of "displacement", instead of other controversial methods of measurement. This was to apply to all considerations of tonnage in the Convention, as applied to the Black Sea.

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Edward Moerschelmann, Secretary General of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Experts:

Lev Antsipo - Chikunski, Engineer Flagman of the III Class, Naval Attaché of the U.S.S.R. at London.

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the provisions providing for prior notification.

In subsequent debates the British lowered their demands for allowable excess tonnage to 8,000 tons, in cases of emergency, above the total of 30,000 tons, for powers not represented. The Soviet delegates also attempted to define "humanitarian purposes" as earthquakes or other "acts of nature". This was opposed by the Japanese and British. After considerable debate, in which the Soviet delegates insisted that the additional tonnage of 8,000 tons be permitted only after receipt of consent of all Black Sea powers, it was finally decided that Turkey should notify all Black Sea powers and receive their unanimous approval before permitting the passage of ships to carry out a "humanitarian" task. The time limit for the foregoing was agreed upon as 48 hours, in spite of Soviet objections. In case the "ceiling" of maximum tonnage had not been attained it was agreed that Turkey alone was to be the arbiter, within the same period of time.

Both the Soviet and Rumanian delegations offered amendments to Article 18. The Soviet proposal was that ships, which had already cleared the Straits prior to the time that Turkey had taken a decision under this Article, be allowed to rejoin their bases, except ships of those powers which were considered as "menacing" Turkey. This was acceptable to Turkey, providing that the decision be in its hands. In this manner it would not be necessary for Turkey to designate the potential "agressor". Turkey also insisted on certain measures of security such as obligatory pilotage and towage in case of threat of war. The Soviet delegates insisted that Turkey actually designate the potential "agressor", forbid passage of ships of

the

the latter, but have no facultative power whatsoever with respect to other so-called "neutral" powers.

In discussions of Article 25 the Soviet delegation supported the Turkish proposal that the Convention enter into force immediately, upon signature, instead of upon subsequent ratification. A period of five years, as the appropriate duration of the Convention, was proposed by the Soviet Union, against the original period of 20 years proffered by Turkey.

In the final discussions concerning the transport of fuel on supply ships, the Soviet Union succeeded in suppressing the word "supplies" and substituting therefore the definitive word "fuel", since the latter is the sole article of supply exported from the Black Sea on naval auxiliaries. A suggestion of the Soviet delegation was adopted, which provided for a determination of tonnage by the method of "displacement", instead of other controversial methods of measurement. This was to apply to all considerations of tonnage in the Convention, as applied to the Black Sea.

gradual break-up of the spirit of pacifism which was so characteristic of the immediate post-war period, and pointed to the warlike and aggressive spirit which typifies the present epoch. He intimated that the right of individual defense was not to be observed only in the abstract; one must of necessity adopt a different attitude with regard to this right when there are fears that it will be used deliberately to endanger the interests of other countries and for the purpose of aggression. The attitude to take when the revision of a treaty helps to maintain and reenforce peace is quite different from that which obtains when this revision provokes political perturbations, troubles international peace and tranquility or ends in the violation by force of the interests of other states. Litvinov concluded with the hope that the Conference would embark upon its work with the interests principally of Turkey and the Black Sea powers at heart.

At the session of June 23, the next day, Litvinov paid homage to the Turkish thesis that the Straits should in principle not be closed to ships of war of all powers. However, he emphasized that the Black Sea should, nevertheless, be considered a closed sea, but should not be compared to the great international canals and straits which connect open and free bodies of water. Apparently not unmindful of regional security he stated, "The more we limit the tonnage and the number of ships entering the Black Sea the greater will be security in this region of Europe and Asia; and if we create security in one part of the world, we will thereby render a great contribution to the general security." However, for the Black Sea powers

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he asked complete freedom of passage in and out of the Black Sea. The case of the Soviet Union was different, he insisted, in that it was absolutely imperative that unhampered liaison be maintained between the shipyards of the Baltic and Black Seas, and that naval units be transferred at will between them. The remilitarization of the Straits, he insisted, was an incontestable right of Turkey, as was the right of self defense. The League of Nations was not dead, he concluded; it will emerge from its present difficulties stronger than ever. Consequently, the interests of the League must never be forgotten, particularly when it becomes necessary for the League to send ships of war to assist the victim of an aggressor.

At the session of June 24, Litvinov proposed that Article 6 of the Turkish draft proposal (relating to the movement of warships in time of peace) be made applicable only to non-Black Sea powers, and that the prohibition against aircraft carriers be added to that of submarines. This in fact would have reserved complete freedom of action for Black Sea powers and presupposed a series of restrictions against non-Black Sea powers. Lord Stanhope, the British delegate, then interpolated that there were two fundamental principles of note in the Lausanne Treaty, namely freedom of passage through the Straits for the naval forces of all powers, and limitation on the size of fleets of non-Black Sea powers to the tonnage of the fleet of the strongest Black Sea power. There were therefore liberty of entrance into the Black Sea for all powers and security for the Black Sea powers in particular, - a general

reciprocity

reciprocity of principle on both sides. Security was the more certain in that it was elastic. It was now proposed, continued Lord Stanhope, that these principles be discarded. There was to be a pronounced difference of treatment in ingress and egress from the Black Sea for the two categories of powers.

Sato, the Japanese delegate, then interpolated to the effect that Japan was ready to make concessions provided that there were equality of treatment for Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. In rebuttal Litvinov insisted on special rights for the Soviet Union and for the abolition of aircraft carriers.

Later on, when the subject of security in both the Straits and the Black Sea came up, Litvinov took issue with other delegates, principally the British. The contention of the latter was that there were two questions to be decided: security between the Black and Mediterranean Seas, that is in the Straits, on the one hand, and security in the Black Sea on the other. Litvinov insisted that the two were closely bound together and were component parts of a single problem.

In connection with the notification preliminary to passage through the Straits, Litvinov was prepared to accede to the wishes of the Turkish delegate, provided that this be applicable only to non-Black Sea powers. The show-down between Litvinov and Lord Stanhope then became apparent: Litvinov for discrimination against non-Black Sea powers, Lord Stanhope for absolute equality of treatment. Litvinov maintained resolutely that there was no situation which could arise where a non-Black Sea power would find it

necessary

necessary to send large battleships into the Black Sea, whereas for Black Sea powers it could easily happen that large ships be dispatched from the Black to the Mediterranean Seas. The argument finally settled on Article 6 and particularly on paragraphs (b) and (h) thereof. Under the former, non-Black Sea powers would be limited to 14,000 tons in passing through the Straits, and under the latter the same would apply to Black Sea powers. Litvinov's contention was that the security of the latter was as important a consideration as the security of Turkey, the one as dependent as the other upon the remilitarization of the Straits. To hold Black Sea powers to a fixed maximum in traversing the Straits would be to discriminate against them, and place them at a disadvantage in case of war; Black Sea powers should have full liberty of disposing of their armed forces as they choose.

In the discussion of paragraph (f) of Article 6, relating to the interdiction against the use of airplanes carried aboard warships, Litvinov asked that his original motion prohibiting the passage of aircraft carriers, be kept on the calendar.

In the discussion of Article 7, Litvinov proposed two amendments: first, that vessels of belligerents be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea, in order not to extend to the Black Sea a war which might be raging outside it; second, that if a Black and non-Black Sea power be at war, ships of the latter be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea except on the order of the League of Nations.

In the discussion of Article 13, Litvinov proposed that the whole convention enter into force after ratification by

five

five members, that is one-half of the participants in the Conference.

After the interval of ten days between the Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the Conference, the British delegate, Lord Stanley, presented a new and revised project which was immediately adopted as a basis for discussion. If Litvinov was opposed to this British manoeuvre, he certainly did not show it, but accepted rather gracefully. He did insist that the original Turkish project be considered simultaneously with the new British project.

In the discussions concerning Article 6, Litvinov pretended to find a distinction in the conception of neutrality, that is, that a country could be neutral vis-à-vis Turkey but belligerent to another, hence the necessity for specifying "neutral vis-à-vis Turkey". President Bruce then stated that this could only arise if there should be two simultaneous wars, to which Litvinov responded that that was precisely his idea. The Rumanian delegate then stated that a more exact wording would be necessary to determine the state of war, for a war might be going on far from the Black Sea area, but yet involve it. To this Litvinov proposed that instead of the term "neutral" there be introduced the phraseology "Turkey not being a belligerent". This was accepted by the Turkish delegate. The Rumanian delegate was then assured by the Turkish delegate that, no matter how many wars might be raging, if Turkey were neutral, passage through the Straits would be possible under the terms of the Convention. Article 6 was then adopted with the reserve that Article 23, when edited in final form, make provision for action

arising

arising out of League obligations and commitments.

In the discussion of Article 9, the Rumanian delegate referred to the question of submarines and pointed out the necessity for Rumania to have a free hand in ordering and conditioning submarines outside the Black Sea. Litvinov again brought up the question of the special rights of Black Sea over non-Black Sea powers, and insisted on this difference in favor of the former. Litvinov stated that he desired that the Soviet Union be able to procure or have constructed submarines outside the Black Sea without necessarily purchasing them. In view of the opposition of the British delegate, however, the question of submarines was postponed to a subsequent date. Mr. Rendel, who presented the British argument, stated that his delegation had come to Montreux with instructions to negotiate for a settlement tending to protect the interests of Turkey, but based upon the general principles of Lausanne. In view of this, the British could not see why submarines, which were no more dangerous than a number of other categories of war vessels, should have to be restricted, to say nothing of aircraft carriers.

In the discussion of Article 10, Litvinov reverted to his stubborn insistence on special rights for the Black Sea powers. He contended that preliminary notice of 15 days was not too much, since it would take that much time to ascertain just how much tonnage there was actually in the Black Sea. He then proposed that 15 days be adopted for non-Black Sea and 3 days for Black Sea powers. Lord Stanley took exception and asked that similar treatment be meted out to both categories of powers. The

Turkish

Turkish delegate also took exception to the Soviet proposal, saying that three days was not enough to effect any appraisal of tonnage in the Black Sea, nor to give notice to the various powers signatory to this Conference. Litvinov, in answer to the proposal of the Japanese delegate that Turkey should notify all powers of the composition of all naval forces which pass through the Straits, made violent and sarcastic reply, asking that under such reasoning all powers in all seas should report ship movements for the general interest of mankind. In rebuttal the Japanese delegate* stated that such information as would at all times be in the possession of the Turkish authorities would enable powers to know in advance the situation in the Black Sea, and if it were possible to send ships through the Straits. The Japanese insisted, however, that the same period of time for the preliminary notification be applicable to both Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. Litvinov argued that 15 days were necessary to ascertain the composition of fleets in the Black Sea, but three days were enough to make provision for the protection of the Straits, that is for egress from the Black Sea. The British delegate then asked that the same period of time be applicable to all, since it was purely an administrative act on the part of Turkey. After discussions among the other delegates, Litvinov made full reservations to Article 10, insisting apparently on a show-down at some point or other as to whether the Soviet Union as a Black Sea power were to be

given

*Mr. Sato, the present Foreign Minister of Japan.

given a favored position, or placed on a par with outside powers.

In the discussions of Article 11 the Soviet Union was insistent that every size ship of a Black Sea power should be able to pass the Straits, and that such ships be allowed escort of their own vessels.

In the discussions of Article 14 Litvinov presented the thesis that, even in visits of courtesy, Turkey should have no greater consideration than Black Sea powers. In other words, in visits of courtesy, where presumably ships in excess of 15,000 tons might be used to convey the head of a state, Black Sea powers should have privileges not less than Turkey. The British delegate, in explanation of this article, stated that the intention was that such ships would not enter the Black Sea, but would merely pay their visit and depart by the same route by which they came. Litvinov then proposed an amendment, accepted by the other delegates, to the effect that visits of courtesy to Turkey, in the Straits, be limited to a certain time, - clearly a derogation of sovereignty by Turkey.

In the discussions of Article 15 Litvinov proposed the figure of 30 percent instead of 10 percent above the standard allowable 30,000 tons above which Black Sea powers would increase their fleets before a proportionate increase be permitted to "outside" fleets which might come into the Black Sea. He further proposed that no nation be permitted more than one-half this tonnage. He conceded that other reasons than courtesy be permitted for ships entering the Black Sea, on condition that this be no excuse for increasing tonnage. He further proposed that ships of non-Black

Sea

Sea powers be limited to "light surface vessels", and that the duration of all visits be limited to fifteen instead of thirty days. A median variant of three weeks was then proposed by Lord Stanley and accepted by Litvinov and the other delegates.

In connection with the definition of "humanitarian" as applied to visits of ships, the British delegate explained that there were many interpretations; famine, revolution, natural disasters such as earthquakes, pursuit of pirate vessels, etc. Litvinov took sarcastic exception to this thesis, and stated that he would agree provided that the period of time for such "humanitarian" visits be reduced and that a time limit be fixed. As to the possibility of a calamity he foresaw such an eventuality "once in a century". The British delegate took exception to Litvinov's statement, and said that every eventuality must be foreseen. As to the tonnage above 30,000 tons allowable for non-Black Sea powers in case of calamity or disaster, it was proposed by the British delegate that provision be made for the dispatch of at least one cruiser of an interested power.

As to the decision to be taken in case of war, to brand a belligerent, Litvinov proposed that such decision be taken by the League, since for Turkey alone to label an aggressor was too great a responsibility. The Turkish delegate said that his country would rather not have to take such a decision in an emergency, but would do so were that the wish of all signatory powers.

In the discussion of Article 18, Litvinov asked that provision be made that, in case of a menace of war, ships

be

be allowed to join their bases immediately before the definitive closing of the Straits. Turkey was not willing to do this, insisting that her position in case of war might be jeopardized thereby. Litvinov countered with the observation that this would constitute a new rule of international law, and that on the basis of such a precedent a country might find a pretext for seizing foreign shipping in its own ports in case of a threat of war.

In the discussion of Article 23, perhaps the most important of the whole Convention, Litvinov submitted a new and separate article. The basic idea incorporated in the new article was that freedom of passage be permitted to those powers who were acting in conformity with obligations arising out of the Pact, or pursuant to accords supplementary to the Pact, which have as their object the rendering of assistance to the victim of an aggressor. Mutual assistance pacts, of course, were the real subject at issue, and considerable opposition was evident from the British side, with particular respect to the "obligations" which Turkey might have as a member of the League to assist in carrying out appropriate measures against an aggressor.

Article 25 concerned ratification. Litvinov proposed that the ratification of five or six participants be sufficient. He also proposed that the duration of the Convention be shortened, and that fifteen years be considered the maximum variant.

In the second reading of Article 10, Litvinov stated that he did not want to insist on special consideration for Black Sea powers. He stated that all he was interested in was a reduction in the period of time necessary for Black

Sea

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

June 3, 1937.

Mr. Kelley:-

Here is the finished memorandum by Mr. Kuniholm. Do you wish it to be circulated, or merely marked for DCR to file with the despatch under reference therein, 767.68119/973. I have retained one copy for EE files.

J.B.Bassett.

OK
RFK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUN 4 1937
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

MEMORANDUM

The Montreux Conference and the Soviet Union

In amplification and extension of the Moscow Embassy's despatch No. 1764 of August 3, 1936, concerning the Montreux Conference and the Soviet participation therein, the following comment, based upon an examination of the official publication of the minutes of the Montreux Conference, is submitted for such interest as it may present. The publication under reference is entitled "Actes de la Conférence de Montreux concernant le régime des détroits, 22 juin - 20 juillet 1936", and is published by Editions A. Pedone, 13 rue Soufflot, Paris V^e; it was forwarded to the Department by the Embassy at Istanbul under cover of its despatch No. 209 of February 5, 1937. In this memorandum only those aspects of the Conference, not covered in the despatch from Moscow, are discussed - particularly those relating to the interpolations and arguments of the Soviet delegates during debates in both the plenary sessions of the Conference itself and the in camera meetings of the technical committee.

At the opening session of the Conference (June 22, 1936), Litvinov stated that he was prepared to participate in the negotiations for the purpose of placing the régime of the Straits into harmony with the interests of the security of Turkey and of assuring peace and tranquility to that region. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had a special interest in the problem by reason of its geographical situation and the lack of communication between the seas which bathe its littoral. He traced the

gradual

FW 767.68119/973

FILED

August 26 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/973

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and encloses for his information a copy of despatch No. 1764, dated August 3, 1936, from the American Embassy at Moscow, regarding the Montreux Conference.

767.68119/973

Enclosure:
Despatch No. 1764, dated
August 3, 1936, from Embassy
at Moscow.

AUG 26 1936 CR

NE:MBB:FMC:SS 8-26

A true copy of the signed original.

August 13, 1936.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 25 1941
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

767.68119/973 1/2

THE STRAITS CONVENTION OF JULY 20, 1936 AS IT AFFECTS AMERICAN INTERESTS

Before proceeding to a discussion of the new Straits Convention, signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936, it is deemed advisable for comparative purposes to first review briefly the situation which prevailed under the Convention signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923.

The Straits Convention of 1923 was based upon the principle of "freedom of transit and of navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace as in time of war, in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus" enounced in Article 23 of the Lausanne Treaty. The Convention further specified that this freedom of navigation should apply to commercial and war vessels under any flag.

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Although the United States was not a signatory to this Convention, nor did it accede to it, it is significant to note that this Government appears to have found the Convention acceptable inasmuch as Article X of the Turkish-American Treaty, signed at Lausanne August 6, 1923 (unratified), provided for complete liberty of navigation and passage in the Straits by American commercial and war vessels and aircraft on the basis of the most favored nation "upon conformity to the rules relative to such navigation and passage established

by

by the Straits Convention signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923."

From the time that the Straits Convention went into force up until the present time American vessels have been granted the same rights as have been accorded other countries and no cases are recalled where American interests were ever prejudiced. Despite this relatively satisfactory situation, however, the Navy Department has felt for a number of years that the interests of this country would be more adequately safeguarded by a bilateral agreement of some kind assuring to this country freedom of navigation of the Straits on the basis of most-favored-nation treatment, i.e., to assure this country bilaterally the same treatment that it was already receiving unilaterally.

In accordance with the Navy Department's desires on this subject the Department instructed the Embassy at Istanbul on July 28, 1931 and again on June 29, 1934 to explore the possibility of concluding such a unilateral agreement. Ambassador Skinner broached the matter casually to the Turkish Foreign Minister, who expressed his willingness to negotiate such an instrument on condition that this Government would be willing to give compensatory guarantees with reference to the defense of the Straits (despatch No. 411, October 29, 1934). This condition was obviously unacceptable and as a consequence the matter was allowed to rest. Pursuance of the matter was also regarded as undesirable

because

because it became clear soon after that a general revision of the Straits régime was imminent.

In this connection it may be observed that the Department, although inclined to conform to Navy's wishes to the extent possible in this connection, did not feel that a bilateral agreement was essential to establish our legal right to freedom of navigation of the Straits and most-favored-nation treatment inasmuch as Article 3 of the American-Turkish Exchange of notes of February 17, 1927, provided that, pending the coming into effect of a Consular Convention of Establishment and Residence, the "essential provisions of the Turkish-American Treaty signed at Lausanne August 6, 1923" should constitute the basis for the treatment which each country would accord the nationals of the other. Another and still stronger guarantee with regard to commercial navigation of the Straits was seen in our Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1929 providing for national treatment of American vessels in Turkish waters.

A second argument which was given serious consideration in this connection was the possibility of directly invoking in case of need that provision of the Straits Convention providing "complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and night under any flag". This question has given rise to considerable debate by interested persons in the Department as a result of which it would seem that there is considerable doubt as to whether or not the Convention could have been

been legally invoked by this country, particularly in view of the failure of this country to avail itself of the opportunity afforded to accede to the Convention, and also because this country would undoubtedly not have been willing to assume the obligations which the invoking of the Convention might have entailed. (For a full discussion of this subject see Mr. Alling's memorandum of June 11, 1936).

Coming now to the new Straits Convention of July 20, 1936 (an analysis of which is contained in 9721/2 a memorandum dated August 12, 1936), the first question which naturally arises is whether its terms are in essential accord with our basic requirements with reference to freedom of navigation and most-favored-nation treatment. The answer would seem to be in the affirmative in view of Article 1 which provides that "the High Contracting Parties recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits" and various succeeding provisions provide for equality of treatment under any flag, except for certain concessions to Black Sea powers with reference to war vessels. It is true that freedom of navigation by air is not accorded but inasmuch as this prohibition is generalized to all countries it is hardly conceivable that this country would desire to interpose an objection on this point. It is also possible that this Government might prefer that the League

of

of Nations should not be employed in implementing certain provisions of the Convention but the part played by the League is so small and our concern in the questions involved so remote that this could hardly be regarded as a matter of serious concern. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Convention as it stands is essentially satisfactory from the American point of view.

Proceeding now to the status of this country under the new Convention, we find the situation somewhat changed with reference to the matter of legal grounds on which it might be invoked. Whereas we felt that the previous Convention could be invoked by virtue of the exchange of notes of February 17, 1927, it would appear that this argument no longer obtains under the new Convention inasmuch as the treatment provided for in Article X of the Turkish-American Treaty of Lausanne was conditioned upon the Straits Convention of July 24, 1923, a document which will go out of effect on August 15.

On the other hand, the two main arguments against our legal right to invoke the old Convention directly, i.e., failure to accede thereto and liability of incurring unacceptable obligations, no longer remain valid under the new Convention which provides for accession only by signatories of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 (according to which Italy alone is eligible for accession) and involves no obligations what-

soever

soever inasmuch as Turkey now assumes full responsibility for controlling navigation through the Straits and for their defence. Under these circumstances it would seem that a very strong case might be made for the right of this country to invoke the Convention of July 20 on legal grounds, making due allowance, of course, for a certain precariousness of this right resulting, as Mr. deWolf points out in his memorandum of June 6, 1936, quoting Professor Garner, from the fact that much depends on the disposition of the parties to such an agreement to maintain the treaty in force and execute its stipulations. Such fears, however, would appear in this instance to be theoretical rather than realistic inasmuch as the precariousness envisaged would be one to which shipping under all flags would be subject, a situation against which this country could hardly hope to receive individual assurance.

As regards the advisability of removing any doubt (if doubt there now is) as to our position in this connection in the form of some kind of bilateral agreement it is obvious, according to Article 1 of the new Convention, which provides that "the exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the present Convention", that any such agreement would have to be confined to an affirmation of our rights under the Convention, such as might

conveniently

conveniently be accomplished by an exchange of notes. Presumably the Turkish Government would not object to such an agreement. In considering this point, however, it is believed that there is a point of policy involved which should not be entirely overlooked. Reference is made here to the case of the passage of the Suez Canal by American men of war in 1898, mentioned in Mr. Alling's memorandum. Should the policy of this government still be, as it apparently was then, to refrain from recognizing the right of certain groups of powers to regulate the use of international waterways by third parties, it is quite possible that we might hesitate to give formal consent to the present Convention which does precisely that thing. It may be observed, however, that this consideration does not appear to have been regarded as important at the time of the negotiation of the Turkish-American Treaty of Lausanne which specifically recognized the Straits Convention of July 24, 1923. This is obviously a matter on which Navy's opinion is important.

In proceeding further with this matter it is suggested that the following action be taken in the order indicated:

1. Solicit the views of the Treaty Division and the Legal Adviser as to whether or not the present Convention could be invoked as a legal right by this country.

2. Consult with Navy as to the advisability of some form of bilateral agreement, presumably an

exchange

exchange of notes.

3. In the event that any action is decided to be desirable, instruct the Embassy in Istanbul to make appropriate investigation as to the practicability of its execution.

NE:RAH:FMC:SS

560
Belgrade
8/2/36

Despite Yugoslav participation in the Montreux Conference the press of that country refrained from commenting editorially on that subject except to observe after the close of the Conference that this type of revisionism was to be condoned in view of its purpose to insure an endurable peace. This lack of editorial comment was not indicative of the degree of Yugoslav interest in the Conference, however, insamuch as that country is reported to be still very apprehensive as regards the designs of Italy and therefore desires to strengthen Turkey's hand to the utmost.

It is also reported that the Yugoslav representatives at the Conference took care to see that Bulgarian interests were safeguarded but no specification is made as to what the particubar interests were.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 560 Belgrade, August 3, 1936.

Subject: Yugoslav reaction to Montreux Conference.

August 26 1936

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1936 AUG 21 PM 2 20
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK
To the Field
In U. S. A.

767.68119/974

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 28 1936

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 21 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

copy sent to Navy 8/26 - MBB-FMC

FILED
AUG 28 1936

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

767.68119/901

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram No. 16, April 29, 5 p.m., reporting that although not a signatory to the Straits Convention signed at Lausanne in 1923 the Yugoslav Government was prepared to support the Turkish demands for its revision.

During the meeting at Montreux the Belgrade press, in spite of Yugoslavia's being a participant, carried no editorial comment, although it devoted considerable space to reporting the progress of the discussions. Upon the conclusion of the new agreement it did note that re-militarization of the Straits constituted revision

of

of the Peace Treaties and was one more instance of washing out the results of the World War. It condoned it, however, on the ground that it was an effort on the part of the democratic nations to insure a durable peace, and that the Turkish Government's conduct in consulting first with her allies of the Balkan Entente and the other powers concerned, before taking her case to the "International Forum", could not be reproached. It also remarked that Yugoslavia was only indirectly interested in the matter and Turkey, as a friend and ally, was warmly congratulated on having regained her security and prestige.

The Government's interest in the matter, however, was more than that of only a disinterested ally. Bound to Turkey through the Balkan Entente, it was greatly to its own interest to support the Turkish demands, although it regretted, no doubt, that it involved acquiescence in revisionism to which Yugoslavia, as a power born of the Peace Treaties, is fundamentally and bitterly opposed. Mr. Musolini's intentions are still regarded here with the greatest suspicion in spite of improved relations with Italy and that country's reaffirmation of friendship made just prior to Great Britain's announcement of the termination of her assurances of unilateral assistance to Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, given by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons on June 18 (Legation's despatch No.557, July 27, 1936). In seconding Turkey, therefore, the Yugoslav Government not only bound Turkey closer, but by strengthening the military position of its friend by aiding it to fortify the Straits, strengthened its own position in the event of trouble with Italy.

It should also not be overlooked that the Yugoslav representative at Montreux took great care that Bulgaria was satisfied with the text of the new Straits agreement. This is of interest in view of recent events in Bulgaria. Should the Kiosseivanoff Government, which stands for rapprochement with Yugoslavia and to which the Yugoslav Government is very friendly, fall and be succeeded by one led by the well known politician and one time Prime Minister Tsankoff, it would mean a revival of the activities of the Macedonian Committee and of Italian influence in Bulgaria, both of which Yugoslavia combated with such difficulty some years ago. Yugoslavia's endeavor to please Bulgaria was made with this possibility in view and was a considered effort to win the friendship of the Bulgarian people regardless of whatever Government might come into power.

The raising of the Straits question by Turkey left the Yugoslav Government with little choice but to lend her support. The conclusion, however, should not be drawn that it has apparently adopted a broader outlook toward revisionism.

Respectfully yours,

Wainwright Abbott

Wainwright Abbott
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

File No. 710

WA/PC

Copy to: Embassy, Istanbul

August 26 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/974

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and encloses for his information a copy of despatch No. 560, dated August 3, 1936, from the Legation at Belgrade, regarding the Montreux Conference.

767.68119/974

Enclosure:
Despatch No. 560, dated August 3, 1936, from the Legation at Belgrade.

NE:MBB:FMC:SS 8-26

A true copy of the signed original.

AUG 26 1936

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.68119/975

SEE 811.42767/68 FOR letter

FROM Turkey (Shaw) DATED May 23, 1936

TO NAME

1—1127

REGARDING: Straits Conference.

Comments on Turkish, Italian and British attitude. Probability that there will be no difficulty as concerns commercial navigation.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM MONTREUX TO THE PRESENT

Summary of: Confidential telegram no. 57, from Ankara, dated June 11, 1942, 10 a.m. File No. 741.67/176.

On June 10, 1942 Saracoglu sketched the history of Turkey's waning friendship with Russia, gradually turning since 1939 to a relationship of correctness not untinged with suspicion, which is summarized herewith.

Rebuffed from time to time by the Soviets, Turkey tended to revert to her traditional British orientation. Germany was carefully kept in the background by Saracoglu, and Ambassador Steinhardt in his conclusion expresses confidence that that country cannot shake Turkish-British friendship, and that Turkey will fight if attacked.

1. At Montreux, Turkey oriented its policy toward Britain, but relations with the USSR remained cordial. Britain laid the groundwork for the Anglo-French-Turkish Alliance when German aggressiveness threatened Danzig and Czechoslovakia.

2. The

2. The Turks in the Spring of 1939 sought in vain to bring their two friends, Britain (and France) and Russia together in a system of defensive alliances. The Soviets stalled, and displayed a suspicious attitude regarding the Straits. Coldness developed between Turkey and Russia after signature of the Anglo-French-Turkish, and Soviet-German pacts.

3. The last period is marked by Turkish suspicion of Russia's territorial designs, aggravated by American and British press accounts of the Soviet's desire for post-war strategic frontiers, and marked recently by British efforts once more to mediate between the two powers, and to reassure Turkey as to Russia's intentions by reference to the Atlantic Charter and to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

Ambassador convinced Turkey will not go over to Axis but will fight if attacked.

Eu:FCBarghoorn:LIS

PB

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 8 - 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1776 Moscow, August 5, 1936.

Subject: Soviet Ratification of Straits Convention.

6
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1936 AUG 21 PM 1 58

DIVISION OF
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AND RECORDS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-C/O
AUG 2
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

DIVISION
OF EASTERN
AUG 27 1936
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 22 1936
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Copy Transmitted by the
Commercial Office (A-C/O)
To Istanbul
8/25/36

767.68119/976

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1764 of August 3, 1936, concerning the Conference of Montreux, I have the honor to report that PRAVDA of August 1, 1936, contained the following announcement of TASS, (official Soviet Telegraph Agency):

> "The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. has ratified the new Straits Convention signed July 20, 1936, at Montreux by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade M. M. Litvinov."

FILED
SEP 14 1936

TREATY DIVISION
SEP 9 - 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

On the

On the same day PRAVDA also announced the ratification of the Convention by Turkey.

Respectfully yours,

Loy W. Henderson,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

1 copy A-M

File No. 710

In Quintuplicate to Department.

CWT:bpg

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HISTORICAL DATA GENEALOGY CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION SERVICE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RESEARCH

ARTHUR ANDREW SMITH
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 29 1936

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1514 Newton St. N. W.,
August 21, 1936.

J.W.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ansd 8/28
AUG 24 1936 RAH-FMC
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

767.68119

Dear Sir:

If not contrary to the practice of your department, will you please let me have the names of the nations whose representatives recently signed an agreement in Switzerland, permitting Turkey to militarize the eastern (Asiatic) shore of the Dardanelles?

Your courtesy will be appreciated.

FILED
AUG 31 1936

Very truly yours,

Arthur A. Smith

767.68119/977

August 29 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/977

767.6811 9/977

Mr. Arthur A. Smith,

1514 Newton Street, Northwest,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In reply to your letter of August 21, 1936, requesting the names of the countries whose representatives signed the Convention regarding the Régimé of the Straits, concluded at Montreux, Switzerland, on July 20, 1936, you are informed that the countries in question were Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Wallace Murray,
Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

NE:RAH:FMC:SS 8-26

AUG 29 1936.

A true copy of the signed original.

September 4 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/978

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and, with reference to previous correspondence regarding the revision of the régime of the Straits, transmits a copy of a despatch dated August 11, 1936, from the Embassy in Istanbul on that subject.

767.68119/978

Enclosure:
From Istanbul, Turkey,
No. 102, August 11, 1936.

NE: RAH/GC

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To Navy 9/4/36 NE-RUH/SC.

Istanbul, Turkey, August 11, 1936.

No. 102

September 4 1936

SUBJECT: Ratification by Turkey of Montreux Straits Convention.

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SEP 16 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR DISTRIBUTION - ... K Yes No
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Copy to M. I. D.

6 RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1936 AUG 25 AM 11 09 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A-C/C SEP 4 1936 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL SEP 9 - 1936

767.68119/978

AUG 26 1936 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

An extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly met at Ankara on July 30th and 31st for the purpose of ratifying the Montreux Straits Convention, and of hearing certain explanations concerning the Convention and foreign affairs generally furnished by the Prime Minister and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The importance of the session was emphasized by the presence at Ankara of the President of the Republic. He left his summer villa at Florya and spent four or five days at the Capital. The members of the Cabinet likewise interrupted or postponed their vacations to be present for the occasion.

767.68119
867.032

FILED JUN 25 1937

The

The speeches of the Prime Minister and the Minister
1/2/3/ for Foreign Affairs, which I enclose in translation, deserve careful reading. The second speech of Dr. Aras, especially when taken in connection with the statements made in the House of Commons by Mr. Eden, throws much light on the present status of the British-Turkish Mutual Assistance Agreement. That Agreement, at least in its more formal aspect, may now be considered as at an end, but care should be taken, I believe, not to conclude from that fact that the relations of close understanding and mutual confidence between Great Britain and Turkey, which seemed to suffer a temporary cooling off at Montreux, but which soon revived, have undergone any change. Dr. Aras is clear on this point.

As reported in my telegram No. 41 of 963 August 8, 12:00 Noon, the Assembly approved the Montreux Convention on July 31 and the law setting forth the approval was duly published in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE of August 5. Turkey's ratification is therefore effective as of that date.

Besides approving the Convention the Assembly, at the request of the Prime Minister, passed a unanimous vote of confidence in the Government and also adopted legislation relating to the financial aspect of the re-arming of the Straits. Concerning the precise nature of this legislation there has been much mystery and many contradictory rumors. Just at present the impression prevails that the Assembly voted for the expenses of the rearming Ltq. 30,000,000 over and above the Ltq. 63,796,190

for

for military purposes in the regular budget, the Ltq. 67,000,000 to be spent immediately but repaid over a period of ten years and the military items in the special budget amounting to Ltq. 7,500,000. On the other hand, no provision was apparently made for raising new revenue and the Prime Minister in his speech expressly states that no new taxes are envisaged. There are those who contend that the Ltq. 30,000,000 is being found by transfers from the budgets of other Departments of the Government. According to present indications the material needed for rearming will come chiefly from Germany and Czechoslovakia and also, possibly, to a small extent, from Sweden.

867.51
867.34

The Straits Commission set up by the Lausanne Convention is in process of liquidating its affairs. As a gesture the Turkish Delegate resigned even before the signature of the Montreux Convention, but a meeting was held last week. This meeting was chiefly concerned with such practical details as the disposition to be made of archives, but the Italian Delegate insisted upon reading a statement reserving the rights of his Government under the Lausanne Straits Convention.

867.0145

Respectfully yours,

J. Howland Shaw.

G. Howland Shaw,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures:
1/ Speech made by Dr. Aras on the Straits Convention, July 31, 1936;
2/ Speech made by Dr. Aras on the International Political Situation, July 31, 1936; and
3/ Speech made by Ismet Inönü before the Grand National Assembly on the occasion of the ratification of the Montreux Convention, July 31, 1936.

Copies sent to Embassies in Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tokyo; Legations in Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, and Riga; and Consulate in Geneva.

720
GHS:mej

4 Carbon Copies Received F.R.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No 102

of August 11, 1936, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

TRANSLATION

SPEECH MADE BY DR. ARAS ON THE STRAITS CONVENTION

July 31, 1936.

The White Book which has already been presented to the Grand National Assembly concerning the question of the Straits contains the notes exchanged between the interested States and ourselves. The White Book No. 2, presented this morning, contains the translations of the minutes of the public sessions of the Montreux Conference. These two documents relieve me from furnishing you further details on the phases of this question which has been closely followed by your Honorable Assembly, as well as by all our citizens, who have always without exception shown a great interest and enthusiasm in our cause in regard to the Straits. The copies of the project which we proposed at the conference and which was accepted as the initial basis of discussion, as well as a copy of the convention signed at the end of the conference and submitted today to your high approval, are since yesterday in the hands of the honorable members of this high assembly.

You have by now certainly formed an opinion in regard to the result of the policy followed with unshaken energy and determination by the Government of the Republic and in regard to the activities it has pursued in this matter. Likewise each of you has already seen and examined the convention in question. In addition, the report of the mixed committee formed in accordance with our usual procedure in order to examine the said convention will be read very shortly.

The exposé of motives very ably summarizes the Straits Convention. Therefore I shall refrain from embarking upon details, but shall merely dwell on the outstanding characteristics of this convention. But before doing so, I wish to briefly acquaint you with the origin of our endeavors resulting in the Montreux Conference.

(1) Our great chief Atatürk always used to remark that the modification of the Straits Convention signed at Lausanne would sooner or later become a necessity. Moreover, during the government's discussion of military questions relating to the defense of the country,

try, the chief of the General Staff, Marshall Çakmak, never failed to point out the disadvantages of the demilitarized status of the Straits. Finally, when I presented for approval to my chief Ismet Inönü the essential lines of the speech drawn up by me together with my collaborator, Numan Menemencioglu, -- a speech which our delegate at Geneva was to make in order to express the views of our government on the well known project presented to the Disarmament Commission by the former British Premier MacDonald, -- my eminent Premier notified me that the time had come to bring up the question of the Straits. It was following this instruction that our Foreign Ministry set to work on the question and it missed no occasion to carry out fully the instructions of our eminent Premier. The later phases of the question are, as I have already pointed out, already known to you.

One of the essential characteristics of the convention presented to you for your high approval, lies in the fact that our full and complete sovereignty over this territory, -- which not only constitutes an integral part of our country, but at the same time links together its inseparable parts, -- has been confirmed in a pacific as well as most cordial manner, and our right of fortifying the Straits, necessary for the defense of the country, has been recognized with the signing of the convention.

The restrictions concerning the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, belonging to our friend and neighbor Greece, -- which had been demilitarized by the Lausanne Convention of 1923, -- have also been abrogated by the Montreux Convention -- a point over which we equally rejoice.

In this connection I wish to repeat once more one of the characteristic features of the policy of the new Turkey: We desire for our friends everything that we desire for ourselves, and we do not desire for our friends, nor for any nation, that which we would consider as unjust for ourselves.

One of the provisions of the Montreux Convention on the subject of which much ink has been spilled in the press of the world is paragraph 2 of Article 19. I wish to expose to you our understanding of the nature and effect of this provision as follows.

The paragraph in question states:

> "However, the passage through the Straits will be prohibited for the vessels of war of all belligerent powers, except in cases coming within the application of Art. 25 of the present convention, as well as in the case of assistance

assistance rendered to a State victim of an act of aggression by virtue of the treaty of mutual assistance to which Turkey is a party concluded within the frame of the Covenant of the League of Nations, registered and published in conformity with the provisions of Article 18 of the said Covenant."

(6)

The provision clearly denotes the confidence which the high contracting parties place in the pacifist policy and correct attitude of Turkey. As a matter of fact, nobody should have any doubt that we shall faithfully uphold all the articles of the Montreux Convention not only with regard to the contracting parties, but with regard to all States without distinction. The entire past of the new Turkey is my most impartial witness.

(7)

From this platform I take special pleasure in expressing my thanks to all the high contracting States, which from the very start have manifested a thorough understanding of our cause as well as to all friendly and benevolent states, which although not participants in the Montreux Conference -- due to their geographical position or due to reasons which stand in no relation to the Straits question or to Turkey -- have nevertheless through their press and attitude supported our case and expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the conference.

I now beg the High Assembly kindly to ratify with urgency this convention which I consider as the beginning of a happy and new era of prosperity.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 102

of August 11, 1936, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

TRANSLATION

SPEECH MADE BY DR. ARAS ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION

July 31, 1936.

Taking advantage of this meeting of the Grand National Assembly I wish to talk to you also about the developments of international relations in another domain. Two principal questions were discussed during the extraordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations on June 30th.

One of these questions was the "reforms" in the Covenant of the League of Nations suggested by certain States. Turkey has for the present not considered making any proposals along these lines, and although her desire is not to avoid examining and studying the proposals to be made in this matter, she has not considered it wise to express views on mere assumptions, without previously obtaining full information as to their nature and effect. Consequently her representatives did not take part in these discussions. It was finally decided to invite the members of the League of Nations to communicate before August 15th, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, the resolutions and proposals which they may deem proper to formulate in regard to the application of Articles 11 and 16 of the Covenant, in order that they be discussed during the regular session of the Assembly in September. It is known to everybody that a strong League of Nations is our sincere desire.

In accordance with another resolution reached in the same meeting of the Assembly, the Committee of Coordination, of which we are a member, met and arrived at a decision the translation of which reads as follows:

> "The Committee of Coordination which was established in accordance with a resolution of the Assembly dated October 15, 1935, regarding the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, decided to propose the abrogation on June 15, 1936, of the restrictive measures adopted by the governments of the States, members of the League of Nations, in accordance with the proposals of the committee numbered 1a, 2a, 3, 4, and 4b."

As a consequence to the above, the Government of the Republic removed on June 15th the economic and financial

financial measures which were applied in regard to Italy as a result of the obligations devolving from the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In a speech made at the extraordinary session of the Assembly, the British Foreign Secretary, while pointing out the necessity of removing the sanctions, referred to the mutual obligations assumed by Great Britain and the Mediterranean States resulting from the application of Article 16 of the Covenant, and remarked that even in the case of adoption of a decision regarding the abrogation of the sanctions, these obligations would, during the period of uncertainty which would follow, continue to remain effective as far as Great Britain was concerned. He added to the foregoing that this statement would hold good as long as the British Government deemed it in conformity with existing circumstances. This statement had previously been made to the House of Commons and the text thereof communicated to our Government in a memorandum.

Your Government, with pleasure took due note of this unilateral engagement assumed without any request coming from Turkey, and without any previous consultation with us, and in return the Government of the Republic notified the British Government that although no demand had been formulated by the said Government, our guarantees would continue to remain operative for a period to be determined by us according to the exigencies of events.

The British Ambassador who visited me on July 27th, informed me of a passage dealing with this question, contained in a speech which the British Foreign Minister planned to make the very same day before the committee of the House of Commons. Since this declaration has already been made and published by the Anatolian Agency, its substance is known to you. In brief, it points out that the very cordial assurances given by the Italian Government to Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece, respecting the situation in the Mediterranean, have been duly recorded by the British Government, and that in view of this situation there no longer exists any necessity for the continued maintenance of the unilateral guarantees given by the British Government in regard to the Mediterranean. As a matter of fact, the Italian Government has through its Ambassador in Ankara notified your Foreign Ministry in cordial terms that it continues to consider itself bound by the stipulations of the treaty of friendship existing between us. It is certainly known to you that Turkey is likewise bound by the stipulation of this treaty of friendship.

Consequently, as the speech of the British Foreign Ministry which I just mentioned clearly records an

an improvement in the Mediterranean relations, and as we have learned from the Italian Ambassador, with whom I had an interview two days ago, that the Italo-British relations are taking a favorable course, there exists no longer any reason for the continuance of the unilateral assurances given by Turkey to Great Britain. I submit to your high assembly this point of view and conviction of the Government of the Republic.

This declaration made with the desire of restoring normal conditions can in no way affect the cordial and trusting friendship existing between us and Great Britain. I consider it as a most pleasant duty to invoke in this connection with respect the great sagacity displayed by the British Foreign Secretary and the continuous efforts made by him always with a view to leading things to an understanding.

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 102

of August 11, 1936, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

TRANSLATION

SPEECH MADE BY ISMET INÖNÜ BEFORE THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE OCCASION OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION.

Honorable Colleagues:

You have just achieved an important deed in the history of Turkey as well as in the history of diplomacy. The Grand National Assembly can be proud of having fulfilled with success one of the heavy duties assumed in regard to the Turkish nation.

Dear Colleagues:

The new Straits Convention constitutes a splendid document consecrating internationally Turkey's security and sovereignty.

With this document Dr. Aras has not only rendered a splendid service to the safety of Turkey but he has once more proven that he is an untiring servitor of the cause of international peace.

Dear Colleagues:

Every international treaty constitutes the expression of a definite period and one can very well contend that the new Straits Convention is a document bearing witness to the policy and existence of the new Turkish State since 1923.

This existence exemplifies above everything else power. The force, the power and the prestige which the regime of Atatürk has assured the Turkish nation in every field in such a short space of time, has thus received its consecration in international life. From the point of view of domestic policy we find ourselves today before an important event which ought to fill us all with pride and instill in us new confidence.

Dear Colleagues:

Another fact which in connection with the Straits Convention affords us great satisfaction is the great confidence manifested by all nations towards Turkey's policy.

policy. The formula found in 1936 for the Turkish Republic in the matter of the Straits Convention, which for a period of 150 years under the incapable and weak Ottoman Empire had been subject to varying treatments, consists of leaving the Straits to the sovereignty of the Turkish nation without any condition or restriction. The realization of the fact that the sovereignty of the Turkish nation over the Straits constitutes the safest guarantee for international peace can be considered as an evolution in the life of humanity.

One of the principal reasons why we left the Straits Conference with satisfaction is because all interested parties have left this conference equally satisfied. All participating nations have without exception signed the convention and our friends the Soviets who had not accepted the Convention of 1923, have also affixed their signature to the new pact. I also take great pleasure in announcing to you that at the present moment the Convention is already ratified by Soviet Russia.

Our country has for a month and a half followed the different phases of the conference with emotion. Those who are closely acquainted with the characteristics of this nation, those who know its history, will find this emotion most natural. Every Turkish home harbors a memory of the dead who now lie on the shores of the Straits. For many long years the Turkish nation had been living with the firm conviction that there was still an unaccomplished task to be fulfilled in regard to those heroes as far as the Straits were concerned. In spite of the fact that it was midnight, the entire Turkish nation eagerly awaited on public squares the announcement of the signing of the Convention, and after hearing the result, celebrated this happy event for several days. The various speakers here in the Grand National Assembly have faithfully conveyed the point of view and sentiments of the Turkish nation. I am sure that the entire nation will feel pride and contentment upon hearing these utterances. It will feel happy over the fact that its intimate sentiments have found expression in the Grand National Assembly.

Dear Colleagues:

The international confidence which the policy of the Turkish nation has obtained is a point worth dwelling upon. This fact does not only fill us with pride and satisfaction but also reminds us of the importance of our task and responsibilities.

In order fully to understand our policy one has to know also the spirit animating the new Turkey. Our

mentality differs entirely from the conception which the Empire left behind in the international world. In our efforts for international equality and peace, we entertain no rancour whatsoever for past events nor do we entertain ideas of revenge.

Dear Colleagues:

There is another point which is as important as the foregoing: We do not know a policy based on fear. We believe that honorable and able people can find the path of mutual understanding only through humane sentiments. Likewise, it is only thus that nations can find the means of effectively collaborating in the cause of peace. Even at the present moment when we are legally in full control of the Straits without any restriction, that is to say, at a moment when we have already fortified the Straits, I wish to state that we shall not deviate from following an upright and pacifist course in international politics.

Those who view with favor this policy of ours will only benefit by collaborating with us. Those who believe that we shall pursue a policy different from the one outlined will certainly experience a deception.

Dear Colleagues:

I do not want you to believe that during the many years during which the Straits were legally demilitarized, we neglected to do that which was feasible. Had these Turkish lands been exposed to an attack even under the conditions which prevailed until now, various preparations had already been made and numerous measures taken for its defense. I am mentioning this fact in order to point out that from the period of the legal demilitarization of the Straits, until the new period during which we are applying all sorts of armaments, this part of the country has not even for a single day been left without adequate measures for its defense.

There is no doubt that the task which the Straits Convention imposes upon us will make considerable expenditures necessary in that part of the country. The Turkish nation is most sensitive in the question of security and defense. Before the Convention was actually signed everybody was conscious of the expenditures which it would entail. Even the imposition of a multitude of new taxes was considered as natural. However, as stated yesterday by our Minister of Finance, I wish to inform you that we believe we are able to find adequate means for the defense of the country within the frame of the financial policy which we are following.

lowing.

We know that there is no limit to the sacrifice which the Turkish nation is ready to make when necessary. But I wish to inform you that today we are not going to impose new taxes and propose new impositions for the fortification of the Straits. We are convinced that the normal development which the country will attain under an adequate economic and financial policy will, as for our other needs, be also sufficient to meet the needs of the army. From the point of view of this development, as already demonstrated, our financial policy tends towards the reduction of certain existing taxes. This is our policy of today.

Unless the international situation creates an extraordinary emergency, we shall continue to follow our above financial policy.

Dear Colleagues:

While talking before the Turkish nation I must state the facts as they are in reality. The results which we have attained are the fruits of our efforts of many years and of our willingsness to sacrifice all our being for the country. However, the great results obtained are not guaranteed to last for ever. The only element constituting a perpetual guarantee is the will of the nation to manifest unceasing vitality. The life of nations consists of an untiring forward move in order to ensure greater progress, greater effort and greater power.

In the spirit of the new Turkish State founded after the defunct Empire, vitality and energy constitute as indispensable an element as air for breathing. We must point this out to the Turkish nation. We must all make it a task for ourselves to render Turkey in fifteen years ten times stronger, and more advanced than today, and to inculcate this into the minds of all others.

Dear Colleagues:

The entire nation is listening to us. I promise the Turkish people that we shall always work with our entire being faithfully to follow the same course which we have been following heretofore, so as to obtain results more brilliant even than those which have so far been obtained by the Turkish nation, in the era of Atatürk and under the regime of Atatürk, thanks to the attachment which it has manifested towards him and the promptness with which it has always followed his policy.

We all pledge to be always firmly united in our national life and, should this country ever be faced by a menace, to move forward as one single being and on the boundaries of our country hold ourselves ready against all eventualities.

---

or

No. 1813 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland. August 15, 1936.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP - 9 1936
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 27 1936
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DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 5 - 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1936 AUG 26 PM 1 27

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: Prospective Publication by League of Nations of Material concerning the Conference on the Régime of the Straits.

1—1055

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 25 1936
A.C.C.

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Distr.
AUG 31 1936

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SEP 11 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that the League of Nations Secretariat has in course of preparation two publications concerning the Conference on the Régime of the Straits which recently took place at Montreux. The first of these, which it is expected will shortly be issued, will contain the text of the Treaty, together with a somewhat extensive foreword by M. Aghnides. The second will be a detailed commentary on each article of the Treaty based on the procès-verbal of the Conference.

I have learned of this from private sources and assume that the project of publication will be carried out. In such an event, I shall transmit this material to the Department, to the American missions in the states which participated in the Conference, and to the American Embassy at Rome.

The League

767.68119/979

FILED
SEP 15 1936

TREATY DIVISION
SEP 12 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The League of Nations was not officially associated with the Conference or with the Treaty. Thus the issue by the League of publications of this character is presumably solely for purposes of information. However, the circumstance of the League entering upon this activity is, I believe, largely due to the fact that M. Aghnides, Director of the Disarmament Section of the League Secretariat, held the position of Secretary-General of the Montreux Conference.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Original and five copies to the Department of State.
One copy to the American Legation, Bern.

PBG/EW:DH

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500.A 15 A 3/1812 FOR #1972

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED August 6, 1936
TO NAME 1—1127

REGARDING:

Japanese Navy and public reaction
to the Montreaux Conference. Advises of -.

las

767.68119/980

767.68119

Tokyo, August 6, 1936.

NO. 1072.

SUBJECT: NAVAL DISARMAMENT .

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

There have been practically no comments in the press during the past two weeks dealing with the recently concluded Montreux Conference. It would appear that the Japanese Navy and the public are satisfied that no particular harm has been done, and that Japan is not as vitally concerned therewith as it is in other naval matters.

It

It was announced on July 26 that the Foreign and Navy Ministries were drafting a reply to the British notification regarding the invocation of the escalator clause for the retention of excess destroyer tonnage and the right to build A-class cruisers and convert those in Class-B. According to the ASAHI, the points to be covered in the note that will be delivered to the British Government are the following: (1) Conversion of A-class cruisers into B-class ships is regarded by Japan as a violation of the treaty; (2) the British invocation of the escalator clause to permit the retention of excess destroyer tonnage is not necessarily opposed; (3) As a result of Britain's invocation of the escalator clause Japan has the right to a proportionate increase in destroyers. However, as Japan would have to construct new ones to keep pace in addition to retaining old vessels in order to maintain the status quo with Britain it advances the opinion that the retention of old ships would be more in line with the spirit of disarmament than the construction of new ones. In other words, the inference is that Japan desires to retain excess tonnage in other categories rather than to build new vessels; (4) because of the growing menace of Soviet submarine construction Japan considers it appropriate to transfer the permitted increase in destroyer tonnage that may be retained but which it does not possess to the submarine category in which it is understood that Japan will have an excess of almost 81,000 tons. As soon as the draft of the foregoing note has been approved by the Cabinet, the Ambassador in London will be instructed to present it to the British Government.

The

The JAPAN ADVERTISER, commenting editorially upon the anticipated Japanese reply to Great Britain, stated that of course from the viewpoint of mere economy the Japanese naval stand is a reasonable one. However, it added, it is unlikely that Great Britain or America with their traditional antagonism to submarines would agree to the proposal to transfer Japan's excess claim in destroyers to the submarine category. The article pointed out that even if it were possible for the USSR to construct a sizable fleet of submarines in the near future Japan's argument is still weak because submarines are not effective against submarines but rather against surface craft. Consequently as the USSR has few if any surface war vessels in the Far East Japan's claim that the threat of a strong Soviet submarine fleet must be met with additional submarine tonnage does not seem to be well founded.

It was stated in the press on July 31 that the Navy Department hoped to present detailed figures covering the third naval replenishment program by August 10. It was announced that the contents of the new building program will be kept strictly secret but observers prophesy that the new program will aim at a naval strength equal to that of the British and American navies. In spite of that opinion the Navy still maintained that while it was striving for parity it would build in accordance with as economical a program as would fit its own conditions and at the same time would secure complete command of the Western Pacific without menacing other Powers. It would seem that the Navy Department is struggling to maintain its balance between

between two opposing forces: on the one hand its own desire and that of all patriotic Japanese to have a navy second to none, and on the other hand the strong economic forces which necessarily limit the amount of money which the Navy can obtain and which is probably considerably less than the amount called for in the forthcoming budget unless the Government will agree to further increase in the number of so-called "red ink" bonds. The Finance Minister has warned that the nation cannot stand much more indebtedness and businessmen have voiced their apprehension that possible inflation, unsound currency, and larger Government budgets will adversely affect business conditions. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Army and Navy have a great influence throughout the nation and that their ambitions regarding increase of armaments may finally prevail. The press reports that with the completion of the second replenishment program the Japanese Navy will represent approximately 64% of the naval strength of the United States or Great Britain. As a result the Navy's demand for further building appeals strongly to a "parity educated" public.

The press has commented upon the new Anglo-Soviet naval agreement with some reserve. Thus far, Government officials have refrained from definite statements claiming that they desire to study the official draft of the agreement. However, editorial observations indicate that naval circles are somewhat concerned over the conclusion of what they term a further rapprochement between the USSR and European

pean nations. One article stated that Government officials have at least failed to show signs of approval of the Anglo-Soviet accord and that Japan cannot remain idle regarding its naval preparedness, particularly if the Anglo-Soviet Pact has given the United States an impression that the agreement may exert pressure upon Japan. It is believed that Japan is not as seriously concerned over the probability that the USSR will construct a formidable Far Eastern fleet as it is over the fact that the Soviet Union is steadily forging new bonds of friendship with other world Powers, while Japan, because of its policy of avoiding entanglements, remains alone and unprotected by any alliance.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

500
[illegible]:C

Copy to Embassy, Moscow.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 270 Sofia, August 5, 1936

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1936 AUG 31 PM 3 46

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SEP 8 - 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SEP 4 - 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A-C/C SEP 4 - 1936 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

TREATY DIVISION SEP 17 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Montreux Conference.

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

To the Field
In U. S. A.

September 8 1936

Copy to Navy MBB- 9/2/36 FNC

767.68119/981

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

767.68119/933

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's despatches Nos. 243, 244 and 261, dated June 22, June 24 and July 27, 1936, respectively, with reference to the Bulgarian attitude toward the Montreux Conference, and to inform the Department that the Bulgarian Council of Ministers ratified the Montreux Agreement on August 4, 1936.

FILED SEP 19 1936

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria was the third country, after Turkey and Russia, to ratify the Agreement.

Respectfully yours,

K. de G. MacVitty
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

KGM/MM

September 3 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/981

767.68119/981

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and transmits herewith for his information a copy of despatch No. 270, of August 5, 1936, from the Legation at Sofia, regarding the ratification of the Montreux Agreement by Bulgaria.

Enclosure:
From Sofia, Bulgaria,
despatch No. 270, of
August 5, 1936.

A true copy of the signed original.

NE:MRB:FMC:SS 9-2

SEP 3 1936.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.68119/982

SEE 871.34/25 FOR #4082

FROM Military Attache (NAME) DATED July 22, 1936

TO Rumania

1—1127

REGARDING: Rumania's objection to fortification of the Straits was due to her lack of navy yards.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1323. Athens, Greece, September 8, 1936.

For the Attention of the Treaty Division.

Subject: Greece Ratifies Straits Convention Negotiated at Montreux.

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TREATY DIVISION
OCT 9 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 12 1936

To Navy 10/12/36 LS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 10 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
OCT 7 1936

767.68119/983

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Convention signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936, concerning the status of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, was ratified in Greece by an emergency law dated August 7, 1936, and published in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Volume I, No. 333) of even date.

Copies of the OFFICIAL GAZETTE, giving the text of the convention in French and in Greek, are transmitted herewith.

Respectfully yours,

Harold Shantz,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

List of enclosures:
OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Volume I, No. 333)
of August 7, 1936 (in quintuplicate).
Legation file No. 631.
Copy to Istanbul.

KLR/Z/B

FILED

yaume de Yougoslavie près la Société des Nations.

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

Article premier.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes reconnaissent et affirment le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation par mer dans les Détroits.

L'usage de ladite liberté est dorénavant réglé par les dispositions de la présente Convention.

SECTION I.

Navires de Commerce.

Article 2.

En temps de paix les navires de commerce jouiront de la complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits, de jour et de nuit, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, sans aucune formalité, sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 3 ci-après. Aucune taxe ou charge autre que celles dont la perception est prévue par l'annexe I à la présente Convention ne sera prélevée par les autorités turques sur ces navires lorsqu'ils passeront en transit sans faire escale dans un port des Détroits.

Afin de faciliter la perception de ces taxes ou charges, les navires de commerce qui franchiront les Détroits feront connaître aux agents du poste visé à l'article 3 leurs nom, nationalité, tonnage, destination et provenance.

Le pilotage et le remorquage restent facultatifs.

Article 3.

Tout navire qui pénètre dans les Détroits par la Mer Egée ou par la Mer Noire s'arrêtera à un poste sanitaire près de l'entrée des Détroits aux fins du contrôle sanitaire établi par les réglements turcs dans le cadre des prescriptions sanitaires internationales. Ce contrôle, dans le cas de navires possédant une patente nette de santé ou présentant une déclaration de santé attestant qu'ils ne tombent pas sous le coup des dispositions de l'alinéa 2 du présent article, s'effectuera de jour et de nuit, avec le plus de rapidité possible, et ces navires ne devront être astreints à aucun autre arrêt au cours de leur passage dans les Détroits.

Les navires qui ont à bord des cas de peste, de cholera, de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ou qui en ont eu moins de sept jours auparavant, ainsi que les navires qui ont quitté un port contaminé depuis moins de cinq fois vingt-quatre heures, s'arrêteront au poste sanitaire indiqué à l'alinéa précedent, pour y embarquer les gardes sanitaires que les autorités turques pourraient désigner. Il ne sera, à ce titre, prélevé aucune taxe ou charge et les gardes devront être débarqués à un poste sanitaire à la sortie des Détroits.

Article 4.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les navires de commerce, quels que soient

σιλείου τῆς Γιουγκοσλαυίας παρὰ τῇ Κοινωνίᾳ τῶν

Οἵτινες ἀφοῦ ἐπέδειξαν τὰ πληρεξούσια αὐτῶν, ἅ
γνωρίσθησαν ὡς νομίμως συντεταγμένα, συνωμολόγ
ἀκολούθους διατάξεις:

Ἄρθρον πρῶτον.

Τὰ Ὑψηλὰ Συμβαλλόμενα Μέρη ἀναγνωρίζουσι καὶ βεβαιώνουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ διάπλου καὶ τῆς ναυσσαπλοΐας ἐν τοῖς Στενοῖς.

Ἡ χρῆσις τῆς ὡς ἄνω ἐλευθερίας διαρρυθμίζεται ὑπὸ τοῦδε ὑπὸ τῶν διατάξεων τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως.

ΤΜΗΜΑ Ι.

Ἐμπορικὰ πλοῖα.

Ἄρθρον 2.

Ἐν καιρῷ εἰρήνης, τὰ ἐμπορικὰ πλοῖα θὰ ἀπολαμβάνωσι τῆς πλήρους ἐλευθερίας τοῦ διάπλου καὶ τῆς θαλασσοπλοΐας ἐν τοῖς Στενοῖς, τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν νύκτα, οἱαιδήποτε καὶ ἂν εἶναι αἱ σημαῖαι καὶ τὸ φορτίον αὐτῶν, ἄνευ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιβαρύνσεως, ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιφύλαξιν τῶν διατάξεων τοῦ κάτωθι ἄρθρου 3. Οὐδὲν τέλος ἢ ἐπιβάρυνσις ἄλλη πλὴν ἐκείνων τῶν ὁποίων ἡ εἴσπραξις προβλέπεται ὑπὸ τοῦ παραρτήματος Ι τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως, θὰ εἰσπράττεται ὑπὸ τῶν Τουρκικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπὶ τῶν πλοίων τούτων ὅταν διαπλέουσιν ἐν διαμετακομίσει καὶ ἄνευ σταθμεύσεως εἰς τινα λιμένα τῶν Στενῶν.

Πρὸς διευκόλυνσιν τῆς εἰσπράξεως τῶν τελῶν ἢ ἐπιβαρύνσεων τούτων τὰ ἐμπορικὰ πλοῖα ἅτινα θὰ διήρχοντο διὰ τῶν Στενῶν θὰ γνωστοποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς πράκτορας τοῦ σταθμοῦ τὰ προβλεπομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρθρου 3 τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν ἐθνικότητα, τὸν χαρακτηριστικότητα, τὸν προορισμὸν καὶ τὴν προέλευσιν αὐτῶν.

Ἡ πλοηγία καὶ ἡ ρυμούλκησις παραμένουσι προαιρετικαί.

Ἄρθρον 3.

Πᾶν πλοῖον εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὰ Στενὰ ἐκ τοῦ Αἰγαίου Πελάγους ἢ τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου θέλει σταθμεύει εἰς ὑγειονομικὸν σταθμὸν πλησίον τῆς εἰσόδου τῶν Στενῶν ἐπὶ σκοπῷ τοῦ ὑγειονομικοῦ ἐλέγχου τοῦ καθοριζομένου ὑπὸ τῶν Τουρκικῶν κανονισμῶν ἐν τῷ πλαισίῳ τῶν διεθνῶν ὑγειονομικῶν διατάξεων. Ὁ ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἐν περιπτώσει πλοίων κατεχόντων καθαρὰν ὑγειονομικὴν πιστοποίησιν ἢ παρουσιάζόντων ὑγειονομικὴν βεβαίωσιν. βεβαιοῦσαν ὅτι δὲν ἐφαρμόζονται ἐπ' αὐτῶν αἱ διατάξεις τῆς παραγράφου 2 τοῦ παρόντος ἄρθρου, θὰ ἐκτελῆται τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν νύκτα μετὰ πάσης δυνατῆς ταχύτητος, καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ταῦτα δέον νὰ μὴ ὑποβάλλωνται εἰς οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην στάθμευσιν κατὰ τὴν διάρκειαν τοῦ διάπλου αὐτῶν διὰ τῶν Στενῶν.

Τὰ πλοῖα ἐφ' ὧν ὑπάρχουσι κρούσματα πανώλους, χολέρας, κιτρίνου πυρετοῦ, ἐξανθηματικοῦ τύφου ἢ εὐφλογίας ἢ ἐφ' ὧν ἐσημειώθησαν τοιαῦτα κρούσματα πρὸ διαστήματος βραχυτέρου τοῦ ἑπταημέρου, ὡς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἅτινα ἀπέπλευσαν ἐκ λιμένος μεμολυσμένου πρὸ διαστήματος βραχυτέρου τῶν πέντε εἰκοσιτετραώρων, θέλουσι σταθμεύει εἰς τὸν ὑγειονομικὸν σταθμὸν τὸν σημειούμενον ἐν τῇ προηγουμένῃ παραγράφῳ. Θὰ παραλάβωσι τοὺς ὑγειονομικοὺς φύλακας τοὺς ὁποίους αἱ τοπικαὶ ἀρχαὶ ἤθελον τυχὸν ὁρίσῃ. Οὐδὲν τέλος ἢ ἐπιβάρυνσις θέλει εἰσπράττεσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, οἱ δὲ φύλακες δέον νὰ ἀποβιβάζωνται εἰς τινα ὑγειονομικὸν σταθμὸν εἰς τὴν ἔξοδον τῶν Στενῶν.

Ἄρθρον 4.

Ἐν καιρῷ πολέμου, τῆς Τουρκίας μὴ οὔσης ἐμπολέμου, τὰ ἐμπορικὰ πλοῖα, οἱαιδήποτε καὶ ἂν ὦσιν ἡ σημαῖαι τὰ

Article 10.

En temps de paix, les bâtiments légers de surface, les petits navires de combat et les navires auxiliaires, qu'ils appartiennent à des Puisssnces riveraines ou non de la Mer Noire, quel que soit leur pavillon, jouiront de la liberté de passage dans les Détroits sans aucune taxe ou charge quelconque, pourvu qu'ils y pénètrent de jour et dans les conditions prévues aux articles 13 et suivants ci-aprés.

Les bâtiments de guerre autres que ceux qui entrent dans les classes visées à l'alinéa précédent n'auront le droit de passage que dans les conditions spéciales prévues aux articles 11 et 12.

Article 11.

Les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire sont autorisées à faire passer par les Détroits leurs bâtiments de ligne d'un tonnage supérieur au tonnage prévu à l'alinéa premier de l'article 14, à la condition que ces bâtiments ne franchissent les Détroits qu'un à un escortés au plus de deux torpilleurs.

Article 12.

Les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire auront le droit de faire passer par les Détroits, en vue de rallier leur base, leurs sous-marins construits ou achetés en dehors de cette mer, si un avis de mise en chantier ou d'achat a été donné en temps utile à la Turquie.

Les sous-marins appartenant auxdites Puissances pourront également traverser les Détroits pour être réparés dans des chantiers situés hors de cette mer à la condition que des précisions à ce sujet soient données à la Turquie.

Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les sous-marins devront naviguer de jour et en surface et traverser les Détroits isolément.

Article 13.

Pour le passage dans les Détroits des bâtiements de guerre, un préavis devra être donné au Gouvernement turc par la voie diplomatique. La durée normale du préavis sera de huit jours; mais il est désirable que, pour les Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire, elle soit portée à quinze jours. Il sera indiqué dans le préavis la destination, le nom, le type et le nombre des bâtiments ainsi que la date de passage pour l'aller et, s'il y a lieu, pour le retour. Tout changement de date devra faire l'objet d'un préavis de trois jours.

L'entrée dans les Détroits pour le passage d'aller devra avoir lieu dans un délai de cinq jours à partir de la date indiquée dans le préavis initial. Après l'expiration de ce délai, il devra être donné un nouveau préavis, dans les mêmes conditions que pour le préavis initial.

Lors du passage, le commandant de la force navale communiquera, sans avoir à s'arrêter, à une station de signaux à l'entrée des Dardanelles ou du Bosphore, la composition exacte de la force se trouvant sous ses ordres.

Ἄρθρον 10.

Ἐν καιρῷ εἰρήνης, τὰ ἐλαφρὰ σκάφη ἐπιφανείας, τὰ μικρὰ πλοῖα μάχης καὶ τὰ βοηθητικὰ πλοῖα, εἴτε ἀνήκουσιν εἰς παροχθίους τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου Δυνάμεις εἴτε μή, οἱασδήποτε καὶ ἂν εἶναι ἡ σημαία αὐτῶν θὰ ἀπολαμβάνωσι τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ διάπλου ἐν τοῖς Στενοῖς ἄνευ οὐδενὸς τέλους ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς ἐπιβαρύνσεως, ὑπὸ τὸν ὅρον ὅπως εἰσέρχωνται εἰς τὰ Στενὰ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς ὅρους τοὺς προβλεπομένους ὑπὸ τῶν κάτωθι ἄρθρων 13 καὶ ἑπομένων.

Τὰ πολεμικὰ σκάφη τὰ μὴ ὑπαγόμενα εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας περὶ ὧν ἡ προηγουμένη παράγραφος δὲν θὰ δικαιοῦνται νὰ διαπλέωσι τὰ Στενὰ εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοὺς εἰδικοὺς ὅρους τοὺς προβλεπομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρθρων 11 καὶ 12.

Ἄρθρον 11.

Ἐπιτρέπεται ὁ διάπλους τῶν Στενῶν εἰς πλοῖα γραμμῆς ἐκτοπίσματος ἀνωτέρου τοῦ προβλεπομένου ὑπὸ τῆς πρώτης παραγράφου τοῦ ἄρθρου 14, ἀνήκοντα εἰς παροχθίους τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου Δυνάμεις, ὑπὸ τὸν ὅρον ὅπως τὰ πλοῖα ταῦτα διέρχωνται τὰ Στενὰ ἓν πρὸς ἓν συνοδευόμενα ὑπὸ δύο κατ' ἀνώτατον ὅριον τορπιλλικῶν.

Ἄρθρον 12.

Τὰ ὑποβρύχια τῶν παροχθίων τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου Δυνάμεων τὰ ναυπηγηθέντα ἢ ἀγορασθέντα ἐκτὸς τῆς θαλάσσης ταύτης, θὰ ἔχωσι τὸ δικαίωμα νὰ διαπλέωσιν τὰ Στενὰ ἵνα μεταβῶσιν εἰς τὴν βάσιν των, ἐφόσον ἐδόθη ἐν καιρῷ τῷ δέοντι προειδοποίησις εἰς τὴν Τουρκίαν περὶ τῆς ἐνάρξεως τῆς ναυπηγήσεως ἢ περὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς αὐτῶν.

Τὰ ὑποβρύχια τὰ ἀνήκοντα εἰς τὰς ρηθείσας δυνάμεις θὰ δύνανται ἐπίσης νὰ διαπλέωσιν τὰ Στενὰ ἵνα ἐπισκευασθῶσιν εἰς ναυπηγεῖα κείμενα ἐκτὸς τῆς θαλάσσης ταύτης ὑπὸ τὸν ὅρον ὅπως δίδωνται εἰς τὴν Τουρκίαν ἀκριβεῖς περὶ τούτου πληροφορίαι.

Ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ περιπτώσει, τὰ ὑποβρύχια δέον νὰ πλέωσιν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ νὰ διέρχωνται διὰ τῶν Στενῶν μεμονωμένως.

Ἄρθρον 13.

Διὰ τὸν διάπλουν τῶν Στενῶν ὑπὸ πολεμικῶν σκαφῶν δέον νὰ δίδεται προειδοποίησις εἰς τὴν Τυρκικὴν Κυβέρνησιν διὰ τῆς διπλωματικῆς ὁδοῦ. Ἡ κανονικὴ προθεσμία τῆς προειδοποιήσεως θὰ εἶναι ὀκταήμερος, ἀλλὰ εἶναι εὐκταῖον ὅπως, διὰ τὰς Δυνάμεις τὰς μὴ παροχθίους τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου, ἡ προθεσμία αὐξηθῇ εἰς δεκαπενθήμερον. Ἐν τῇ προειδοποιήσει θὰ δηλοῦται ὁ προορισμός, τὸ ὄνομα, ὁ τύπος καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν σκαφῶν ὡς καὶ ἡ ἡμερομηνία τοῦ διάπλου διὰ τὴν μετάβασιν καί, ἐὰν συντρέχει λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἐπιστροφήν. Πᾶσα μεταβολὴ ἡμερομηνίας δέον νὰ ἀποτελέσῃ ἀντικείμενον τριημέρου προειδοποιήσεως.

Ἡ εἴσοδος εἰς τὰ Στενὰ διὰ τὸν διάπλουν μεταβάσεως δέον νὰ λαμβάνῃ χώραν ἐντὸς πενθημέρου προθεσμίας ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμερομηνίας τῆς καθοριζομένης ἐν τῇ ἀρχικῇ προειδοποιήσει. Μετὰ τὴν λῆξιν τῆς προθεσμίας ταύτης, δέον νὰ δίδεται ἑτέρα προειδοποίησις ὑφ' οὓς ὅρους καὶ ἡ ἀρχικὴ ταύτη.

Κατὰ τὴν διάρκειαν τοῦ διάπλου ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως δέον νὰ γνωστοποιήσῃ, χωρὶς νὰ ἀναγκασθῇ νὰ σταθμεύσῃ, εἰς ἕνα σηματοφορικὸν σταθμὸν εἰς τὴν εἴσοδον τῶν Δαρδανελλίων ἢ τοῦ Βοσπόρου, τὴν ἀκριβῆ σύνθεσιν τῆς ὑπ' αὐτὸν δυνάμεως.

connaître, conformément à l'annexe IV à la présente Convention, au Gouvernment turc, le 1er janvier et le 1er juillet de chaque année, le tonnage total de sa flotte en Mer Noire, et le Gouvernement turc transmettra cette information aux autres Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations.

c) Le tonnage que l'une quelconque des Puissances non riveraines aura la faculté d'avoir en Mer Noire sera limité aux deux tiers du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes a) et b) ci-dessus;

d) Toutefois au cas où une ou plusieurs Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire désireraient y envoyer, dans un but humanitaire, des forces navales, ces forces, dont l'ensemble ne devra, en aucune hypothèse, excéder 8.000 tonnes, seront admises à pénétre dans la Mer Noire, sans le préavis prévu à l'article 13 de la présente Convention, moyennant une autorisation obtenue du Gouvernement turc dans les conditions suivantes: si le tonnage global visé aux paragraphes a) et b) ci-dessus n'est pas atteint et ne doit pas être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le Gouvernement turc accordera ladite autorisation dans le plus bref délai après la réception de la demande dont il aura été saisi ; si ledit tonnage global se trouve être déjà utilisé ou s'il devait être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le Gouvernement turc donnera immédiatement connaissance de la demande d'autorisation aux autres Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire et si ces Puissances, vingt-quatre heures après en avoir été informées, n'y font pas d'objection, il fera savoir aux Puissances intéressées, au plus tard dans un délai utile de quarante-huit heures, la suite qu'il aura décidé de donner à leur demande.

Toute entrée ultérieure en Mer Noire de forces navales des Puissances non riveraines ne s'effectuera que dans limites disponibles du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes a) et b) ci-dessus.

2. Quel que soit l'objet de leur présence en Mer Noire, les bâtiments de guerre des Puissances non riveraines ne pourront pas y rester plus de vingt et un jours;

Article 19.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les bâtiments de guerre jouiront d'une complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits dans des conditions identiques à celles qui sont stipulées aux articles 10 à 18.

Toutefois il sera interdit aux bâtiments de guerre de toute Puissance belligérante de passer à travers les Détroits, sauf dans les cas rentrant dans l'application de l'article 25 de la présente Convention ainsi que dans le cas d'assistance prêtée à un Etat victime d'une agression en vertu d'un traité d'assistance mutuelle engageant la Turquie, conclu dans le cadre du Pacte de la Société des Nations, enregistré et publié conformément aux dispositions de l'article 18 dudit Pacte.

Dans les cas exceptionnels visés à l'alinéa précédent ne seront pas applicables les limitations indiquées dans les articles 10 à 18.

Malgré l'interdiction de passage édictée dans l'alinéa précédent, les navires de guerre légers, les petits bâtiments auxiliaires et les petits bâtiments de guerre ne jaugeant pas plus de 1.000 tonnes, pourront passer les Détroits, à condition toutefois que ces bâtiments soient destinés à rentrer dans leur base d'attache.

Les bâtiments de guerre construits hors des eaux de la Mer Noire, qui seront transférés dans cette mer, devront y arriver par la voie des Détroits et ne pourront y être définitivement maintenus que dans les limites prévues par la présente Convention.

ἀνακοινώνῃ, συμφώνως πρὸς τὸ παράρτημα ΙΙ τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως, εἰς τὴν Τουρκικὴν Κυβέρνησιν, τὴν 1ην Ἰανουαρίου καὶ τὴν 1ην Ἰουλίου ἑκάστου ἔτους, τὸ συνολικὸν ἐκτόπισμα τοῦ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ Πόντῳ στόλου της. Ἡ δὲ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις θέλει διαβιβάζει τὴν πληροφορίαν ταύτην εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ Ὑψηλὰ Συμβαλλόμενα Μέρη, ὡς καὶ εἰς τὸν Γενικὸν Γραμματέα τῆς Κοινωνίας τῶν Ἐθνῶν·

γ΄) Τὸ ἐκτόπισμα τὸ ὁποῖον μία οἱαδήποτε μὴ παρόχθιος Δύναμις θὰ ἔχῃ τὴν εὐχέρειαν νὰ ἔχῃ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ Πόντῳ, θὰ περιορίζεται εἰς τὰ 2)3 τοῦ συνολικοῦ ἐκτοπίσματος τοῦ προβλεπομένου ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνωτέρω παραγράφων α΄ καὶ β΄.

δ΄) Ἐν τούτοις ἐν ᾗ περιπτώσει μία ἢ πλείονες μὴ παρόχθιοι τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου Δυνάμεις θὰ ἐπεθύμουν νὰ ἀποστείλωσιν ἐπὶ ἀνθρωπιστικῷ σκοπῷ ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν ταύτην, αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται, ὧν τὸ σύνολον δέον ἐν σύδεμιᾷ ὑποθέσει νὰ μὴ ὑπερβαίνῃ τοὺς 8.000 τόννους, θὰ γίνωνται δεκταὶ ὅπως εἰσέρχονται εἰς τὸν Εὔξεινον Πόντον, ἄνευ τῆς προειδοποιήσεως τῆς προβλεπομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρθρου 13 τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως, κατόπιν ἀδείας παρεχομένης ὑπὸ τῆς Τουρκικῆς Κυβερνήσεως ὑπὸ τοὺς ἀκολούθους ὅρους : Ἐὰν τὸ συνολικὸν ἐκτόπισμα τὸ προβλεπόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ὡς ἄνω α΄ καὶ β΄ παραγράφων δὲν ἔχει συμπληρωθῇ καὶ δὲν πρόκειται νὰ γίνῃ ὑπέρβασις τούτου ὑπὸ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν ὁποίων ζητεῖται ἡ ἀποστολή, ἡ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις θὰ παρέχῃ τὴν ἐν λόγῳ ἄδειαν τὸ ταχύτερον μετὰ τὴν λῆψιν τῆς αἰτήσεως ἥτις ἤθελε τῇ ὑποβληθῇ· ἐὰν τὸ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος συνολικὸν ἐκτόπισμα ἔχῃ ἤδη χρησιμοποιηθῇ, ἢ ἐὰν πρόκειται νὰ γίνῃ ὑπέρβασις τούτου ὑπὸ τῶν Δυνάμεων ὧν ἐζητήθη ἡ ἀποστολή, ἡ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις θὰ κοινοποιήσῃ ἀμέσως τὴν αἴτησιν ἀδείας εἰς τὰς λοιπὰς παροχθίους τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου Δυνάμεις, καὶ ἐὰν αἱ Δυνάμεις αὗται, δὲν προβάλλουν ἀντίρρησιν ἐντὸς 24 ὡρῶν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινοποιήσεως, ἡ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις θὰ γνωστοποιῇ εἰς τὰς ἐνδιαφερομένας Δυνάμεις ἐντὸς ὠφελίμου προθεσμίας τεσσαράκοντα ὀκτὼ τοὐλάχιστον ὡρῶν τὴν συνέχειαν ἣν θὰ ἤθελεν ἀποφασίσει νὰ δώσῃ εἰς τὴν αἴτησίν των.

Πᾶσα μεταγενεστέρα εἴσοδος εἰς τὸν Εὔξεινον Πόντον ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων τῶν μὴ παροχθίων Δυνάμεων δὲν θὰ ἐκτελῆται εἰ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διαθεσίμοις ὁρίοις τοῦ συνολικοῦ ἐκτοπίσματος τοῦ προβλεπομένου ὑπὸ τῶν ὡς ἄνω α΄ καὶ β΄ παραγράφων.

2. Οἱοσδήποτε καὶ ἂν εἶναι ὁ σκοπὸς τῆς παρουσίας αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ Πόντῳ, τὰ πολεμικὰ σκάφη τῶν μὴ παροχθίων Δυνάμεων δὲν θὰ δύνανται νὰ παραμένωσιν ἐν αὐτῷ πέραν τῶν εἴκοσι καὶ μιᾶς ἡμερῶν.

Ἄρθρον 19.

Ἐν καιρῷ πολέμου, τῆς Τουρκίας μὴ οὔσης ἐμπολέμου, τὰ πολεμικὰ πλοῖα θὰ ἀπολαμβάνουν ἀπολύτου ἐλευθερίας διάπλου καὶ ναυσιπλοΐας ἐν τοῖς Στενοῖς ὑπὸ ὅρους ὁμοίους πρὸς τοὺς συνομολογηθέντας ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις 10 ἕως 18.

Ἐν τούτοις θὰ ἀπαγορεύεται εἰς τὰ πολεμικὰ πλοῖα πάσης ἐμπολέμου Δυνάμεως νὰ διαπλέωσι τὰ Στενά, ἐξαιρουμένων τῶν περιπτώσεων τῶν ὑπαγομένων εἰς τὴν ἐφαρμογὴν τοῦ ἄρθρου 25 τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως, ὡς καὶ τῆς περιπτώσεως συνδρομῆς παρεχομένης εἰς Κράτος ὅπερ ἐγένετο θῦμα ἐπιθέσεως, δυνάμει Συνθήκης ἀμοιβαίας συνδρομῆς ὑποχρεούσης τὴν Τουρκίαν, συνομολογηθείσης ἐν τῷ πλαισίῳ τοῦ Συμφώνου τῆς Κοινωνίας τῶν Ἐθνῶν, καταχωρηθείσης καὶ δημοσιευθείσης συμφώνως πρὸς τὰς διατάξεις τοῦ ἄρθρου 18 τοῦ ἐν λόγῳ Συμφώνου.

Εἰς τὰς ἐξαιρετικὰς περιπτώσεις τὰς προβλεπομένας ὑπὸ τῆς προηγουμένης παραγράφου δὲν θὰ ἐφαρμόζωνται οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις 10 ἕως 18 σημειούμενοι περιορισμοί.

Παρὰ τὴν ἀπαγόρευσιν διάπλου τὴν διατυπωθεῖσαν εἰς τὴν ὡς

au Gouvernement turc, pour les survols occasionnels, un préavis de trois jours et, pour les survols de services réguliers, un préavis général des dates de passage.

D'autre part, nonobstant la remilitarisation des Détroits, le Gouvernement turc fournira les facilités nécessaires pour le passage en toute sécurité des aéronefs civils autorisés d'après la réglementation aérienne en vigueur, en Turquie à survoler le territoire turc entre l'Europe et l'Asie. Pour les cas où une autorisation de survol aurait été accordée, la route à suivre dans la zone des Détroits sera périodiquement indiquée.

SECTION IV.

Dispositions générales.

Article 24.

Les attributions de la Commission internationale constituée en vertu de la Convention concernant le régime des Détroits en date du 24 juillet 1923 sont transférées au Gouvernement turc.

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à réunir les statistiques et à fournir les renseignements relatifs à l'application des articles 11, 12, 14 et 18.

Il doit veiller à l'exécution de toute disposition de la présente Convention ayant trait au passage des bâtiments de guerre dans les Détroits.

Dès qu'il aura été avisé du prochain passage dans les Détroits d'une force navale étrangère, le Gouvernement turc fera connaître aux représentants à Ankara des Hautes Parties contractantes la composition de cette force, son tonnage, la date prévue pour son entrée dans les Détroits et, s'il y a lieu la date probable de son retour.

Le Gouvernement turc adressera au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations ainsi qu'aux Hautes Parties contractantes un rapport annuel indiquant les mouvements des bâtiments de guerre étrangers dans les Détroits et fournissant tous renseignements utiles pour le commerce et la navigation maritime et aérienne envisagée dans la présente Convention.

Article 25.

Aucune disposition de la présente Convention ne porte atteinte aux droits et obligations découlant du Pacte de la Société des Nations pour la Turquie ou pour toute autre Haute Partie contractante, Membre de la Société des Nations.

Section V.

Dispositions Finales.

Article 26.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dans le plus court délai possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées aux archives du Gouvernement de la République française à Paris.

Le Gouvernement japonais aura la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Gouvernement de la République française, par son représentant diplomatique à

δύνανται νὰ χρησιμοποιῶσι τὰς ὁδοὺς ταύτας κατόπιν προειδοποιήσεως τριῶν ἡμερῶν πρὸς τὴν Τουρκικὴν Κυβέρνησιν διὰ τὰς ἐκτάκτους πτήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὰς πτήσεις τακτικῶν συγκοινωνιῶν κατόπιν γενικῆς προειδοποιήσεως περιεχούσης τὰς ἡμερομηνίας διελεύσεως.

Ἀφ' ἑτέρου, παρὰ τὴν ἐπανοχύρωσιν τῶν Στενῶν, ἡ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις θὰ παρέχῃ τὰς ἀναγκαίας εὐκολίας διὰ τὴν διέλευσιν ἐν πάσῃ ἀσφαλείᾳ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀεροσκαφῶν εἰς ἃ ἐπετράπη, συμφώνως πρὸς τὸν ἀεροπορικὸν κανονισμὸν τὸν ἰσχύοντα ἐν Τουρκίᾳ, νὰ ὑπερίπτανται τοῦ τουρκικοῦ ἐδάφους μεταξὺ Εὐρώπης καὶ Ἀσίας. Διὰ τὴν περίπτωσιν καθ' ἣν ἄδεια πτήσεως ἤθελε παρασχεθῇ ἡ ἀκολουθητέα ὁδὸς ἐν τῇ ζώνῃ τῶν Στενῶν θὰ καθορίζεται περιοδικῶς.

ΤΜΗΜΑ IV.

Γενικαὶ διατάξεις.

Ἄρθρον 24.

Αἱ ἁρμοδιότητες τῆς Διεθνοῦς Ἐπιτροπῆς τῆς συσταθείσης δυνάμει τῆς Συμβάσεως τῆς ἀφορώσης τὸ καθεστὼς τῶν Στενῶν, ὑπὸ ἡμερομηνίαν 24 Ἰουλίου 1923, μεταβιβάζονται εἰς τὴν Τουρκικὴν Κυβέρνησιν.

Ἡ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν ὑποχρέωσιν νὰ συγκεντρώνῃ τὰς στατιστικὰς καὶ νὰ παρέχῃ τὰς πληροφορίας τὰς σχετικὰς πρὸς τὴν ἐφαρμογὴν τῶν ἄρθρων 11, 12, 14 καὶ 18.

Ὀφείλει νὰ ἐπαγρυπνῇ διὰ τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν πάσης διατάξεως τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως, ἀφορώσης τὸν διάπλουν τῶν πολεμικῶν σκαφῶν διὰ τῶν Στενῶν.

Ἅμα τῇ προειδοποιήσει περὶ μέλλοντος διάπλου διὰ τῶν Στενῶν ξένης ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ἡ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις θὰ γνωστοποιῇ εἰς τοὺς ἐν Ἀγκύρᾳ ἀντιπροσώπους τῶν Ὑψηλῶν Συμβαλλομένων Μερῶν τὴν σύνθεσιν τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης, τὸ ἐκτόπισμα, τὴν προβλεπομένην ἡμερομηνίαν τῆς εἰσόδου αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ Στενὰ καὶ ἂν συντρέχῃ λόγος τὴν πιθανὴν ἡμερομηνίαν τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς αὐτῆς.

Ἡ Τουρκικὴ Κυβέρνησις θὰ ἀπευθύνῃ εἰς τὸν Γενικὸν Γραμματέα τῆς Κοινωνίας τῶν Ἐθνῶν ὡς καὶ εἰς τὰ Ὑψηλὰ Συμβαλλόμενα Μέρη ἐτησίαν ἔκθεσιν ἀναφέρουσαν τὰς κινήσεις τῶν ξένων πολεμικῶν πλοίων ἐν τοῖς Στενοῖς καὶ παρέχουσαν πάσας τὰς χρησίμους πληροφορίας διὰ τὸ ἐμπόριον, τὴν ναυσιπλοΐαν καὶ τὴν ἀεροπλοΐαν, ὡς προβλέπονται ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως.

Ἄρθρον 25.

Οὐδεμία διάταξις τῆς παρούσης συμβάσεως θίγει τὰ δικαιώματα καὶ τὰς ὑποχρεώσεις τὰς ἀπορρεούσας ἐκ τοῦ Συμφώνου τῆς Κοινωνίας τῶν Ἐθνῶν ὅσον ἀφορᾷ τὴν Τουρκίαν ἢ ἕτερον οἱονδήποτε Ὑψηλὸν Συμβαλλόμενον Μέρος, μέλος τῆς Κοινωνίας τῶν Ἐθνῶν.

ΤΜΗΜΑ V.

Ἀκροτελεύτιοι διατάξεις.

Ἄρθρον 26.

Ἡ παροῦσα Σύμβασις θὰ κυρωθῇ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν βραχυτέρῳ διαστήματι.

Αἱ ἐπικυρώσεις θὰ κατατεθῶσιν εἰς τὰ ἀρχεῖα τῆς Κυβερνήσεως τῆς Γαλλικῆς Δημοκρατίας ἐν Παρισίοις.

Ἡ Ἰαπωνικὴ Κυβέρνησις θὰ ἔχει τὴν εὐχέρειαν νὰ ἀρκεσθῇ εἰς τὸ νὰ γνωστοποιήσῃ εἰς τὴν Κυβέρνησιν τῆς Γαλλικῆς Δημοκρατίας διὰ τοῦ διπλωματικοῦ ἐν Παρισίοις Ἀντιπρο-

pours. Ce préavis contiendra l'indication et les motifs des amendements proposés.

S'il est impossible d'aboutir sur ces propositions par la voie diplomatique, les Hautes Parties contractantes se feront représenter à une conférence convoquée à cet effet.

Cette conférence ne pourra statuer qu'à l'unanimité, à l'exception des cas de revision relatifs à l'article 14 et à l'article 18, pour lesquels il suffira d'une majorité des trois quarts des Hautes Parties contractantes.

Cette majorité sera calculée en y comprenant les trois quarts des Hautes Parties contractantes riveraines de la Mer Noire, y compris la Turquie.

EN FOI DE QUOI les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente Convention.

FAIT à Montreux, le vingt juillet mil neuf cent trente six, en onze exemplaires, dont le premier, revêtu des sceaux des Plénipotentiaires, sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et dont les autres ont été remis aux Puissances signataires.

(L.S.) N. P. NICOLAEV
(L.S.) PIERRE NE·I·COV
(L.S.) J. PAUL-BONCOUR
(L.S.) H. PONSOT
(L.S.) STANLEY
(L.S.) S. M. BRUCE
(L.S.) N. POLITIS
(L.S.) RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI

Les soussignés, Plénipotentiaires du Japon, déclarent, au nom de leur Gouvernement, que les dispositions de la présente Convention ne modifient en rien la position du Japon comme Etat non membre de la Société des Nations, tant à l'égard du Pacte de la Société des Nations qu'à l'égard des traités d'assistance mutuelle conclus dans le cadre dudit Pacte, et que le Japon conserve notamment, pour ce qui concerne ce Pacte et ces traités dans les dispositions des articles 19 et 25, une pleine liberté d'appréciation.

(L.S.) N. SATO
(L.S.) MASSA-AKI HOTTA
(L.S.) N. TITULESCO
(L.S.) CONST. CONTZESCO
(L.S.) V.V. PELLA
(L.S.) Dr. R. ARAS
(L.S.) SUAD DAVAZ
(L.S.) N. MENEMENCIOGLU
(L.S.) ASIM GÜNDÜZ
(L.S.) N. SADAK
(L.S.) MAXIME LITVINOFF
(L.S.) Dr. I. V. SOUBBOTITCH

ANNEXE I

1. Les taxes et charges qui peuvent être prélevées conformément à l'article 2 de la présente Convention seront celles qui sont indiquées dans le tableau ci-après

Ἡ προειδοποίησις θὰ περιέχῃ τὸν καθορισμὸν καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν προτεινομένων τροποποιήσεων.

Ἐὰν δὲν καταστῇ δυνατὸν νὰ καταλήξωσιν αἱ συνεννοήσεις ἐπὶ τῶν προτάσεων τούτων διὰ τῆς διπλωματικῆς ὁδοῦ, τὰ Ὑψηλὰ Συμβαλλόμενα Μέρη θὰ ἀντιπροσωπευθῶσιν εἰς Συνδιάσκεψιν ἐπὶ τούτῳ συγκαλουμένην.

Ἡ συνδιάσκεψις αὕτη δὲν θὰ δύναται νὰ λάβῃ ἀποφάσεις εἰμὴ μόνον κατὰ πλειοψηφίαν ἐξαιρουμένων τῶν περιπτώσεων ἀναθεωρήσεως τῶν σχετικῶν πρὸς τὸ ἄρθρον 14 καὶ τὸ ἄρθρον 18, ὅσον ἀφορᾷ τὰ ὁποῖα πλειοψηφία τῶν 3)4 τῶν Ὑψηλῶν Συμβαλλομένων Μερῶν θὰ εἶναι ἐπαρκής.

Ἡ πλειοψηφία αὕτη θὰ ὑπολογίζεται συμπεριλαμβανομένων τῶν 3)4 τῶν παροχθίων τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου Ὑψηλῶν Συμβαλλομένων Μερῶν, συμπεριλαμβανομένης τῆς Τουρκίας.

Εἰς πίστωσιν τῶν ἀνωτέρω οἱ ὡς ἄνω κατονομαζόμενοι πληρεξούσιοι ὑπέγραψαν τὴν παρούσαν Σύμβασιν.

Ἐγένετο ἐν Μοντρὲ τῇ εἰκοστῇ Ἰουλίου χιλιοστοῦ ἐννεακοσιοστοῦ τριακοστοῦ ἕκτου ἔτους εἰς ἕνδεκα ἀντίτυπα ὧν τὸ πρῶτον περιβεβλημένον διὰ τῶν σφραγίδων τῶν πληρεξουσίων θέλει κατατεθῇ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχείοις τῆς Κυβερνήσεως τῆς Γαλλικῆς Δημοκρατίας καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὁποίων τὰ λοιπὰ παρεδόθησαν εἰς τὰς συνυπογραψάσας Δυνάμεις.

(Τ. Σ.) Ν. Π. ΝΙΚΟΛΑΕΦ
(Τ.Σ.) ΠΕΤΡΟΣ ΝΕ·Ι·ΚΩΦ
(Τ. Σ.) Ι. ΠΑΥΛΟΣ-ΜΠΟΝΚΟΥΡ
(Τ. Σ.) ΕΡΡΙΚΟΣ ΠΟΝΣΩ
(Τ. Σ.) ΣΤΑΝΛΕ·Υ·
(Τ. Σ.) Σ. Μ. ΜΠΡΟΥΣ
(Τ. Σ.) Ν. ΠΟΛΙΤΗΣ
(Τ. Σ.) ΡΑΟΥΛ·ΒΙΒΙΚΑ—ΡΩΣΣΕΤΗΣ

Οἱ κάτωθι ὑπογραμμένοι Πληρεξούσιοι τῆς Ἰαπωνίας, δηλοῦσιν ἐν ὀνόματι τῆς Κυβερνήσεως αὐτῶν, ὅτι αἱ διατάξεις τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως κατ' οὐδὲν μεταβάλλουσι τὴν θέσιν τῆς Ἰαπωνίας ὡς Κράτους μὴ Μέλους τῆς Κοινωνίας τῶν Ἐθνῶν, τόσον ὡς πρὸς τὸ Σύμφωνον τῆς Κοινωνίας τῶν Ἐθνῶν, ὅσον καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὰς συνθήκας ἀμοιβαίας συνδρομῆς τὰς συναφθείσας ἐν τῷ πλαισίῳ τοῦ ρηθέντος Συμφώνου, καὶ ὅτι ἡ Ἰαπωνία διατηρεῖ ἰδίως ὅσον ἀφορᾷ τὸ συμφωνον τοῦτο καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ταύτας ἐν τῇ διατάξει τῶν ἄρθρων 19 καὶ 25, πλήρη ἐλευθερίαν ἐκτιμήσεως.

(Τ. Σ.) Ν. ΣΑΤΟ
(Τ. Σ.) ΜΑΣΣΑ—ΑΚΙ—ΧΟΤΤΑ
(Τ. Σ.) Ν. ΤΙΤΟΥΛΕΣΚΟ
(Τ. Σ.) ΚΩΝ. ΚΟΝΤΖΕΣΚΟ
(Τ. Σ.) Β. Β. ΠΕΛΛΑ
(Τ. Σ.) ΔΡ. Ρ. ΑΡΑΣ
(Τ. Σ.) ΣΟΥΑΝΤ ΝΤΑΒΑΖ
(Τ. Σ.) Ν. ΜΕΝΕΜΕΝΤΖΙΟΓΛΟΥ
(Τ. Σ.) ΑΣΙΜ ΓΚΟΥΝΤΟΥΖ
(Τ. Σ.) Ν. ΣΑΝΤΑΚ
(Τ. Σ.) ΜΑΞΙΜΟΣ ΛΙΤΒΙΝΩΦ
(Τ. Σ.) ΔΡ. Ι. Β. ΣΟΥΜΠΟΤΙΤΣ

ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ Ι.

1. Τὰ τέλη καὶ αἱ ἐπιβαρύνσεις ἅτινα δύνανται νὰ εἰσπραχθῶσι συμφώνως πρὸς τὸ ἄρθρον 2 τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως εἶναι ἐκεῖνα ἅτινα ἀναφέρονται εἰς τὸν κάτωθι πίνακα. Αἱ

ANNEXE II (1)

A. Déplacement type.

1. Le déplacement type d'un bâtiment de surface est le déplacement du bâtiment achevé, avec son équipage complet, ses machines et chaudières, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses installations, équipements, vivres, eau douce pour l'équipage, approvisionnements divers, outillages et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit emporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible et sans eau de réserve pour l'alimentation des machines et chaudières.

2. Le déplacement type d'un sous-marin est le déplacement en surface du bâtiment achevé (non compris l'eau des compartiments non étanches), avec son équipage complet, son appareil moteur, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses installations, équipements, vivres pour l'équipage, outillages divers et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit exporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible, huile lubrifiante, eau douce ou eau de ballast de toute sorte.

3. Le mot «tonne», sauf dans l'expression «tonnes métriques», désigne une tonne de 1.016 kilogrammes (2.240 lbs).

B. Classes.

1. Les bâtiments de ligne sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface appartenant à l'une des deux sous-classes suivantes:

a) bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, les bâtiments auxiliaires ou les bâtiments de ligne de la sous-classe b), dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 10.000 tonnes (10.160 tonnes métriques) ou qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces);

b) bâtiments de guerre de surface autre que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, dont le déplacement type n'est pas supérieur à 8.000 tonnes (8.128 tonnes métriques) et qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces).

2. Les bâtiments porte-aéronefs sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface qui, quel soit leur déplacement, sont conçus ou aménagés principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer. Si un bâtiment de guerre n'a pas été conçu ou aménagé principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer, l'installation sur ce bâtiment d'un pont d'atterrissage ou d'envol n'aura pas pour effet de le faire entrer dans la classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs.

La classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs se subdivise en deux sous-classes, à savoir:

a) bâtiments pourvus d'un pont tel que les aéronefs puissent y prendre leur vol ou s'y poser;

b) bâtiments non pourvus du pont décrit au paragraphe a) ci-dessus.

3. Les bâtiments légers de surface sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface autres que les bâtiments

(1) Les textes de la présente annexe ont été empruntés au Traité naval de Londres du 25 mars 1936.

ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ ΙΙ (1)

Α') Συμβατικὸν ἐκτόπισμα.

1. Τὸ συμβατικὸν ἐκτόπισμα ἑνὸς πλοίου ἐπιφανείας εἶναι τὸ ἐκτόπισμα τοῦ πλοίου μετὰ τὴν ἀποπεράτωσιν τῆς ναυπηγήσεώς του μετὰ πλήρους τοῦ πληρώματός του, τῶν μηχανῶν καὶ λεβήτων του, ἕτοιμον νὰ ἀναχθῇ εἰς τὸ πέλαγος, ἔχων ὁλόκληρον τὸν ὁπλισμόν καὶ ὅλα του τὰ πυρομαχικά, τας ἐγκαταστάσεις, τὰ ἐξαρτήματα. τρόφιμα, γλυκὺ ὕδωρ διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα, ἐφόδια παντὸς εἴδους, ἐργαλεῖα καὶ ἀνταλλακτικὰ πάσης φύσεως, τὰ ὁποῖα δέον νὰ συναποφέρῃ ἐν καιρῷ πολέμου, ἀλλ' ἄνευ καυσίμων καὶ ἄνευ ἐφεδρικοῦ ὕδατος διὰ τὴν τροφοδότησιν τῶν μηχανῶν καὶ τῶν λεβήτων.

2. Τὸ συμβατικὸν ἐκτόπισμα ἑνὸς ὑποβρυχίου εἶναι τὸ ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ ἐκτόπισμα τοῦ ὑποβρυχίου μετὰ τὸ πέρας τῆς ναυπηγήσεώς του (μὴ συμπεριλαμβανομένου τοῦ ὕδατος τῶν μὴ στεγανῶν χώρων) μετὰ πλήρους τοῦ πληρώματός του, τῶν πρωωστήρων, ἕτοιμον νὰ ἀναχθῇ εἰς τὸ πέλαγος, ἔχον ὁλόκληρον τὸν ὁπλισμόν καὶ πάντα τὰ πυρομαχικά του, τὰς ἐγκαταστάσεις, ἐξαρτήματα, τρόφιμα διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα, ἐργαλεῖα διάφορα καὶ ἀνταλλακτικὰ πάσης φύσεως, ἅτινα δέον νὰ συναποφέρῃ ἐν καιρῷ πολέμου, ἀλλὰ ἄνευ τῶν καυσίμων, ἐλαίου λιπάνσεως, γλυκέος ὕδατος, ἢ ὕδατος θαλασσερμάτων πάσης φύσεως.

3. Ἡ λέξις «τόννος» ἐξαιρουμένης τῆς ἐκφράσεως «μετρικοὶ τόννοι» σημαίνει τόννον 1.016 χιλιογράμμων (2.240 λίτραι).

Β') Κατηγορίαι.

1. Τὰ πλοῖα γραμμῆς εἶναι τὰ πολεμικὰ πλοῖα ἐπιφανείας τὰ ἀνήκοντα εἰς μίαν τῶν κάτωθι κατηγοριῶν:

α') Πολεμικὰ ἐπιφανείας, πλὴν τῶν ἀεροπλανοφόρων, τῶν βοηθητικῶν ἢ τῶν πλοίων γραμμῆς τῆς ὑποκατηγορίας β', τῶν ὁποίων τὸ συμβατικὸν ἐκτόπισμα εἶναι ἀνώτερον τῶν 10.000 τόννων (10.160 μετρικοὶ τόννοι) ἢ τὰ ὁποῖα φέρουσι πυροβόλον διαμετρήματος ἀνωτέρου τῶν 203 χιλιοστομέτρων (8 ἀγγλικῶν δακτύλων).

β') Τὰ πολεμικὰ πλοῖα ἐπιφανείας πλὴν τῶν ἀεροπλανοφόρων. τῶν ὁποίων τὸ συμβατικὸν ἐκτόπισμα δὲν εἶναι ἀνώτερον τῶν 8.000 τόννων (8.128 μετρικῶν τόννων) καὶ ἅτινα φέρουσι πυροβόλον διαμετρήματος ἀνωτέρου τῶν 203 χιλιοστομέτρων (8 ἀγγλικῶν δακτύλων).

2. Τὰ ἀεροπλανοφόρα πλοῖα εἶναι πολεμικὰ πλοῖα ἐπιφανείας, ἅτινα ἀνεξαρτήτως τοῦ ἐκτοπίσματος αὐτῶν, ἐσχεδιάσθησαν ἢ διασκευάσθησαν κυρίως ἵνα μεταφέρωσι καὶ θέτωσιν ἐν δράσει ἀεροσκάφη κατὰ θάλασσαν. Ἂν πολεμικὸν πλοῖον δὲν ἐσχεδιάσθη ἢ διεσκευάσθη κυρίως πρὸς μεταφορὰν καὶ θέσιν ἐν δράσει ἀεροσκαφῶν, ἡ ἐγκατάστασις ἐπὶ τοῦ πλοίου τούτου καταστρώματος προσγειώσεως ἢ ἀπογειώσεως δὲν θὰ εἶχε ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα τὴν κατάταξιν τοῦ πλοίου τούτου εἰς τὴν κατηγορίαν τῶν ἀεροπλανοφόρων.

Ἡ κατηγορία τῶν ἀεροπλανοφόρων ὑποδιαιρεῖται εἰς δύο ὑποκατηγορίας, ἤτοι :

α) Πλοῖα ἐφωδιασμένα διὰ καταστρώματος τοιούτου ὥστε τὰ ἀεροσκάφη νὰ δύνανται νὰ ἀπογειωθῶσιν ἢ νὰ προσγειωθῶσιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ.

β) Πλοῖα μὴ ἐφωδιασμένα διὰ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀνωτέρω παραγράφῳ α περιγραφέντος καταστρώματος.

(1) Τὰ κείμενα τοῦ παρόντος παραρτήματος ἐλήφθησαν ἐκ τῆς ναυτικῆς Συνθήκης τοῦ Λονδίνου τῆς 25 Μαρτίου 1936.

i) s'il a été mis sur cale avant le 1er janvier 1920.....16ans ;
ii) s'il a été mis sur cale après le 31 décembre 1919.....20 ans ;
d) pour un bâtiment léger de surface de la sous-classe (c).....16 ans ;
e) pour un sous-marin .....13 ans ;

ANNEXE III

Il est convenu que, parmi les trois navires-écoles hors d'âge ci-dessous désignés de la marine japonaise, deux unités seront admises à visiter les ports des Détroits ensemble.

Le tonnage global de ces deux navires sera, dans ce cas, considéré comme équivalant à 15.000 tonnes.

	Date de la mise en chantier	Date de la l'entrée en service	Déplacement type (tonnes)	Armement
Asama	20-X-1896	18-III-1899	9.240	IV×200 mm. XII×150 mm.
Yakumo	1-IX-1898	20-VI-1900	9.010	IV×200 mm. XII×150 mm.
Iwate	11-XI-1898	18-III-1901	9.180	IV×200 mm. XIV×150 mm.

ANNEXE IV.

1. Les classes et sous-classes de bâtiments à comprendre dans le calcul du tonnage total des flottes des Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, visé à l'article 18 de la présente Convention, sont les suivantes :

Bâtiments de ligne :
sous-classe (a)
sous-classe (b)
Bâtiments porte-aéronefs :
sous-classe (a)
sous-classe (b)
Bâtiments légers de surface :
sous-classe (a)
sous-classe (b)
sous-classe (c)

Sous marins

suivant les définitions de l'annexe II à la présente Convention.

Le déplacement dont il doit être tenu compte dans le calcul du tonnage total est le déplacement type, tel qu'il est défini à l'annexe III. Ne seront pris en considération que les bâtiments qui ne sont pas «hors d'âge», tels qu'ils sont définis à ladite annexe.

2. Le communication prévue à l'article 18, alinéa b), doit comprendre en outre le tonnage total des bâtiments des classes et sous-classes mentionnées au paragraphe premier de la présente annexe.

PROTOCOLE

Au moment de signer la Convention portant la date de ce jour, les plénipotentiaires soussignés, engageant leurs gouvernements respectifs, déclarent accepter les dispositions ci-après :

1. La Turquie pourra remilitariser immédiatement

I. Ἐὰν ἐτέθη ἐπὶ τῆς ναυπηγικῆς ἐσχάρας πρὸ τῆς 1ης Ἰανουαρίου τοῦ 1920..... 16 »
II. Ἐὰν ἐτέθη ἐπὶ τῆς ναυπηγικῆς ἐσχάρας μετὰ τὴν 31ην Δεκεμβρίου 1919 ..... 20 »
δ) διὰ ἐλαφρὸν πλοῖον ἐπιφανείας τῆς ὑποκατηγορίας γ ..... 16 »
ε) διὰ ὑποβρύχιον ..... 13 »

ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ III.

Συμφωνεῖται ὅπως μεταξὺ τῶν κάτωθι σημειουμένων τριῶν ὑπερηλίκων πλοίων-σχολῶν τοῦ Ἰαπωνικοῦ Ναυτικοῦ, δύο μονάδες θὰ εἶναι ἀποδεκταὶ ὅπως ἐπισκέπτωνται ὁμοῦ τοὺς λιμένας τῶν Στενῶν.

Τὸ συνολικὸν ἐκτόπισμα τῶν δύο τούτων πλοίων θὰ θεωρεῖται ἐν τῇ περιπτώσει ταύτῃ ὡς ἰσοδυναμοῦν πρὸς 15.000 τόννους.

	Ἡμερομηνία ἐνάρξεως ναυπηγήσεως	Ἡμερομηνία ἐνάρξεως ὑπηρεσίας	Συμβατικὸν ἐκτόπισμα (Τόννοι)	Ὁπλισμός
Ἀσάμα	20.X.1896	18,III.1899	9.240	IY×200 χ.μ. XII×150 χ.μ.
Γιακοῦμο	1.IX.1898	20.YI.1890	9.010	IY×200 χ.μ. XII×150 χ.μ.
Ἰουᾶτε	11.XI.1898	18.III.1901	9.180	IY×200 χ.μ. XIY×150 χ.μ.

ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ IV.

1. Αἱ κατηγορίαι καὶ ὑποκατηγορίαι τῶν περιλαμβανομένων εἰς τὸν ὑπολογισμὸν τοῦ συνολικοῦ ἐκτοπίσματος τῶν στόλων τῶν παροχθίων Δυνάμεων τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου τοῦ προβλεπομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρθρου 18 τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως εἶναι αἱ ἀκόλουθοι:

Πλοῖα γραμμῆς:
ὑποκατηγορία α
ὑποκατηγορία β
Ἀεροπλανοφόρα πλοῖα:
ὑποκατηγορία α
ὑποκατηγορία β
Ἐλαφρὰ πλοῖα ἐπιφανείας:
ὑποκατηγορία α
ὑποκατηγορία β
ὑποκατηγορία γ
Ὑποβρύχια

κατὰ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς τοῦ παραρτήματος II τῆς παρούσης Συμβάσεως.

Τὸ ἐκτόπισμα ὅπερ δέον νὰ λαμβάνεται ὑπ' ὄψιν κατὰ τὸν ὑπολογισμὸν τοῦ συνολικοῦ ἐκτοπίσματος εἶναι τὸ συμβατικὸν ἐκτόπισμα, οἷον καθορίζεται ἐν τῷ Παραρτήματι III. Δὲν θὰ λαμβάνωνται ὑπ' ὄψιν εἰ μὴ τὰ μὴ ὑπερήλικα πλοῖα ὡς καθωρίσθησαν ἐν τῷ ρηθέντι παραρτήματι.

2. Ἡ ἀνακοίνωσις ἡ προβλεπομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄρθρου 18, ἐδάφιον β, δέον νὰ περιλαμβάνῃ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ συνολικὸν ἐκτόπισμα τῶν πλοίων τῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ ὑποκατηγοριῶν τῶν ἀναφερομένων εἰς τὴν πρώτην παράγραφον τοῦ παρόντος παραρτήματος.

ΠΡΩΤΟΚΟΛΛΟΝ

Κατὰ τὴν στιγμὴν τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τῆς ὑπὸ σημερινὴν ἡμερομηνίαν Συμβάσεως, οἱ κάτωθι ὑπογεγραμμένοι πληρεξούσιοι δεσμεύοντες τὰς οἰκείας αὐτῶν Κυβερνήσεις, δηλοῦσιν ὅτι ἀποδέχονται τὰς κάτωθι διατάξεις :

1. Ἡ Τουρκία θὰ δύναται νὰ ἐπανοπλήσῃ ἀμέσως τὴν

October 12 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/983

767.68119/983

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and transmits herewith for his information a copy of despatch No. 1323, dated September 8, 1936, from the American Legation at Athens, Greece, together with its enclosure, regarding the ratification by Greece of the Convention signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936.

Enclosure:

From Legation, Athens,
No. 1323, September 8,1936.



NE/LS

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
OCT 18 1936
WAR DEPARTMENT
6510
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 24 1936
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
6-5
2724-T28
17

G-2 Report

TURKEY (Combat)

Subject: System of Supply.
Purchase of Armament for the Fortification of the Straits.

767.68119/984

Supplementing reports No. 6618 (6510) and No. 6667 (6510) of March 19, 1936, and August 7, 1936, respectively, it is now being rumored in the press that the Turkish Government has awarded a contract for the rearmament of the Straits to a German consortium which includes the Krupps. The cost mentioned, viz. Ltq. 9,000,000, corresponds with the amount known to be held in Germany.

Reiteration is given to the statement that the Turkish Government intends to do this work of refortification itself, obtaining from abroad only the materiel and necessary technical equipment. Moreover, it is again being stated that particular attention will be paid to providing mobile defenses; that a large portion of the materiel contracted for will be motorized equipment from Krupps susceptible of being readily transported from one point to another.

That the German group is affording long term facilities of payment, as much as ten years, is well known.

ROYDEN WILLIAMSON,
Major, (Cav.), Acting G.S.,
Military Attache.

From: M.A. Istanbul Report No. 6679 September 11, 1936.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 026 Foreign Relations/1080 FOR Instruction #1471

FROM Great Britain (Bingham) DATED Oct. 27, 1936
TO NAME 1—1127 ero

REGARDING:

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1923.

Request to obtain permission to publish in -, certain correspondence on file number 767.68119

767.68119/985

lw

No. 1929 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland, November 6, 1936

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DEC 9 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1936 NOV 18 AM 11 46

DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOV 21 1936 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS NOV 19 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Publications concerning the Montreux Conference on the Regime of the Straits.

1—1055 G P O

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEC 30 1936 RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEC 14 1936 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to call attention to my despatch No. 1813 Political dated August 15, 1936 in which I gave certain information which had come to me respecting the prospective publication of two documents on the Montreux Conference on the Régime of the Straits. I am now informed that developments in this matter, which, as will be noted, involve a change in the original plan, are as follows.

(a) The Turkish Government is publishing a document embodying the procès verbaux of the Conference with an explanatory forward by M. Aghnides (of the League of Nations Secretariat) who was Secretary-General of the Conference.

Although this is being brought out by the Turkish Government, I have reason to believe that it is chiefly the work of M. Aghnides; it was, in any event, prepared in Geneva under his auspices.

It is

TREATY DIVISION DEC 23 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILED JAN 8 - 1936

767.68119/986

It is being published in Paris. The Turkish Government will, I understand, transmit it officially to the states parties to the Conference. I do not believe that it is regarded as a confidential publication. I have been unable nevertheless as yet to obtain copies in Geneva, although I expect to have made available to me a copy for my own use at a later date.

I venture to state that should the Department be interested in this document copies can presumably be obtained either through the American Embassy at Paris or through the American Embassy at Istanbul.

(b) Members of the League Secretariat under the direction of M. Aghnides are engaged in preparing a study of the Montreux Convention which will take the form of a "history" of each article of the Convention based on developments of the pertinent questions antecedent to and through the Montreux Conference. I believe, however, that some time will elapse before this work reaches publication.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Original and three copies to the Department of State
One copy to the American Embassy, Paris
One copy to the American Embassy, Istanbul
One copy to the American Legation, Bern

PBG/IS

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, November 14, 1936.

No. 103

Subject: Transmitting French text of the document ratifying the new Straits Convention concluded at Montreux.

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 8 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 24 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NOV 21 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
DEC 14 1936

TREATY DIVISION
DEC 23 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

767.68119/987

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a single copy of the French text of the "Procès-Verbal" of the Deposit of Ratifications of the new Straits Convention signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936.

The Department may recall that in his despatch No. 1929, Political, of November 6, 1936, the American Consul at Geneva stated that the Turkish Government had the intention of publishing a document embodying the Procès Verbaux of that Conference with an explanatory foreword by M. Aghnides, of the League of

Nations ...

N/C

Nations Secrétariat, who was Secretary General of the Conference.

The Consul further stated that this document is being published in Paris and that he understood that the Turkish Government would transmit it officially to the States parties to the Conference. He had been unable to obtain a copy in Geneva.

Inquiries addressed by the Embassy to the Service du Protocole and the Service Français de la Société des Nations at the Quai d'Orsay reveal that no copies of this document have as yet been received by the French Government, although an official in the latter service was aware of the intention of the Turkish Government shortly to publish the Procès Verbaux.

The Quai d'Orsay has consented to forward copies of this document if and when it becomes available.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Edwin C. Wilson
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure: (single copy)
Copy of "Procès Verbal"
above referred to.
In quintuplicate

SPT/cg

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 103
of November 12, 1936
from the Embassy at Paris

PROCES VERBAL DE DEPOT DES RATIFICATIONS SUR LA CONVENTION CONCERNANT LE REGIME DES DETROITS SIGNEE A MONTREUX LE 20 JUILLET 1936

CONFORMEMENT aux dispositions de l'article 26 de la Convention concernant le Regime des Detroits, signée à Montreux le 20 JUILLET 1936 entre la BULGARIE, la FRANCE, l'EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE, le COMMONWEALTH d'AUSTRALIE la GRECE, le JAPON , la ROUMANIE, la TURQUIE, l'UNION des REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES SOCIALISTES et la YOUGOSLAVIE

le Ministre de BULGARIE à PARIS

le Ministre des AFFAIRES ETRANGERES de la République Française

le Ministre Plénipotentiaire de S.M. BRITANNIQUE à PARIS

le Chargé d'Affaires de GRECE à PARIS

le Ministre de ROUMANIE à PARIS

l'Ambassadeur de TURQUIE à PARIS

le Conseiller de l'Ambassade de l'UNION des REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES SOCIALISTES à PARIS

le Ministre de YOUGOSLAVIE à PARIS

ont déposé les instruments de ratifications de :

SA MAJESTE le ROI des BULGARES

M. le PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

S.M. LE ROI DE GRANDE - BRETAGNE , d'IRLANDE et des TERRITOIRES BRITANNIQUES AU DELA DES MERS, EMPEREUR DES INDES
Pour le ROYAUME UNI

S.M. le ROI DE GRANDE - BRETAGNE , d'IRLANDE et des TERRITOIRES BRITANNIQUES AU DELA DES MERS, EMPEREUR DES INDES
Pour le COMMONWEALTH D'AUSTRALIE

.....

S.M. LE ROI DES HELLENES

S.M. LE ROI DE ROUMANIE

S.EXC. LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE TURQUE

du COMITE CENTRAL EXECUTIF DE L'UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES SOCIALISTES

S.M. LE ROI DE YOUGOSLAVIE

sur ladite CONVENTION

Les instruments de ratifications produits aujourd'hui, ayant été trouvés, après examen, en bonne etdue forme, sont confiés au Gouvernement de la République FRANCAISE pour être déposés dans les archives du Département des Affaires Etrangères.
des

EN FOI DE QUOI a été dressé le présent procès-verbal dont une copie certifiée conforme sera adressée, par les soins du Gouvernement de la République Française, à chacune des Puissances signataires de cet Acte.

Fait à Paris le 9 NOVEMBRE 1936

signé : C. BATOLOFF
signé : YvonDELBOS
signé : Lloyd THOMAS
signé : Lloyd THOMAS
signé : MARCHETTI
signé : CESIANO
signé : SUAD DAVAS
signé : HIRSCHFELD
signé : Bojidar POURITCH

Pour copie certifiée conforme
le Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Chef du Service du Protocole

P. de Fouquières

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 156 Ankara, November 13, 1936.

Subject: Entry into Effect of the Provisions of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 102 of August 11, 1936, and other correspondence regarding the new régime of the Straits as the result of the

1/ Montreux Conference, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a note received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey on November 12, 1936,

2/ together with an English translation thereof.

The note informs the diplomatic missions accredited to Ankara that, the proper number of instruments of

ratification

ratification of the Powers signatory to the Montreux Convention having been deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of France, the provisions of the Montreux Convention became definitively effective on November 9, 1936.

The note was delivered to the Embassy during the morning of November 12. That afternoon I had an appointment with Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Early in the course of general conversation, I took occasion to congratulate the Minister on the definitive coming into force of the Montreux Convention, as notified in the Ministry's circular note of November 11; and I inquired whether, as reported in the press, it was the intention of the Turkish Government to make official publication of the documents. He said that such a publication was in course of preparation, and that he would gladly send me a copy. In thanking him, I remarked that if he should see fit to communicate it to me under cover of a note, his doing so would forestall and set at rest any question that might arise as to the intentions of the Turkish Government concerning our participation in the benefits of the Convention. He at once volunteered to make such a formal signed communication, by way of further assurance such as he had already given me orally (see memorandum of conversation with him, July 25, transmitted to the Department in Embassy's No. 90, July 29); and he went on to say that he had already gone further than merely giving individual assurances to us

and

and to other nations not signatory to the Convention -- he had, in reporting it to the Grand National Assembly and asking ratification in behalf of the Turkish Government, explained that it embodies a recognition of the principle of free commercial navigation of the Straits and that such recognition is therefore implicit in the Turkish ratification.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMURRAY

Enclosures:
1. Note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, No. 21109/49, November 11, 1936.
2. Translation.

720

FEF:KOS

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 156, dated November 13, 1936, from the American Embassy at Ankara, on subject of Entry into Effect of the Provisions of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits.

TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI

HARICIYE VEKÂLETI

21109/49

En se référant à sa Note circulaire en date du 5 août 1936, sub No. 14490/30, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance des Missions Diplomatiques accréditées à Ankara, pour toutes fins utiles, que le nombre voulu d'instruments de ratification des Puissances signataires de la Convention concernant le Régime des Détroits signée à Montreux le 20 juillet 1936, ayant été déposé aux archives du Gouvernement de la République Française à Paris, le procès-verbal de dépôt en a été dressé en date du 9 novembre 1936. Par conséquent ladite Convention, dont les dispositions ont été provisoirement appliquées à dater du 15 août 1936, est entrée définitivement en vigueur à partir du 9 novembre 1936, conformément à l'article 26 de cette même Convention.

Ankara, le 11 Novembre 1936

(SEAL)

Ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

en Ville.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No156, dated November 13, 1936, from the American Embassy at Ankara, on subject Entry into Effect of the Provisions of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits.

TRANSLATION

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

21109/49

Referring to its Circular Note dated August 5, 1936, No. 14490/30, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to bring to the knowledge of the Diplomatic Missions accredited to Ankara, for such purposes as it may serve, that the requisite number of instruments of ratification of the Powers signatory to the Convention regarding the Régime of the Straits signed at Montreux July 20, 1936, having been deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic at Paris, the procès-verbal of deposit has been drawn up under date of November 9, 1936. That Convention, the stipulations of which have been provisionally applied since August 15, 1936, has therefore come definitively into force as from November 9, 1936, in accordance with Article 26 of the same Convention.

Ankara, November 11, 1936.

Embassy of the United States of America.

City.

December 11 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/988

767.68119/988

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and, with reference to previous correspondence regarding the new régime of the Straits as a result of the Montreux Conference, transmits for the information of the Navy Department a copy of a despatch from the Embassy at Istanbul reporting the definitive entrance into force of the Montreux Convention on November 9, 1936, following the deposit of the required number of ratifications in the archives of the Government of the Republic of France.

Enclosure:
From Ankara
Despatch No. 156,
dated November 13, 1936.

NE: RAH/GC

DEC 11 19

A true copy of the signed original

Copy for Mr. Wallace Murray.

Ankara, November 13, 1936.

Confidential

Memorandum of conversation with Dr. Tevfik Rustu Aras, Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 12, 1936.

Subject: (1) Straits Convention; and

(2) Turkish Relations with Great Britain and Other Powers.

767.68119/989

A day or two after the close of the festivities in connection with the anniversary of the Republic, on October 29, I had word conveyed to Dr. Aras that, while I had no particular business to take up with him, I should welcome an opportunity to call on him, at his convenience, to pay my respects. According to what I understand is the usual dilatory practice in such cases, no definite word came from his office until several follow-up inquiries had been made; and then, yesterday morning, came a message setting an appointment for 6:30 (later changed to 4:30) that afternoon.

(1) Early in the course of general conversation, I took occasion to congratulate the Minister on the definitive coming into force of the Montreux Convention, as notified in the Ministry's circular note of November 11;

and

and I inquired whether, as reported in the press, it was the intention of the Turkish Government to make official publication of the documents. He said that such a publication was in course of preparation, and that he would gladly send me a copy. In thanking him, I remarked that if he should see fit to communicate it to me under cover of a note, his doing so would forestall and set at rest any question that might arise as to the intentions of the Turkish Government concerning our participation in the benefits of the Convention. He at once volunteered to make such a formal signed communication, by way of further assurance such as he had already given me orally (see memorandum of conversation with him, July 25, transmitted to the Department in Embassy's No. 90, July 29); and he went on to say that he had already gone further than merely giving individual assurances to us and to other nations not signatory to the Convention -- he had, in reporting it to the Grand National Assembly and asking ratification in behalf of the Turkish Government, explained that it embodies a recognition of the principle of free commercial navigation of the Straits and that such recognition is therefore implicit in the Turkish ratification.

(2) In the course of a general discussion of the European situation, Dr. Aras gave expression to the interesting viewpoint that Turkey, although its necessities had impelled it to adopt a rather authoritarian form of government, was nevertheless a liberal influence in international affairs -- only less so than Great Britain and France. One aspect of this liberalism was its readiness to maintain the friendliest relations with other peoples, whether communistic, fascist or democratic, regardless of their types of government or their political and social philosophies. I ventured the comment that, as a newcomer here, I had been struck by the fact that the closest friends of Turkey seemed to be the protagonists of the three philosophies he had referred to -- Russia, Germany and Great Britain. To my surprise, he quite outspokenly made exception of Germany. I remarked that the closeness of both economic and cultural ties with Germany had seemed to me to bring that country into the same category with the others. He admitted the closeness of those ties, but said that Turkish relationships with Russia and with Great Britain were of quite a different order: with Russia there was a traditional bond of understanding and

<u>good-will</u>;

good-will; and with Great Britain there had developed a complete identity of views. He then went on to emphasize this latter statement, saying that in matters affecting Europe, or the Mediterranean, or Western Asia -- anywhere, in fact, where Turkey possesses any interest or influence -- there is no point in which there is even so much as a difference of nuance in the viewpoints of Turkey and of Great Britain. From this rather sweeping asseveration he lapsed into the reflection that it would be well for Europe if Great Britain and Russia were on more friendly terms, and that his Government would of course hope to be of any possible assistance in bringing about a better understanding between the two.

741.67

MacM:KOS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1936 DEC 8 PM 12 58
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

December 2, 1936.

Judge Moore:

CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR MACMURRAY AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON NOVEMBER 12, 1936.

In the course of a courtesy call of Ambassador MacMurray on Dr. Tevfik Rustu Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on November 12, 1936, the conversation centered particularly on the Straits Convention and Turkish relations with other Powers.

(1) In discussing the Straits Convention Mr. MacMurray found the occasion to observe that it would serve to set any doubts at rest if the Turkish Government could see fit to furnish the Embassy with a note setting forth its intentions regarding our participation in the benefits of the Convention. The Foreign Minister agreed to provide such written assurance, but added that he had already gone further than giving [redacted] assurances when, in reporting the Convention to the Grand National Assembly, he had explained that it "embodies a recognition of the principle of free commercial navigation of the Straits and that such recognition is therefore implicit in the Turkish ratification."

Obviously, however, from the point of view of this Government a written assurance addressed specifically to us is far more satisfactory than a general statement such as the Foreign

Minister

FW 767.68119/989

FEB 2

Minister made in the Turkish Assembly.

(2) In speaking of Turkish foreign relations Dr. Aras remarked that Turkey desires friendly relations with all peoples be they communist, fascist, or democratic. Mr. MacMurray responded that he had been struck as a newcomer in Turkey by the fact that the closest friends of Turkey seem to be protagonists of the three philosophies referred to, i. e. Russia, Germany, and Great Britain. To this the Foreign Minister acquiesced with regard to Great Britain and Russia, but demurred with regard to Germany whose relations with Turkey he described as being of quite a different order. He then went on to expand upon the identity of views in the international field now existing between Turkey and Great Britain, which he sweepingly described as being in complete harmony on all subjects and in all regions of the world where Turkey has interests. Dr. Aras concluded with the statement that he wished that Great Britain and Russia were on more friendly terms and said that his Government would be only too pleased, of course, to be of assistance in achieving such an end.

RAH/GC

Wallace Murray

5

VOLUNTARY REPORT

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1936 DEC 11 PM 12 36

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DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1936
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DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 17 1936

767.68119/990

FILED
FEB 12 1937

PROMULGATION OF CONVENTION SIGNED

AT MONTREUX, JULY 20, 1936, CONCERNING

THE STRAITS REGIME.

From American Consul

Edwin A. Plitt

APPROVED:

Addison E. Southard
American Consul General.

Paris, France. Date of Completion: December 2, 1936.

Date of Mailing: December 4, 1936.

There is enclosed, in duplicate, the French text of a decree dated November 30, 1936, promulgating the convention concerning the regime to be enforced in the Straits, signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936, between Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

Enclosures: As stated.

710
EAP/MG

Source of Information:

JOURNAL OFFICIEL, December 2, 1936.

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

Promulgation de la convention concernant le régime des détroits signés à Montreux le 20 juillet 1936 entre la Bulgarie, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Grèce, le Japon, la Roumanie, la Turquie, l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes et la Yougoslavie.

Le Président de la République française,

Sur la proposition du ministre des affaires étrangères,

Décrète:

Art. 1er. — Une convention concernant le régime des détroits ayant été signée à Montreux, le 20 juillet 1936, entre la Bulgarie, la France, l'empire britannique, la Grèce, le Japon, la Roumanie, la Turquie, l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes et la Yougoslavie et les ratifications de:

S. M. le roi des Bulgares;

M. le Président de la République française;

S. M. le roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, empereur des Indes tant pour le Royaume-Uni que pour le Commonwealth d'Australie;

S. M. le roi des Hellènes;

S. M. le roi de Roumanie;

S. Exc. M. le président de la république turque;

Du comité central exécutif de l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes;

S. M. le roi de Yougoslavie,

ayant été déposées à Paris, le 9 novembre 1936, ladite convention, dont la teneur suit, recevra sa pleine et entière exécution.

CONVENTION

CONCERNANT LE RÉGIME DES DÉTROITS, SIGNÉE A MONTREUX, LE 20 JUILLET 1936.

Sa Majesté le roi des Bulgares, le Président de la République française, Sa Majesté le roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, empereur des Indes, Sa Majesté le roi des Hellènes, Sa Majesté l'empereur du Japon, Sa Majesté le roi de Roumanie, le président de la république turque, le comité central exécutif de l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes, et sa Majesté le roi de Yougoslavie;

Animés du désir de régler le passage et la navigation dans le détroit des Dardanelles, la mer de Marmara et le Bosphore, compris sous la dénomination générale de « Détroits », de manière à sauvegarder, dans le cadre de la sécurité de la Turquie et de la sécurité, dans la mer Noire, des Etats riverains, le principe consacré par l'article 23 du traité de paix signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923;

Ont résolu de substituer la présente convention à la convention signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté le roi des Bulgares:

M. le docteur Nicolas P. Nicolaev, ministre plénipotentiaire, secrétaire général du ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes;

M. Pierre Nelcov, ministre plénipotentiaire, directeur des affaires politiques au ministère des affaires étrangères et des cultes.

Le Président de la République française:

M. Paul-Boncour, sénateur, délégué permanent de la France à la Société des nations, ancien président du conseil, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères, chevalier de la Légion d'honneur, Croix de guerre;

M. Henri Ponsot, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la République française à Ankara, grand officier de la Légion d'honneur.

Sa Majesté le roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, empereur des Indes:

Pour la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande du Nord et toutes les parties de l'empire britannique qui ne sont pas individuellement membres de la Société des nations:

Le très honorable lord Stanley, P. C., M. C., M. P., secrétaire parlementaire à son amirauté;

Pour le Commonwealth d'Australie:

Le très honorable Stanley Melbourne Bruce, C. H., M. C., haut commissaire du Commonwealth d'Australie à Londres.

Sa Majesté le roi des Hellènes:

M. Nicolas Politis, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire de Grèce à Paris, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères;

M. Raoul Bibica Rosetti, délégué permanent de la Grèce auprès de la Société des nations.

Sa Majesté l'empereur du Japon:

M. Naotake Sato, jusammi, grand cordon de l'ordre du Soleil-Levant, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire à Paris;

M. Masa-aki Hotta, jushii, deuxième classe de l'ordre du Soleil-Levant, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire à Berne.

Sa Majesté le roi de Roumanie:

M. Nicolas Titulesco, ministre secrétaire d'Etat au département des affaires étrangères;

M. Constantin Contzesco, ministre plénipotentiaire, délégué de la Roumanie aux commissions européenne et internationale du Danube;

M. Vespasien Pella, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire à la Haye.

Le président de la république turque:

M. le docteur Rustu Aras, ministre des affaires étrangères, député d'Izmir;

M. Suad Davaz, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la république turque à Paris;

M. Numan Menemencioglu, ambassadeur de Turquie, secrétaire général du ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. Asim Gunduz, général de corps d'armée, sous-chef de l'état-major général;

M. Necmeddin Sadak, délégué permanent de Turquie auprès de la Société des nations, député de Sivas, rapporteur à la commission des affaires étrangères.

Le comité central exécutif de l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes:

M. Maxime Litvinoff, membre du comité central exécutif de l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes, commissaire du peuple aux affaires étrangères.

Sa Majesté le roi de Yougoslavie:

M. Ivan Soubbotitch, délégué permanent du royaume de Yougoslavie près la Société des nations.

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

Art. 1er. — Les hautes parties contractantes reconnaissent et affirment le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation par mer dans les détroits.

L'usage de ladite liberté est dorénavant réglé par les dispositions de la présente convention.

SECTION I

Navires de commerce.

Art. 2. — En temps de paix, les navires de commerce jouiront de la complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les détroits, de jour et de nuit, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, sans aucune formalité, sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 3 ci-après. Aucune taxe ou charge autre que celles dont la perception est prévue par l'annexe I à la présente convention ne sera prélevée par les autorités turques sur ces navires lorsqu'ils passeront en transit sans faire escale dans un port des détroits.

Afin de faciliter la perception de ces taxes ou charges, les navires de commerce qui franchiront les détroits feront connaître aux agents du poste visé à l'article 3 de leurs nom, nationalité, tonnage, destination et provenance.

Le pilotage et le remorquage restent facultatifs.

Art. 3. — Tout navire qui pénètre dans les détroits par la mer Egée ou par la mer Noire s'arrêtera à un poste sanitaire près de l'entrée des détroits aux fins du contrôle sanitaire établi par les règlements turcs dans le cadre des prescriptions sanitaires internationales. Ce contrôle, dans le cas de navires possédant une patente nette de santé ou présentant une déclaration de santé attestant qu'ils ne tombent pas sous le coup des dispositions de l'alinéa 2 du présent article, s'effectuera de jour et de nuit, avec le plus de rapidité possible, et ces navires ne devront être astreints à aucun autre arrêt au cours de leur passage dans les détroits.

Les navires qui ont à bord des cas de peste, de choléra, de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ou qui en ont eu moins de sept jours auparavant, ainsi que les navires qui ont quitté un port contaminé depuis moins de cinq fois vingt-quatre heures, s'arrêteront au poste sanitaire indiqué à l'alinéa précédent pour y embarquer les gardes sanitaires que les autorités turques pourraient désigner. Il ne sera, à ce titre, prélevé aucune taxe ou charge et les gardes devront être dé-

Crémieu (Isère), M. Dessort (Joseph), en remplacement de M. Jacquet, démissionnaire.

Denain (Nord), M. Godart (Pierre-Eugène), en remplacement de M. Cuvelier, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Firminy (Loire), M. Seve (Marc-Louis-Sébastien), en remplacement de M. Moulin, démissionnaire.

Hirson (Aisne), M. Jenot (Maxime-Valère-Auguste-Clément), en remplacement de M. Dubuquoy, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Montbrison (Loire), M. Machon (Jean-Benoit - Marius), en remplacement de M. Fraisse, démissionnaire et qui est nommé juge de paix honoraire.

Montier-en-Der (Haute-Marne), M. Neury (Louis), en remplacement de M. Loré, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Montier-en-Der (Haute-Marne), M. Cunin (Louis-François-Eugène), en remplacement de M. Comte, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Rennes, canton Sud-Est (Ille-et-Vilaine), M. Maulion (Pierre-Paul-Henri), en remplacement de M. Brossault, décédé.

Sennecey-le-Grand (Saône-et-Loire), M. Ponsot (Jean-Marie), en remplacement de M. Robin, décédé.

Saint-Jean-Soleymieux (Loire), M. Phalippon (Benoit), en remplacement de M. Redon, décédé.

Varilhes (Ariège), M. Soula (Adrien), en remplacement de M. Pennabayre, décédé.

Vihiers (Maine-et-Loire), M. Angebault (Joseph-Jean), en remplacement de M. Beauchêne, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Villedieu (la) (Vienne), M. Rousseau (Delphin-Louis), en remplacement de M. Bellot, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Vimy (Pas-de-Calais), M. Paul (Léon-François-Joseph), en remplacement de M. Thomas, démissionnaire.

Wassigny (Aisne), M. Vereecke (Yvon-Emile), en remplacement de M. Marchand, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Art. 2. — Le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à Paris, le 27 novembre 1936.

ALBERT LEBRUN.

Par le Président de la République:
Le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice,
MARC RUCART.

Le Président de la République française,

Sur le rapport du garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice,

Décrète:

Art. 1er. — Sont nommés suppléants des juges de paix de:

Dampierre (Jura), M. Hatier (Francis-Marie), en remplacement de M. Brunnet, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Dunkerque, canton Est (Nord), M. Allemès (Jean-Albert-Emmanuel), en remplacement de M. Allemès, son père, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Estrées-Saint-Denis (Oise), M. Fafet (François-Narcisse), en remplacement de M. Moren, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Etaples (Pas-de-Calais), M. Bourgy (Fernand), en remplacement de M. Helle, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Evian-les-Bains (Haute-Savoie), M. Giletto (Félicien-François), en remplacement de M. Jallon, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Frangy (Haute-Savoie), M. Mugnier (Joseph-François-Fernand), en remplacement de M. Vautier, décédé.

Froissy (Oise), M. Ledon (François-Eugène), en remplacement de M. Routier, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Guitres (Gironde), M. Darnaud (Paul-Albert-Maurice), en remplacement de M. Lucas, qui a été révoqué.

Haroué (Meurthe-et-Moselle), M. Quenette (Paul-Arsène), en remplacement de M. Caye, décédé.

Lencloître (Vienne), M. Diot (Jules-Ferdinand), en remplacement de M. Pathé, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Levet (Cher), M. Paulin (Jules-Valentin-Alexis), en remplacement de M. Dubois, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Lezay (Deux-Sèvres), M. Proust (Jean-Louis-Edmond), en remplacement de M. Poireau, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Lussac (Gironde), M. Pierre (Marcel), en remplacement de M. Berthon, décédé.

Lyon (tribunal de simple police) (Rhône), M. Fiot (Paul-Octave-Antoine-Marie), en remplacement de M. Falconnet, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Melle (Deux-Sèvres), M. Lauquin (Antoine-Charles), en remplacement de M. Fouché, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Meyrueis (Lozère), M. Fabre (André-Edouard-Jean), en remplacement de M. Cabanel, décédé.

Montmirey-le-Château (Jura), M. Barbier (Joseph), en remplacement de M. Petit, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Treffort (Ain), M. Bonnet (Marie-Emile), en remplacement de M. Bonet, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Art. 2. — Est acceptée la démission de M. Bordes, suppléant du juge de paix de Bordeaux, 6e canton (Gironde).

Art. 3. — Le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à Paris, le 27 novembre 1936.

ALBERT LEBRUN.

Par le Président de la République:
Le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice,
MARC RUCART.

Le Président de la République française,

Sur le rapport du garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice,

Décrète:

Art. 1er. — Sont nommés suppléants des juges de paix de:

Bourgtheroulde (Eure), M. Martin (Gilbert-Henri-Albert), en remplacement de M. Saliceti, démissionnaire.

Jean-Marie-Joseph), en remplacement de M. Johanet, démissionnaire.

Rambervillers (Vosges), M. Duclosson (Jules-Adrien), en remplacement de M. Démolis, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Ribiers (Hautes-Alpes), M. Garcin (Joseph-Adrien), en remplacement de M. Arnaud, atteint par la limite d'âge et qui est nommé juge de paix honoraire.

Romans-sur-Isère (Drôme), M. Chevalier (Alexandre-Paul), en remplacement de M. Sibilat, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Rue (Somme), M. Philippo (Félix-Louis-Charles), en remplacement de M. Morel, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Saillans (Drôme), M. Davalon (Léon-Antoine-Joseph), en remplacement de M. Mathieu, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Souterraine (la) (Creuse), M. Beaumont (Joseph-Paul), en remplacement de M. Aguillaume, atteint par la limite d'âge.

Saint-Chély (Aveyron), M. Niel (Marius-Joseph - Justin - Auguste-Pierre-Jean-Hypolitte), en remplacement de M. Boscary, décédé.

Saint - Gengoux - le - National (Saône-et-Loire), M. Dubost (Jean), en remplacement de M. Point, atteint par la limite d'âge.

barqués à un poste sanitaire à la sortie des détroits.

Art. 4. — En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les navires de commerce, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, jouiront de la liberté de passage et de navigation dans les détroits dans les conditions prévues aux articles 2 et 3.

Le pilotage et le remorquage restent facultatifs.

Art. 5. — En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante, les navires de commerce n'appartenant pas à un pays en guerre avec la Turquie jouiront de la liberté de passage et de navigation dans les détroits à condition de n'assister en aucune façon l'ennemi.

Ces navires entreront de jour dans les détroits et le passage devra s'effectuer par la route qui sera, dans chaque cas, indiquée par les autorités turques.

Art. 6. — Au cas où la Turquie s'estimerait menacée d'un danger de guerre imminent, il continuerait néanmoins à être fait application des dispositions de l'article 2, sauf que les navires devraient entrer de jour dans les détroits et que le passage devrait s'effectuer par la route indiquée, dans chaque cas, par les autorités turques.

Le pilotage pourrait, dans ce cas, être rendu obligatoire, mais sans rétribution.

Art. 7 — Le terme « navires de commerce » s'applique à tous les navires qui ne sont pas visés par la section II de la présente convention.

SECTION II

Bâtiments de guerre.

Art. 8. — Aux fins de la présente convention, la définition applicable aux bâtiments de guerre et à leurs spécifications, ainsi qu'au calcul des tonnages est celle qui figure dans l'annexe II à la présente convention.

Art. 9. — Les bâtiments auxiliaires de la marine militaire spécifiquement conçus pour le transport des combustibles, liquides ou non, ne seront pas astreints au préavis visé à l'article 13 et n'entreront pas dans le calcul des tonnages soumis à limitation en vertu des articles 14 et 18, à condition de traverser les détroits isolément. Toutefois ils demeureront assimilés aux bâtiments de guerre en ce qui concerne les autres conditions de passage.

Les bâtiments auxiliaires visés au précédent alinéa ne pourront bénéficier de la dérogation envisagée que si leur armement ne comporte pas: comme artillerie contre objectifs flottants, plus de deux pièces d'un calibre de 105 millimètres au maximum; comme artillerie contre objectifs aériens, plus de deux matériels d'un calibre de 75 millimètres au maximum.

Art. 10. — En temps de paix, les bâtiments légers de surface, les petits navires de combat et les navires auxiliaires, qu'ils appartiennent à des puissances riveraines ou non de la mer Noire, quel que soit leur pavillon, jouiront de la liberté de passage dans les détroits sans aucune taxe ou charge quelconque, pourvu qu'ils y pénètrent de jour et dans les conditions prévues aux articles 13 et suivants ci-après.

Les bâtiments de guerre autres que ceux qui entrent dans les classes visées à l'alinéa précédent n'auront le droit de passage que dans les conditions spéciales prévues aux articles 11 et 12.

Art. 11. — Les puissances riveraines de la mer Noire sont autorisées à faire passer par les Détroits leurs bâtiments de ligne d'un tonnage supérieur au tonnage prévu à l'alinéa 1er de l'article 14, à la condition que ces bâtiments ne franchissent les Détroits qu'un à un, escortés au plus de deux torpilleurs.

Art. 12 — Les puissances riveraines de la mer Noire auront le droit de faire passer par les Détroits, en vue de rallier leur base, leurs sous-marins construits ou achetés en dehors de cette mer, si un avis de mise en chantier ou d'achat a été donné en temps utile à la Turquie.

Les sous-marins appartenant auxdites puissances pourront également traverser les Détroits pour être réparés dans des chantiers situés hors de cette mer à la condition que des précisions à ce sujet soient données à la Turquie.

Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les sous-marins devront naviguer de jour et en surface et traverser les Détroits isolément.

Art. 13. — Pour le passage dans les Détroits des bâtiments de guerre, un préavis devra être donné au gouvernement turc par la voie diplomatique. La durée normale du préavis sera de huit jours; mais il est désirable que, pour les puissances non riveraines de la mer Noire, elle soit portée à quinze jours. Il sera indiqué dans le préavis la destination, le nom, le type et le nombre des bâtiments ainsi que la date de passage pour l'aller et, s'il y a lieu, pour le retour. Tout changement de date devra faire d'objet d'un préavis de trois jours.

L'entrée dans les Détroits pour le passage d'aller devra avoir lieu dans un délai de cinq jours à partir de la date indiquée dans le préavis initial. Après l'expiration de ce délai, il devra être donné un nouveau préavis, dans les mêmes conditions que pour le préavis initial.

Lors du passage, le commandant de la force navale communiquera, sans avoir à s'arrêter, à une station de signaux à l'entrée des Dardanelles ou du Bosphore, la composition exacte de la force se trouvant sous ses ordres.

Art. 14. — Le tonnage global maximum de toutes les forces navales étrangères pouvant se trouver en cours de transit dans les détroits ne devra pas dépasser 15.000 tonnes, sauf dans les cas prévus à l'article 11 et à l'annexe III à la présente convention.

Toutefois les forces visées à l'alinéa précédent ne devront pas comprendre plus de neuf bâtiments.

Ne seront pas compris dans ce tonnage les bâtiments appartenant à des puissances riveraines ou non riveraines de la mer Noire qui, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 17, rendent visite à un port des détroits.

Ne seront pas davantage compris dans ce tonnage les bâtiments de guerre qui auraient subi une avarie lors de la traversée; ces bâtiments se soumettront, pendant les réparations, aux dispositions spéciales de sécurité édictées par la Turquie.

Art. 15. — Les bâtiments de guerre en transit dans les détroits ne pourront, en aucun cas, utiliser les aéronefs dont ils seraient porteurs.

Art. 16. — Les bâtiments de guerre en transit dans les détroits ne devront, sauf en cas d'avarie ou de fortune de mer, y séjourner au delà du temps nécessaire pour effectuer leur passage.

Art. 17. — Les dispositions des articles précédents ne sauraient en aucune manière empêcher une force navale d'un tonnage et d'une composition quelconques de rendre, dans un port des détroits, sur l'invitation du gouvernement turc, une visite de courtoisie d'une durée limitée. Cette force devra quitter les détroits par la même route que pour l'entrée, à moins qu'elle ne soit dans les conditions voulues pour passer en transit dans les détroits, conformément aux dispositions des articles 10, 14 et 18.

Art. 18. — 1. Le tonnage global que les puissances non riveraines de la mer Noire peuvent avoir dans cette mer en temps de paix est limité de la façon suivante:

a) Sauf dans le cas prévu au paragraphe *b* ci-après, le tonnage global desdites puissances n'excèdera pas 30.000 tonnes;

b) Au cas où, à un moment quelconque, le tonnage de la flotte la plus forte de la mer Noire viendrait à dépasser d'au moins 10.000 tonnes celui de la flotte la plus forte en cette mer à la date de la signature de la présente convention, le tonnage global de 30.000 tonnes mentionné au paragraphe *a* sera majoré d'autant, jusqu'à concurrence d'un maximum de 45 000 tonnes. A cette fin, chaque puissance riveraine fera connaître, conformément à l'annexe IV à la présente convention, au gouvernement turc, le 1er janvier et le 1er juillet de chaque année, le tonnage total de sa flotte en mer Noire, et le gouvernement turc transmettra cette information aux autres hautes parties contractantes ainsi qu'au secrétaire général de la Société des nations;

c) Le tonnage que l'une quelconque des puissances non riveraines aura la faculté d'avoir en mer Noire sera limité aux deux tiers du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes *a* et *b* ci-dessus;

d) Toutefois, au cas où une ou plusieurs puissances non riveraines de la mer Noire désireraient y envoyer, dans un but humanitaire, des forces navales, ces forces, dont l'ensemble ne devra, en aucune hypothèse, excéder 8.000 tonnes, seront admises à pénétrer dans la mer Noire, sans le préavis prévu à l'article 13 de la présente convention, moyennant une autorisation obtenue du gouvernement turc dans les conditions suivantes: si le tonnage global visé aux paragraphes *a* et *b* n'est pas atteint et ne doit pas être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le gouvernement turc accordera cette autorisation dans le plus bref délai après la réception de la demande dont il aura été saisi; si ledit tonnage global se trouve être déjà utilisé ou s'il devait être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le gouvernement turc donnera immédiatement connaissance de la demande d'autorisation aux autres puissances riveraines de la mer Noire et si ces puissances, vingt-quatre heures après en avoir été informées, n'y font pas d'objection, il fera savoir aux puissances intéressées, au plus tard dans un délai utile de quarante-huit heures, la suite qu'il aura décidé de donner à leur demande.

Toute entrée ultérieure en mer Noire de forces navales des puissances non riveraines ne s'effectuera que dans les limites disponibles du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes *a* et *b* ci-dessus.

2. Quel que soit l'objet de leur présence en mer Noire, les bâtiments de guerre des puissances non riveraines ne pourront pas y rester plus de vingt et un jours.

Art. 19. — En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les bâtiments de guerre jouiront d'une complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les détroits dans des conditions indentiques à celles qui sont stipulées aux articles 10 à 18.

Toutefois, il sera interdit aux bâtiments de guerre de toute puissance belligérante de passer à travers les détroits, sauf dans les cas rentrant dans l'application de l'article 25 de la présente convention, ainsi que dans le cas d'assistance prêtée à un Etat victime d'une agression, en vertu d'un traité d'assistance mutuelle engageant la Turquie, conclu dans le cadre du pacte de la Société des nations, enregistré et publié conformément aux dispositions de l'article 18 dudit pacte.

Dans les cas exceptionnels visés à l'alinéa précédent, ne seront pas applicables les limitations indiquées dans les articles 10 à 18.

Malgré l'interdiction de passage édictée dans l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus, les bâtiments de guerre des puissances belligérantes riveraines ou non de la mer Noire, séparés de leurs ports d'attache, sont autorisés à rallier ces ports.

Il est interdit aux bâtiments de guerre belligérants de procéder à toute capture, d'exercer le droit de visite et de se livrer à un acte hostile quelconque dans les détroits.

Art. 20. — En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante, les dispositions des articles 10 à 18 ne seront pas applicables; le passage des bâtiments de guerre sera entièrement laissé à la discrétion du gouvernement turc.

Art. 21. — Au cas où la Turquie s'estimerait menacée d'un danger de guerre imminent, elle aurait le droit d'appliquer les dispositions de l'article 20 de la présente convention.

Les bâtiments de guerre qui, après avoir passé par les détroits antérieurement à l'usage par la Turquie de la faculté que lui confère l'alinéa précédent, se trouveraient ainsi séparés de leurs ports d'attache, pourront rallier ces ports. Il est cependant entendu que la Turquie pourra ne pas faire bénéficier de ce droit les bâtiments de l'Etat dont l'attitude aurait motivé l'application du présent article.

Si le gouvernement turc fait usage de la faculté que lui confère l'alinéa 1er ci-dessus, il adressera une notification à cet effet aux hautes parties contractantes, ainsi qu'au secrétaire général de la Société des nations.

Si le conseil de la Société des nations, par une majorité des deux tiers, décide que les mesures ainsi prises par la Turquie ne sont pas justifiées, et si tel est également l'avis de la majorité des hautes parties contractantes signataires de la présente convention, le gouvernement turc s'engage à rapporter les mesures en question, ainsi que celles qui auraient été prises en vertu de l'article 6 de la présente convention.

Art. 22. — Les bâtiments de guerre ont à bord des cas de peste, de cho

de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ou qui en ont eu moins de sept jours auparavant, ainsi que les bâtiments qui ont quitté un port contaminé depuis moins de cinq fois vingt-quatre heures, devront passer les détroits en quarantaine et appliquer par les moyens du bord les mesures prophylactiques nécessaires pour éviter toute possibilité de contamination des détroits.

SECTION III

Aéronefs.

Art. 23. — En vue d'assurer le passage des aéronefs civils entre la Méditerranée et la mer Noire, le gouvernement turc indiquera, en dehors des zones interdites des détroits, les routes aériennes destinées à ce passage; les aéronefs civils pourront utiliser ces routes en donnant au gouvernement turc, pour les survols occasionnels, un préavis de trois jours et, pour les survols de services réguliers, un préavis général des dates de passage.

D'autre part, nonobstant la remilitarisation des détroits, le gouvernement turc fournira les facilités nécessaires pour le passage en toute sécurité des aéronefs civils autorisés d'après la réglementation aérienne en vigueur en Turquie à survoler le territoire turc entre l'Europe et l'Asie. Pour les cas où une autorisation de survol aurait été accordée, la route à suivre dans la zone des détroits sera périodiquement indiquée.

SECTION IV

Dispositions générales.

Art. 24. — Les attributions de la commission internationale constituée en vertu de la convention concernant le régime des détroits, en date du 24 juillet 1923, sont transférées au gouvernement turc.

Le gouvernement turc s'engage à réunir les statistiques et à fournir les renseignements relatifs à l'application des articles 11, 12, 14 et 18.

Il doit veiller à l'exécution de toute disposition de la présente convention ayant trait au passage des bâtiments de guerre dans les détroits.

Dès qu'il aura été avisé du prochain passage dans les détroits d'une force navale étrangère, le gouvernement turc fera connaître aux représentants à Ankara des hautes parties contractantes la composition de cette force, son tonnage, la date prévue pour son entrée dans les détroits et, s'il y a lieu, la date probable de son retour.

Le gouvernement turc adressera au secrétaire général de la Société des nations ainsi qu'aux hautes parties contractantes un rapport annuel indiquant les mouvements des bâtiments de guerre étrangers dans les détroits et fournissant tous renseignements utiles pour le commerce et la navigation maritime et aérienne envisagée dans la présente convention.

Art. 25. — Aucune disposition de la présente convention ne porte atteinte aux droits et obligations découlant du pacte de la Société des nations pour la Turquie ou pour toute autre haute partie contractante, membre de la Société des nations.

SECTION V

Dispositions finales.

Art. 26. — La présente convention sera ratifiée dans le plus court délai possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées aux archives du Gouvernement de la République française à Paris

Le gouvernement japonais aura la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Gouvernement de la République française, par son représentant diplomatique à Paris, que la ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, il devra transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Un procès-verbal de dépôt sera dressé dès que six instruments de ratification, y compris celui de la Turquie, auront été déposés. A cette fin, la notification prévue à l'alinéa précédent équivaudra au dépôt de l'instrument de ratification.

La présente convention entrera en vigueur à la date de ce procès-verbal.

Le Gouvernement français remettra à toutes les hautes parties contractantes une copie authentique du procès-verbal visé à l'alinéa précédent et des procès-verbaux de dépôt des ratifications ultérieures.

Art. 27. — A partir de son entrée en vigueur, la présente convention sera ouverte à l'adhésion de toute puissance signataire du traité de paix de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923.

Toute adhésion sera signifiée par la voie diplomatique au Gouvernement de la République française et, par celui-ci, à toutes les hautes parties contractantes.

Elle portera effet à dater du jour de la signification au Gouvernement français.

Art. 28. — La présente convention aura une durée de vingt ans à dater de son entrée en vigueur.

Toutefois, le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation affirmé à l'article 1er de la présente convention aura une durée illimitée.

Si, deux ans avant l'expiration de ladite période de vingt ans, aucune haute partie contractante n'a donné un préavis de dénonciation au Gouvernement français, la présente convention demeurera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que deux années se soient écoulées après l'envoi d'un préavis de dénonciation. Ce préavis sera notifié par le Gouvernement français aux hautes parties contractantes.

Si la présente convention venait à être dénoncée conformément aux dispositions du présent article, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de se faire représenter à une conférence en vue d'arrêter les termes d'une nouvelle convention.

Art. 29. — A l'expiration de chaque période quinquennale à compter de la mise en vigueur de la présente convention, chacune des hautes parties contractantes pourra prendre l'initiative de proposer des amendements à une ou plusieurs dispositions de la présente convention.

Pour être recevable, la demande de revision formulée par une des hautes parties contractantes doit être appuyée, s'il s'agit de modifications à l'article 14 ou à l'article 18, par une autre haute partie contractante et, s'il s'agit de modifications à tout autre article, par deux autres hautes parties contractantes.

La demande de revision ainsi appuyée devra être notifiée à toutes les hautes parties contractantes trois mois avant l'expiration de la période quinquennale en cours. Ce préavis contiendra l'indication et les motifs des amendements proposés

S'il est impossible d'aboutir sur ces propositions par la voie diplomatique, les hautes parties contractantes se feront représenter à une conférence convoquée à cet effet.

Cette conférence ne pourra statuer qu'à l'unanimité, à l'exception des cas de revision relatifs à l'article 14 et à l'article 18, pour lesquels il suffira d'une majorité des trois quarts des hautes parties contractantes.

Cette majorité sera calculée en y comprenant les trois quarts des hautes parties contractantes riveraines de la mer Noire, y compris la Turquie.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente convention.

Fait à Montreux, le 20 juillet 1936, en onze exemplaires, dont le premier, revêtu des sceaux des plénipotentiaires, sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et dont les autres ont été remis aux puissances signataires.

(*L. S.*) N. P. NICOLAEV.
(*L. S.*) PIERRE NEÏCOW.
(*L. S.*) J. PAUL-BONCOUR.
(*L. S.*) H. PONSOT.
(*L. S.*) STANLEY.
(*L. S.*) S. M. BRUCE.
(*L. S.*) N. POLITIS.
(*L. S.*) RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI.

Les soussignés, plénipotentiaires du Japon, déclarent, au nom de leur gouvernement, que les dispositions de la présente convention ne modifient en rien la position du Japon comme Etat non membre de la Société des nations, tant à l'égard du pacte de la Société des nations qu'à l'égard des traités d'assistance mutuelle conclus dans le cadre dudit pacte, et que le Japon conserve notamment, pour ce qui concerne ce pacte et ces traités dans les dispositions des articles 19 et 25, une pleine liberté d'appréciation.

(*L. S.*) N. SATO.
(*L. S.*) MASSA-AKI HOTTA.

(*L. S.*) N. TITULESCO.
(*L. S.*) CONS. CONTZESCO.
(*L. S.*) V. V. PELLA.
(*L. S.*) Dr R. ARAS.
(*L. S.*) SUAD DAVAZ.
(*L. S.*) N. MENEMENCIOGLU.
(*L. S.*) ASIM GÜNDÜZ.
(*L. S.*) N. SADAK.
(*L. S.*) MAXIME LITVINOFF.
(*L. S.*) Dr I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

ANNEXE I

1. Les taxes et charges qui peuvent être prélevées conformément à l'article 2 de la présente convention seront celles qui sont indiquées dans le tableau ci-après. Les réductions éventuelles de ces taxes et charges que le gouvernement turc admettrait seront appliquées sans distinction de pavillon.

Montant de la taxe ou de la charge à percevoir sur chaque tonne de jauge nette (net register tonnage).

Nature du service rendu.	Francs or (1).
a) Contrôle sanitaire.....	0 075
b) Phares, bouées lumineuses et bouées de chenaux ou autres:	
Jusqu'à 800 tonnes.....	0 42
Au-dessus de 800 tonnes.....	0 21
c) Service de sauvetage, y compris les canots de sauvetage, les postes de fusées porte-amarres, les sirènes de brume, les radiophares, ainsi que les bouées lumineuses non comprises sous *b*), ou autres installations du même genre.....	0 10

2. Les taxes et charges définies au tableau annexé au paragraphe 1er de la présente annexe s'appliqueront à une double traversée des Détroits (c'est-à-dire à un passage de la mer Egée à la Mer noire et au voyage de retour vers la mer Egée ou bien à une traversée des Détroits de la Mer noire à la mer Egée suivie du retour en Mer noire); toutefois, si un navire de commerce franchit à nouveau les Détroits en vue de retourner en mer Egée ou en Mer noire, selon le cas, plus de six mois après la date d'entrée dans les Détroits pour le voyage d'aller, le navire pourra être appelé, sans distinction de pavillon, à acquitter une seconde fois ces taxes et charges.

3. Si a la traversée d'aller, un navire de commerce déclare ne pas devoir revenir, il n'aura à acquitter, quant aux taxes et charges visées aux alinéas *b*) et *c*) du paragraphe 1er de la présente annexe, que la moitié du tarif

4. Les taxes et charges définies au tableau annexé au paragraphe 1er de la présente annexe et qui ne seront pas plus élevées qu'il n'est indispensable pour couvrir les frais occasionnés par les services en question et pour conserver un fonds de réserve ou un fonds de roulement raisonnable ne seront augmentées ou complétées que par application des dispositions de l'article 29 de la présente convention. Elles seront acquittées en francs or ou en monnaie turque d'après le cours des changes pratiqué à la date du payement.

5. Les navires de commerce pourront être tenus d'acquitter des taxes et des charges pour les services facultatifs tels que le pilotage et le remorquage lorsqu'un tel service aura été dûment rendu par les autorités turques à la demande de l'agent ou du capitaine du navire en question. Le gouvernement turc publiera de temps à autre, le tarif des taxes et charges qui seront perçues au titre de ces services facultatifs.

6. Ces tarifs ne seront pas augmentés dans les cas où lesdits services seront obligatoires par application de l'article 5.

(1) Actuellement 100 piastres équivalent à environ 2 francs 50 centimes or.

Enclosure to report dated December 2, 1936, from American Consul Edwin A. Plitt, Paris, France, entitled: "Promulgation of Convention Signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936, Concerning the Straits Regime."

From JOURNAL OFFICIEL, December 2, 1936.

ANNEXE II (1)

A. — *Déplacement type.*

1. Le déplacement type d'un bâtiment de surface est le déplacement du bâtiment achevé, avec son équipage complet, ses machines et chaudières, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses installations, équipements, vivres, eau douce pour l'équipage, approvisionnements divers, outillages et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit emporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible et sans eau de réserve pour l'alimentation des machines et chaudières.

2. Le déplacement type d'un sous-marin est le déplacement en surface du bâtiment achevé (non compris l'eau des compartiments non étanches), avec son équipage complet, son appareil moteur, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses installations, équipements, vivres pour l'équipage, outillages divers et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit emporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible, huile lubrifiante, eau douce ou eau de ballast de toute sorte.

3. Le mot « tonne », seul dans l'expression « tonnes métriques », désigne une tonne de 1.016 kilogr. (2.240 lbs).

B. — *Classes.*

1. Les *bâtiments de ligne* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface appartenant à l'une des deux sous-classes suivantes:

a) Bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, les bâtiments auxiliaires ou les bâtiments de ligne de la sous-classe *b*), dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 10.000 tonnes (10.160 tonnes métriques) ou qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces);

b) Bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, dont le déplacement type n'est pas supérieur à 8.000 tonnes (8.128 tonnes métriques) et qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces).

2. Les *bâtiments porte-aéronefs* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface qui, quel que soit leur déplacement, sont conçus ou aménagés principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer. Si un bâtiment de guerre n'a pas été conçu ou aménagé principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer, l'installation sur ce bâtiment d'un pont d'atterrissage ou d'envol n'aura pas pour effet de le faire entrer dans la classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs.

La classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs se subdivise en deux sous-classes, à savoir:

a) Bâtiments pourvus d'un pont tel que les aéronefs puissent y prendre leur vol ou s'y poser;

b) Bâtiments non pourvus du pont décrit au paragraphe *a*) ci-dessus.

3. Les *bâtiments légers de surface* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, les petits navires de combat ou les bâtiments auxiliaires, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), sans dépasser 10.000 tonnes (10.160 tonnes métriques), et qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces).

La classe des bâtiments légers de surface se subdivise en trois sous-classes, à savoir:

a) Bâtiments portant un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces);

b) Bâtiments qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces), et dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 3.000 tonnes (3.048 tonnes métriques);

c) Bâtiments qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces), et dont le déplacement type n'est pas supérieur à 3.000 tonnes (3.048 tonnes métriques).

4. Les *sous-marins* sont tous les bâtiments conçus pour naviguer au-dessous de la surface de la mer.

5. Les *petits navires de combat* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments auxiliaires, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), sans dépasser 2.000 tonnes (2.032 tonnes métriques), et qui n'ont aucune des caractéristiques suivantes.

a) Etre armés d'un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces);

b) Etre conçus ou équipés pour lancer des torpilles;

c) Etre conçus pour atteindre une vitesse supérieure à vingt nœuds.

6. Les *bâtiments auxiliaires* sont des bâtiments de surface faisant partie de la flotte militaire, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), qui sont normalement utilisés pour le service de la flotte, ou comme transports de troupes, ou pour tout emploi autre que celui de bâtiments combattants, qui ne sont pas spécialement construits pour être des bâtiments combattants, et qui n'ont aucune des caractéristiques suivantes:

a) Etre armés d'un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces);

b) Etre armés de plus de huit canons d'un calibre supérieur à 76 millimètres (3 pouces);

c) Etre conçus ou équipés pour lancer des torpilles;

d) Etre conçus pour être protégés par des plaques de blindage;

e) Etre conçus pour atteindre une vitesse supérieure à vingt-huit nœuds;

f) Etre conçus ou aménagés principalement pour mettre en action des aéronefs en mer;

g) Etre équipés de plus de deux appareils à lancer des aéronefs.

C. — *Bâtiments hors d'âge.*

Les bâtiments des classes et sous-classes suivantes seront considérés comme « hors d'âge » lorsque, depuis leur achèvement, se sera écoulé le nombre d'années indiqué ci-dessous:

a) Pour un bâtiment de ligne, 26 ans;

b) Pour un bâtiment porte-aéronefs, 20 ans;

c) Pour un bâtiment léger de surface des sous-classes (*a*) et (*b*):

i) S'il a été mis sur cale avant le 1er janvier 1920, 16 ans;

ii) S'il a été mis sur cale après le 31 décembre 1919, 20 ans;

d) Pour un bâtiment léger de surface de la sous-classe (*c*), 16 ans;

e) Pour un sous-marin, 13 ans.

ANNEXE III

Il est convenu que, parmi les trois navires-écoles hors d'âge ci-dessous désignés de la marine japonaise, deux unités seront admises à visiter les ports des détroits ensemble.

Le tonnage global de ces deux navires sera, dans ce cas, considéré comme équivalant à 15.000 tonnes.

	DATE de la mise en chantier.	DATE de l'entrée en service.	DÉPLACEMENT type.	ARMEMENT
			tonnes.	
Asama.....	20 octobre 1896.	18 mars 1899.	9.240	IV × 200 mm. XII × 150 mm.
Yakumo.....	1er septembre 1898.	20 juin 1900.	9.010	IV × 200 mm. XII × 150 mm.
Iwate.....	11 novembre 1898.	18 mars 1901.	9.180	IV × 200 mm. XIV × 150 mm.

ANNEXE IV

1. Les classes et sous-classes de bâtiments à comprendre dans le calcul du tonnage total des flottes des puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, visé à l'article 18 de la présente convention, sont les suivantes:

Bâtiments de ligne:
Sous-classe (*a*);
Sous-classe (*b*);

Bâtiments porte-aéronefs:
Sous-classe (*a*);
Sous-classe (*b*);

Bâtiments légers de surface:
Sous-classe (*a*);
Sous-classe (*b*);
Sous-classe (*c*);

Sous-marins

suivant les définitions de l'annexe II à la présente convention.

Le déplacement dont il doit être tenu compte dans le calcul du tonnage total est le déplacement type, tel qu'il est défini à l'annexe III. Ne seront pris en considération que les bâtiments qui ne sont pas « hors d'âge », tels qu'ils sont définis à ladite annexe.

2. La communication prévue à l'article 18, alinéa *b*), doit comprendre en outre le tonnage total des bâtiments des classes et sous-classes mentionnées au paragraphe 1er de la présente annexe.

PROTOCOLE

Au moment de signer la convention portant la date de ce jour, les plénipotentiaires soussignés, engagent leurs gouvernements respectifs, déclarent accepter les dispositions ci-après.

1. La Turquie pourra remilitariser immédiatement la zone des Détroits telle qu'elle est définie dans le préambule de ladite convention.

2. A partir du 15 août 1936, le gouvernement turc appliquera provisoirement le régime spécifié dans ladite convention.

3. Le présent protocole prendra effet à dater de ce jour.

Fait à Montreux, le 28 juillet 1936.

N. B. NICOLAEV.
PIERRE NEICOV.
J. PAUL-BONCOUR.
L. PONSOT.
STANLEY.
S. M. BRUCE.
N. POLITIS.
RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI.
N. SATO (*ad referendum*).
MASSA-AKI HOTTA (*ad referendum*).
N. TITULESCO.
CONS. CONTZESCO.
V. V. PELLA.
Dr R[illegible]AS.
SUAD DAVAZ.
N. MENEMENCIOGLU.
ASIM GUNDUZ.
N. SADAK.
MAXIME LITVINOFF.
Dr I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

Art. 2. — Le ministre des affaires étrangères est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à Paris, le 30 novembre 1936.

ALBERT LEBRUN.

Par le Président de la République:
Le ministre des affaires étrangères,
YVON DELBOS.

(1) Les textes de la présente annexe ont été empruntés au traité naval de Londres du 25 mars 1936.

MINISTÈRE DE L'INTÉRIEUR

Citation à l'ordre de la nation
(à titre posthume).

Le Gouvernement de la République cite à l'ordre de la nation M. Godart (Aimé-Auguste-Joseph), maire de Neuville-Saint-Vaast (Pas-de-Calais).

Doué des plus belles qualités de caractère, d'intelligence et de fermeté, a été porté, par le suffrage de ses concitoyens, à la première magistrature de Neuville-Saint-Vaast, cité martyre douloureusement entrée dans l'histoire.

Est mort victime du devoir après s'être dépensé sans compter au service de la collectivité qu'il administrait.

En toutes circonstances et notamment pendant la guerre, M. Godart s'était fait remarquer par son courage et son abnégation.

Fait à Paris, le 1er décembre 1936.

Le ministre de l'intérieur,
MARX DORMOY.

Cabinet du ministre.

Par arrêté en date du 25 novembre 1936, sont nommés:

Chef de cabinet, chargé des questions administratives.

M. Charles Dumas.

Chef de cabinet, chargé du secrétariat particulier.

M. Pierre Delcourt

Election législative.

Le Président de la République française,

Sur le rapport du ministre de l'intérieur,

Vu les décrets organique et réglementaire du 2 février 1852;

Vu le décret du 1er mai 1869 concernant l'heure d'ouverture du scrutin;

Vu la loi organique du 30 novembre 1875 sur l'élection des députés;

Vu l'article 6 de la loi du 16 juin 1885;

Vu la loi du 17 juillet 1889 sur les candidatures multiples;

Vu la loi du 29 juillet 1913 ayant pour objet d'assurer le secret et la liberté du vote, ainsi que la sincérité des opérations électorales, modifiée et complétée par la loi du 31 mars 1914;

Vu la loi du 20 mars 1914 réglementant l'affichage électoral, modifiée par les lois du 2 avril 1932 et 20 mars 1936;

Vu la loi du 31 mars 1914 ayant pour objet de réprimer les actes de corruption dans les opérations électorales;

Vu le paragraphe 3 de l'article 1er de la loi du 18 octobre 1919 relatif à la durée de la 12e législature;

Vu la loi du 8 juin 1923 concernant la distribution des bulletins de vote et circulaires électorales;

Vu la loi du 21 juillet 1927 portant rétablissement du scrutin uninominal pour l'élection des députés;

Vu la loi du 25 mars 1932 relative à l'élection des députés et le tableau des circonscriptions électorales y annexé, modifiée par les lois des 20 et 21 mars 1936;

Vu le décret du 16 mars 1936 portant convocation de tous les collèges électoraux;

Vu le procès-verbal de la séance de la Chambre des députés en date du 28 septembre 1936, duquel il résulte que M. Barbier, député de la circonscription de Lapalisse (Allier), déclare se démettre de son mandat,

Décrète:

Art. 1er. — Le collège électoral de la circonscription de Lapalisse (Allier) est convoqué pour le dimanche 27 décembre 1936, à l'effet d'élire un député.

Art. 2. — L'élection aura lieu suivant les formes déterminées par les lois et décrets ci-dessus visés.

Art. 3. — Les maires des communes où, conformément à l'article 8 du décret réglementaire du 2 février 1852, il y aurait lieu d'apporter des modifications à la liste électorale arrêtée le 31 mars dernier, publieront, cinq jours avant la réunion des électeurs, un tableau desdites modifications.

Art. 4. — Le ministre de l'intérieur est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à Paris, le 30 novembre 1936.

ALBERT LEBRUN.

Par le Président de la République:
Le ministre de l'intérieur,
MARX DORMOY.

Conseil de préfecture de la Seine.

Le Président de la République française,

Vu le décret du 6 septembre 1926;

Vu le décret du 3 décembre 1926;

Vu le décret du 21 octobre 1936;

Sur la proposition du ministre de l'intérieur,

Décrète:

Art. 1er. — M. Guist'hau, conseiller au conseil de préfecture de la Seine, est nommé président de section au conseil de préfecture de la Seine, en remplacement de M. Monentheuil, précédemment nommé président de ce conseil.

Art. 2. — Le ministre de l'intérieur est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à Paris, le 1er décembre 1936.

ALBERT LEBRUN.

Par le Président de la République:
Le ministre de l'intérieur,
MARX DORMOY.

Administration centrale.

Par arrêté du ministre de l'intérieur en date du 16 novembre 1936:

M. Paolacci, gardien de bureau de 8e classe du 1er décembre 1936, est promu gardien de bureau de 5e classe, au traitement annuel de 10.050 fr., à compter du 1er décembre 1936, avec une ancienneté de 1 an 7 mois et 2 jours dans cette classe (7 ans 7 mois 2 jours de bonifications pour services militaires).

M. Albertini, gardien de bureau de 8e classe du 1er décembre 1936, est promu gardien de bureau de 6e classe, au traitement annuel de 9.700 fr., à compter du 1er décembre 1936, avec une ancienneté de 1 an 5 mois et 9 jours dans cette classe (5 ans 5 mois 9 jours de bonifications pour services militaires).

M. Lecoint, gardien de bureau de 8e classe du 1er décembre 1936, est promu gardien de bureau de 5e classe, au traitement annuel de 10.050 fr., à compter du 1er décembre 1936, avec une ancienneté de 11 mois et 7 jours dans cette classe (6 ans 11 mois 7 jours de bonifications pour services militaires).

M. Baron, gardien de bureau de 8e classe du 1er décembre 1936, est promu gardien de bureau de 4e classe, au traitement annuel de 10.400 fr., à compter du 1er décembre 1936, avec une ancienneté de 1 an 4 mois et 13 jours dans cette classe (9 ans 4 mois et 13 jours de bonifications pour services militaires).

Instruction relative à l'application de la loi du 20 avril 1936, tendant à compléter la loi du 20 août 1926, instituant la médaille des évadés.

Paris, le 1er décembre 1936.

La présente instruction a pour but de fixer les règles à suivre pour l'obtention de la médaille des évadés à titre civil, dont les conditions ont été déterminées par la loi du 20 avril 1936 (*Journal officiel* du 23 avril 1936), complétant la loi du 20 août 1926 (*Journal officiel* du 25 août 1926), l'article 2 du décret du 2 octobre 1926 (*Journal officiel* du 3 octobre 1926), et la loi du 17 avril 1932 (*Journal officiel* du 28 avril 1932).

§ 1er. — *Etablissement des demandes.*

Les demandes formulées par les postulants (ou présentées à titre posthume), établies sur papier libre (avec signature légalisée), devront mentionner les renseignements suivants:

Nom, prénoms, profession et domicile de l'évadé, date et lieu de naissance, adresse actuelle et, éventuellement: classe, bureau de recrutement et affectation actuelle (armée active ou réserve).

Date (jour et heure) de l'occupation de la localité par l'ennemi.

Date et lieux de la capture et des internements successifs.

Date, lieu et récit très méticuleusement détaillés, avec tracé de l'évasion ou de *la tentative d'évasion mise réellement à exécution;* dans ce dernier cas, il y aura lieu de produire au moins deux témoignages (avec signatures légalisées) relatifs aux sanctions encourues à ce sujet; l'un de ces témoignages, au moins, devra émaner de compagnons de captivité ayant assisté à la tentative d'évasion sans y avoir participé.

Il sera nécessaire de faire parvenir la copie, certifiée conforme, par le maire ou le commissaire de police, des pièces attestant que les intéressés ont été l'objet de condamnations de la part des autorités allemandes.

Le cas échéant, il faudra indiquer:

La date et le lieu de la présentation aux autorités militaires (préciser celles-ci ou an-

TURKISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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12/9
DEC 9 1936
RAH-FMC
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 14 1936

The Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable Secretary of State and has, in accordance with the instructions of his Government, the honor to inform him that the Convention concerning the regime of the Straits signed at Montreux on July 20th 1936, and the dispositions of which had been provisionally enacted since August 15th, 1936, has definitively come into force as from the date of November 9th, 1936, when the fact that the deposit in the Archives of the French Republic of the required number of ratifications by the signatory powers was duly established in a procès -verbal drawn up on this effect.

December 7th, 1936.

M. M. E.

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Secretary of State,
The Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

TREATY DIVISION
DEC 10 1936
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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767.68119/961

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compli-
ments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Turkey and has
the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ambassador's
note of December 7, 1936, conveying the information that
the Straits Convention signed at Montreux on July 20, [illegible]
definitely came into force on November 9, 1936 upon the
deposit in the archives of the French Republic of the re-
quired number of ratifications.

Department of State,

Washington,

DEC 12 1936

NE:RAH:FMC:SS

12/9

No. 2001 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland, January 7, 1937.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 25 1937
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JAN 22 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 3

767.68119/992

SUBJECT: Régime of the Straits - Changes in the Rôle of the League as a Result of the Montreux Convention.

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1937 JAN 21 PM 4 1
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

M
E PL
D N I
JAN 20 1937

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose, as of probable interest to the Department, an informal memorandum, which was prepared at my request by Mr. Field of the League Secretariat, concerning the changes in the rôle played by the League respecting the régime of the Straits in peace time brought about by the Montreux Convention of last July.

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note
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It will be noted that under the régime of the Straits which existed prior to the Montreux Convention and was based on the Lausanne Convention of 1923 the Straits Commission transmitted to the powers concerned semi-annual reports on the strongest Black Sea fleet and immediate reports on any alterations in that fleet resulting from passage of any vessel thereof into or out of the Black Sea. By arrangement between the Commission and the League Council the League Secretariat was the intermediary for the transmission of these reports. Under the Montreux Convention the Turkish Government furnishes semi-annual

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FEB 10 1937

TREATY DIVISION
FEB 5 - 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

reports

reports on all Black Sea fleets to the powers concerned while the immediate notifications of changes are discontinued. The Secretary General of the League likewise receives the semi-annual information, and distributes it on his own account.

A second feature of the Lausanne régime was the submission by the Straits Commission of an annual report to the League. Under the Montreux Convention this annual report is submitted by the Turkish Government to the High Contracting Parties and to the League.

I am submitting this information as indicative of the limitations of Geneva as a source of information regarding developments respecting the Straits in time of peace.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosure: The memorandum by Mr. Field.

Original and four copies to Department of State.
One copy to the American Legation, Bern.
One copy to the American Embassy, Istanbul.

EPL/DH

Enclosure No 1
with No 209 of Political
January 7 1937

Copy

MEMORANDUM

1. Paragraph 2(a) of the Annex to Article 2 of the Lausanne Convention provided that the Straits Commission would on each first of July and December obtain and transmit to the Powers concerned information as to the composition of the strongest naval force in the Black Sea; it would also immediately inform these Powers of any alteration in that force resulting from passage of any vessel thereof into or out of the Black Sea. The President of the Straits Commission having requested, and the League Council, on September 10, 1925, having agreed, that the duty of informing the powers concerned should be carried out through the intermediary of the League Secretariat (C.596. M.190.1925.VII, October 1st, 1925), the Secretary General has, since that time, semi-annually communicated to the League Members and to the U.S.A. (and, before they entered into the League, to Germany, Russia and Turkey) the Straits Commission's notes concerning the composition of the Russian fleet - the last one having been distributed in February 1936 (1). In addition it has from time to time communicated any changes in the Soviet fleet resulting from passage through the Straits.

Under the Montreux Convention (Article 18(d)), it is the Turkish Government which is to furnish the semi-annual information, not only to the High Contracting Parties but also to the Secretary-General of the League; the data, moreover, are to cover not only the U.S.S.R. fleet but all Black Sea fleets. The first such notification was distributed by the League last August (see Extract No. 107 of Official Journal, C.P.C. 350). On the other hand, the Montreux Convention no longer requires immediate notification of intervening changes.

2. In addition, the Lausanne Convention, in Article 15, required that the Straits Commission address an annual report to the League, giving an account of its activities, and furnishing all information which might be useful in the interests of commerce and navigation.

The Montreux Convention contains a similar requirement in the last paragraph of Article 24, except that the annual report will be prepared and sent by the Turkish Government itself, not only to the League but also to the H.C.P. The report, moreover, is to contain also information as to the movement in the Straits of foreign war ships.

N.H.Field.

(1) See Extract No. 106 of Official Journal (C.P.C.345).

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 242

Bucharest, January 23, 1937.

Subject: Rumanian Announcement of Entry into Force of New Straits Convention.

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 12 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 12 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

TREATY DIVISION
FEB 16 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 9 - 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 8 1937
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FILED
FEB 20 1937

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the MONITORUL OFICIAL (No. 17) of January 22, 1937, carried the following announcement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (translated from Rumanian):

> "The Convention with regard to the Straits Regime, signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936, whose provisions were applied provisionally from August 15, 1936, entered definitively into force on November 9, 1936, in conformity with Article 26 of that Convention."

Respectfully yours,

Frederick P. Hibbard

Frederick P. Hibbard,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

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LEGAL ADVISER
JUN 14 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 3 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 209 Istanbul, February 5, 1937.

Subject: Régime of the Straits: Minutes of the Montreux Conference.

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No
To the Field
In U. S. A.

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1937 FEB 23 PM 2 58
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Letter to Mary
2/26/37
NE: RAW: EJR

February 26 1937

TREATY DIVISION
JUN 9 - 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 5 - 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 24 1937
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

767.881/19/994

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
FEB 24 1937

FILED
JUN 11 1937

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 156 of November 13, 1936, in the third paragraph of which I reported that, in conversation with Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, I had taken the opportunity to suggest that he formally communicate to me under cover of a note a copy of the official publication (then in preparation) of the Minutes of the Montreux Conference.

Dr. Aras was good enough to forward to me, with a note dated January 13, 1937, one copy of that publication,

together

together with a French translation of the discourse with which he had presented the Convention to the Grand National Assembly, on July 31, 1936, for
1/ ratification. I enclose herewith a copy of his note and of its enclosures. (It is regretted that only a single copy of the publication in question -- "*Actes de la Conférence de Montreux concernant le régime des Détroits, 22 juin - 20 juillet 1936"; published by Editions A. Pedone, 13, Rue Soufflot, Paris Vº; price, French francs 65.00 -- has been obtainable for forwarding to the Department.)

2/ I also enclose a copy of the reply to Dr. Aras's note, which I have prepared for delivery to him, under date of February 10, upon his return to Turkey. It will be noted that this reply takes cognizance of his assurances that the benefits of the Convention would accrue, without discrimination, to signatories and to non-signatories of the Montreux Convention.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMURRAY

3 ✓

Enclosures:
1. Copy of note from Dr. Aras, January 13, 1937, together with enclosures; and
2. Reply thereto, February 10, 1937.

*ENCLOSURE FILED IN OVERFLOW FILES.
DATE FILED 6-10-37
Sup

Copies sent to Embassies in Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tokyo; Legations in Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia; and Consulate in Geneva.

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MacM:KOS

Enclosure No. / to Despatch No. 209

of February from the Embassy at Istanbul.

C O P Y.

TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI
Hariciye Vekâleti

775/5

Ankara, le 13 Janvier 1937.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à Votre Excellence, sous pli séparé, pour l'information de Son Gouvernement, les procès-verbaux de la Conférence de Montreux du 20 juillet 1936, ainsi que la traduction du discours que j'avais prononcé à la Grande Assemblée Nationale, en date du 31 juillet 1936, lors de la ratification de la Convention.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

(s) DR. T. R. ARAS.

SON EXCELLENCE

Monsieur J. Mac Murray,
Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

A n k a r a

er

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No.

of February from the Embassy at Istanbul.

C O P Y

DISCOURSE DELIVERED BY TURKISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BEFORE THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON JULY 31, 1936.

Mes Chers Collègues,

Le Livre Blanc qui avait déjà été présenté au Kamutay concernant la question des Détroits, contenait les Notes échangées entre les Puissances intéressées et nous-mêmes; Le Livre Blanc No. 2 qui fut présenté ce matin comprend les traductions des Procès-Verbaux des séances publiques de la Conférence de Montreux. Ces deux documents me dispensent de fournir des détails sur les phases de cette question qui ont été suivies de très près par Votre Haute Assemblée, conjointement à l'intérêt et à l'enthousiasme que tous les concitoyens sans exception ont de tout temps témoigné à l'égard de notre clause au sujet des Détroits. Les copies du projet que nous avons proposé à la Conférence et qui a été adopté d'abord comme base de discussion, de même que les exemplaires de la Convention des Détroits signée à l'issue de la Conférence et soumis aujourd'hui à votre haute approbation, se trouvent depuis hier entre les mains des très honorables membres de Votre Haute Assemblée.

Vous vous êtes certainement fait une idée précise de ce résultat concret de la politique que le Gouvernement de la République a poursuivie avec une volonté et une décision inébranlable et de l'activité qu'il a déployée dans cette question. De même, chacun de vous a déjà vu et étudié la Convention. Par ailleurs, il vous sera donné maintenant lecture du rapport de la Haute Commission Mixte que vous avez constituée, suivant notre procédure habituelle, pour étudier la Convention.

L'exposé des motifs résume bien la Convention des Détroits. Je m'abstiendrai donc d'entrer dans les détails de la Convention et je me contenterai de m'arrêter sur ses caractéristiques. Je tiens cependant à faire auparavant un exposé succint sur la génèse de notre dernière démarche au sujet de la question des Détroits, démarche qui a abouti à la Conférence de Montreux.

Notre Grand Chef Atatürk faisait toujours observer que

la révision de la Convention des Détroits signée à Lausanne était une nécessité qui s'imposerait tôt ou tard. Et chaque fois qu'une question militaire était débattue au sein du Gouvernement touchant la défense de notre pays, le Maréchal Çakmak, Chef du Grand Etat-Major Général, ne manquait de relever les inconvénients de l'état de démilitarisation des Détroits. Ce fut au moment où, ayant élaboré avec mon collaborateur Numan Menemencioğlu, je présentais à l'approbation de mon chef Ismet Inönü, les lignes essentielles du discours que notre délégué à Génève allait prononcer pour exprimer les vues posé par l'ex-Premier anglais M. Mac Donald, à la Commission du Désarmement, que mon éminent Président m'a signifié que le moment était venu de soulever la question des Détroits. C'est sur cette directive que notre Département des Affaires Etrangères s'est mis à l'oeuvre, et il n'a manqué aucune occasion pour exécuter pleinement les instructions de notre éminent Président du Conseil. Vous en connaissez bien les phases ultérieures, ainsi que je vous les ai exposées tout à l'heure.

L'une des caractéristiques essentielles de la Convention soumise à votre Haute approbation réside dans le fait que notre Souveraineté pleine et entière sur ce territoire, qui constitue non seulement une partie intégrante de notre pays, mais qui relie en même temps l'une à l'autre ses parties inséparables, a été consacrée par la voie pacifique, aussi bien que d'une façon amicale, et que notre droit de fortifier les Détroits qu'exigeait la défense du pays, a été reconnu dès la signature de la Convention.

Les stipulations concernant les Îles de Lemnos et de Samothrace appartenant à la Grèce voisine et amie, qui avaient été démilitarisées par la Convention de Lausanne de 1923, se trouvent aussi abrogées par la Convention de Montreux, ce dont nous nous réjouissons également.

A cette occasion, je tiens à relever une fois de plus une des caractéristiques de la politique de la nouvelle Turquie: souhaiter également, pour nos amis ce que nous souhaitons pour nous-mêmes, et ne pas souhaiter, pour nos amis et aussi pour aucune autre Puissance, tout ce que nous considérerions comme injuste à notre égard.

L'une des stipulations de la Convention de Montreux, qui a fourni à la Presse Mondiale l'occasion de verser beaucoup d'encre, est celle du deuxième alinéa de l'article 19. Je voudrais devant vous en exposer la portée et la nature, telles quelles.

L'alinéa en question dit:

"Toutefois, il sera interdit aux bâtiments de guerre "de toutes Puissances belligérantes de passer à travers "les Détroits, sauf dans les cas rentrant dans l'applica-

"tion

"tion de l'article 25 de la présente Convention, ainsi "que dans le cas d'assistance à prêter à un Etat victime "d'une agression, en vertu d'un Traité d'assistance mu- "tuelle engageant la Turquie, conclue dans le cadre du "Pacte de la Société des Nations, enregistrée et publiée "conformément aux dispositions de l'article 18 dudit "Pacte."

La signification claire de cette clause est que les Hautes Parties Contractantes de la Convention ont confiance dans la politique pacifiste et l'attitude correcte de la Turquie. En effet, personne au monde ne devrait douter que nous allons appliquer intégralement tous les articles de la Convention de Montreux, non seulement à l'égard des Contractants, mais aussi à l'égard de tous les Etats, sans établir aucune distinction entre eux. Tout le passé de la nouvelle Turquie en est mon témoin impartiale.

Du haut de cette tribune je me fais un agréable devoir d'exprimer mes remerciements à toutes les Puissances Contractantes qui ont montré dès le début qu'elles nous avaient bien compris et à tous les pays amis et bienveillants qui, sans avoir participé à la Conférence par suite de leur position géographique ou pour des raisons qui n'ont aucun rapport avec nous et avec la question des Détroits, ont, par leur presse et par toute leur attitude, soutenu notre thèse et se sont réjouis du résultat obtenu.

Je prie la Haute Assemblée de vouloir bien ratifier par la procédure d'urgence cette Convention que je considère comme le début d'une ère de prospérité salutaire pour notre pays.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 209

of February from the Embassy at Istanbul.

C O P Y

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ankara,
February 10, 1937.

Mr. Minister:

I have the honor to acknowledge and to thank Your Excellency for the note of January 13 with which you were so good as to communicate to me a copy of the minutes of the Montreux Conference leading to the conclusion of the Convention of July 20, 1936, concerning the Régime of the Straits, together with a translation of the discourse which Your Excellency delivered before the Grand National Assembly on July 31, last.

I have had much satisfaction in transmitting Your Excellency's letter and its accompaniments to my Government, pointing out to it particularly that in your discourse presenting the Montreux Convention to the Grand National Assembly for ratification, Your Excellency had stressed the fact that the benefits of that Convention accrue alike to the signatories and to non-signatory states, without distinction.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) J. V. A. MacMURRAY.

His Excellency
Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Turkish Republic,
Ankara.

er

February 26 1937

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/994

767.68119/994

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and, referring to the Department's communication of December 11, 1936, regarding the new régime of the Straits following the conclusion of the Montreux Convention, transmits another despatch from the Embassy in Istanbul on this subject. Particular attention is invited in this connection to the Ambassador's note of February 10 to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, wherein the Ambassador takes the occasion to affirm his understanding that the benefits of the Convention accrue alike to signatory and to non-signatory states, without distinction.

NE RAH/EG
2/26/37

FEB 26 1937

767.68119

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.65/332 FOR MEMO

FROM State Department Western European Affairs (DUNN) DATED Jan. 4, 1937
NAME

TO

REGARDING: Memorandum of conversation with the British Ambassador, who stated that the British Government had instructed its Ambassador in Rome, to endeavor to induce the Italian Government to adhere to the Straits Convention negotiated at Montreux.

ge

767.68119/995

TURKISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 MAR 2 AM 10 27

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Ack. and Letter to Navy 3/4/37 NE/RA N/EG.

March 5 1937

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
MAR 2 1937
Same on 1994
(from Istanbul)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 2 1937
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit herewith, for information, a copy of the "Actes de la Conférence de Montreux", relating to the regime of the Straits.

Enclosure sent to Navy: duplicate.

DIVISION
OF EASTERN
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 - 1937
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

February 26th, 1937.

DIVISION OF WESTERN
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 1937
DEPARTMENT OF

767.68119/996

1 Enclosure

The Honorable Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

TREATY DIVISION
MAR 10 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILED
JUL 29 1937

767.68119/996

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Turkey and acknowledges with thanks the receipt of the Ambassador's note of February 26, 1937, transmitting a copy of the "Actes de la Conférence de Montreux", relating to the régime of the Straits.

Department of State,

Washington,

March 5 1937

MAR 5 1937 PM

767.68119/996

NE RAH/EG
3/4/37

A true copy of the original

March 5 1937

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/996

767.68119/996

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and, with reference to the Department's communication of February 26, 1937, transmitting a copy of a despatch dated February 5 from the American Ambassador in Turkey, regarding the new régime of the Straits following the conclusion of the Montreux Convention, transmits herewith a copy of the "Actes de la Conférence de Montreux", being the Minutes of the Montreux Conference, which publication has kindly been furnished the Department by the Ambassador of Turkey in Washington. It may be observed that this is the publication mentioned in the despatch of February 5 as being transmitted in single copy, for which reason a copy was not available for distribution to the Navy Department with this Department's letter of February 26.

Enclosure:
"Actes de la
Conférence
de Montreux.

MAR 6 1937 PM

NE RAH/EG
3/4/37

A true copy of the signed original

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LEGAL ADVISER
MAR 17 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Istanbul, Turkey, February 16, 1937.

No. 216

Subject: Régime of the Straits: Maps Delimiting Militarized Zones.

TREATY DIVISION
MAR 26 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 15 1937

FOR DISTRIBUTION
To the Field
In U. S. A.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1937 MAR 10 AM
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

HISTORICAL ADVISER
MAR 29 1937
DEPT. OF STATE

Letter to Navy 3/12/37 NE/RA/EG

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 11 1937
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Office of the Geographer
MAR 29 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
MAR 10 1937
* Four of each received

1 copy of each map filed in HA-Geo: (1) 388.4 hak 1937 T (2) 388.7 hak 1937 T

767.68119/997

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 209 of February 5, 1937, and previous correspondence relating to the Montreux Conference and the régime of the Straits, I have the honor to enclose herewith two copies each of (1) a map showing the militarized zones of the Bosphorus, and (2) a map showing the militarized zones of the Dardanelles.

These maps were obtained for the Embassy from the Ministry of National Defense by Major Royden Williamson, the Embassy's Military Attaché, who has forwarded copies of them to the War Department.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMurray

J. V. A. MacMurray.

Enclosures:
(1) and (2) - Maps.

880
FEF:mej

Copy of accompanying documents stamped to be filed to DCR
JUL 23 1937

March 15 1937

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/997

767.68119/997

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and, with reference to previous correspondence regarding the Montreux Convention governing the régime of the Straits, transmits herewith two maps showing the new demilitarized zones of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, together with a copy of the despatch from the Embassy at Istanbul under cover of which the maps were received.

Enclosures:
Two maps.
Despatch from Istanbul,
No. 216, February 16, 1937.

MAR 15 1937.

NE RAH/EG

A true copy of the signed original

767.68119/997

Çanakkale ve Civarının 1:400,000 Mikyaslı 2. Memnu mıntaka hudutlarını gösterir kroki.




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767.68119/997

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS



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Yum Br.
Galara Br.
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

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
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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 16, 1937.

A-M

Judge Moore:

With regard to my memorandum of March 10, 1937 giving excerpts from a personal letter received from Mr. G. Howland Shaw, Counselor of the Embassy at Istanbul, concerning the present international position of Turkey, there is attached 767.68119/798 a despatch from the Embassy at Istanbul giving certain supplemental facts on this subject which were brought out in the course of a conversation between Mr. Shaw and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office.

Wallace Murray

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, Turkey, February 20, 1937.

No. 220

Subject: Conversation with Numan Menemencioglu, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Mr. Shaw, Counselor of this Embassy, having returned from home leave and resumed residence at Ankara on special duty, recently took occasion to request an interview with Numan Menemencioglu, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office, with a view to his own "education" concerning the latest phases of Turkey's international situation. In view of their old friendship, Numan Bey set forth quite frankly the Turkish viewpoint upon current developments, in a conversation of which Mr. Shaw has given me the following report:

"Numan

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"Numan Bey first of all analysed the European situation. He said that as a result of the British-Italian gentleman's agreement and the Turkish-Italian conversations which followed logically from that agreement, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean had greatly improved. In the Western Mediterranean, of course, with the Spanish mess, things seemed to get worse all the time and nobody could say what would or would not happen. Naturally, the great problem in Europe is Germany and everything that the other countries do seems calculated to advance the German game. England clearly will avoid taking any real stand on anything until she has re-armed. In France the German contention that the present European crisis is due to the Franco-Soviet treaty is, strange as it may seem, beginning to find supporters. At any rate, the French have not concluded the military agreements called for under their treaty with the Soviets and the latter are therefore in a state of complete uncertainty as to whether the treaty is worth anything at all. The Italians are sometimes with the Germans and sometimes with the English. Europe, in short, is in a state of complete 'incorrection' with the Germans constantly trying to see just how far they can go and desiring to go just as far as possible before England is in a position to take a definite stand. Numan Bey expressed anxiety lest some sort of German attack on the 'Corridor' be launched in the more immediate future. As to giving Germany back her colonies, he said he thought the English weren't so enthusiastic over these territories as to be unwilling to part with them, but if she did so, some very ticklish problems would arise. Other countries would put in a claim for colonies and insist on 'access to raw materials' and where would the process stop? And if the colonies were returned to Germany, it would certainly be impossible for the Western Powers to sit back while a strenghened Germany went to war with the Soviets and Czechoslovakia.

"As to the attitude of Italy towards the Montreux Convention, Numan Bey said the Italians had raised two questions one of which was not clear to him and the other of which presented serious difficulties. The Italians had first of all insisted that they must be treated on a footing of complete equality with the signatories of the Convention. To this the Turks had pointed out that, if the Italians adhered to the Convention, they would naturally be on a footing of equality with signatories. Numan Bey evidently suspects there is more than meets the eye in this Italian demand. The second point is that, if the Italians do adhere to the Convention, they will do so with reservations as to the rôle of the League of Nations substantially similar to the Japanese reservations.

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Since the Italians were still members of the League, Numan Bey thought this was a rather singular point to raise. Of course, if they got out, then things would be quite different. Count Ciano, it seems, did press Dr. Aras for de jure recognition of Ethiopian annexation. Dr. Aras had replied that Turkey in withdrawing her Legation at Addis had given de facto recognition, but that any de jure recognition must come from Geneva. He undertook, however, to help on the cause at Geneva.

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"Numan Bey said it was quite true the Germans had raised the question of the Montreux Convention. They had sent a note to which a reply would be made shortly and the German Ambassador had recently come to see him. The conversation, I gathered, was distinctly spirited on Numan Bey's side. The Ambassador had started off by saying that Germany's historical interest in the Straits had not been recognized at Montreux. To this, Numan Bey had replied that Montreux was linked with Lausanne and Lausanne had been Lausanne because Turkey and Germany had been defeated in the Great War. It would be very nice if Lausanne and Versailles could be entirely wiped out, but how could it be done? Did the Ambassador wish to claim for Germany the pre-war régime when the Straits were completely closed? It seems the Ambassador did not, but that his Government had in mind putting on record a general reservation to the Montreux Convention and in connection therewith had desired the Ambassador to have an exploratory conversation. Numan Bey pointed out that in talking of Germany's historical interest it was clear that the Ambassador was, not in the field of legal rights, but in that of politics pure and simple. It was obviously an attempt to hit at the Russians, but in trying to hit the Russians, the Germans were bringing up the question of Turkish sovereignty. The Turks had agreed to give certain rights to war vessels of all countries, whether signatory to the Convention or not, but of course on the tacit assumption that these countries recognized Turkish sovereignty and the conditions laid down in the Convention. If Germany for purely political reasons attacked the Convention by putting on record a general reservation, then clearly Turkey was within her rights in closing the Straits to any German vessel. Numan Bey then went on to discuss the practical aspects of the German position. If there were peace then no question arose at all. If there were war between Germany and Russia, Turkey being neutral, then the fleet of neither could pass through the Straits. If Turkey were allied with Russia, then of course they would do everything possible to sink the German fleet and if allied with Germany, they would do the same to the Russian fleet. The famous case of the GOEBEN and BRESLAU was apparently brought up and Numan Bey pointed out that at that time

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Turkey was not tied by any international engagement. The situation was quite different now. The Ambassador referred to the possibility of the Russian Black Sea fleet sailing out and attacking Germany in the Baltic. Numan Bey asked the Ambassador whether he thought it likely that the Russian Black Sea fleet which according to him consisted of two ships the seaworthiness of which was open to question, would take the risk of fighting the modern and efficient German fleet and leave the Russian Black Sea coast completely without defense.

"On Germany's domination of the Turkish market, Numan Bey said that he did not favor any exclusive or quasi-exclusive political or economic tie-up between Turkey and any country. He said he had warned Mr. Schacht that Turkey would be compelled to take measures to control her exports. Some progress in the direction of a sounder diversification had been made with England and Holland, although trade with France amounted to nothing. He said he had submitted the problem of what to do about Turkey's exports to Germany to Celal Bey and Faik Kurtoglu. He suggested that some system of bounties on imports from countries other than Germany might be used. I said I didn't think this would be of much help to those who couldn't buy in the Turkish market because of the high prices given by the Germans. He said there might also have to be some sort of bounties for exports as well.

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"Concerning the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Treaty, Numan Bey told me that when Stoyadinovitch had consulted them about it, the Turks had taken the position that it would be a good move as tending to bring the Bulgarians out of their isolation and make it more difficult for them to tie up with some non-Balkan Power. Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country in a position to do the trick. Turkey already had a treaty with Bulgaria; there were still some questions outstanding between Rumania and Bulgaria and clearly the Greeks weren't likely to make a treaty with Bulgaria. As to any Bulgarian-Yugoslav union, Numan Bey didn't think that the possibility enters into the sphere of practical international politics because such a union would involve doing away with the Bulgarian dynasty. He did not deny the possibility of German influence at Belgrade, but felt that it could not get very far, as the Yugoslavs knew that if they should really turn Berlin-wards they would have a solid Turkish, Bulgarian and Greek combination against them in their rear."

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Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMurray.

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Copies to London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Geneva, Belgrade, and Sofia.

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